| Myers v Myers |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05228 [119 AD3d 1114] |
| July 10, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| 1 Christina A. Myers, Appellant, v Thomas E. Myers,Respondent. |
Cynthia Feathers, Glens Falls, for appellant.
Maxwell & Van Ryn, Delmar (Paul W. Van Ryn of counsel), forrespondent.
Clark, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Connolly, J.), entered June6, 2013 in Albany County, ordering, among other things, equitable distribution of theparties' marital property, upon a decision of the court.
Six years before the parties' marriage in June 2000, plaintiff (hereinafter the wife)became the sole owner of real property, which would later become the parties' maritalresidence. At the time of marriage, the wife owned the property free and clear of anyliens or encumbrances. In 2005, apparently in an effort to consolidate debt, defendant(hereinafter the husband) and the wife jointly applied for a mortgage on the property. Tosatisfy the requirements of the mortgage lender, the husband's name had to appear on thedeed to the residence.[FN*] Thus, on March 31, 2005, the wifeexecuted a deed conveying ownership of the residence from her alone to both her and thehusband. A mortgage was issued jointly to the parties that same day.
In December 2011, the wife commenced this action for divorce on the basis that theparties' marriage was irretrievably broken. The parties executed an interim agreement, aswell as a subsequent stipulation and opting out agreement, resolving all issues but thedistribution of the marital residence and the debt attached thereto, which had amountedto approximately $160,000. [*2]Thereafter, the actionproceeded to trial, following which Supreme Court issued a decision and order finding,among other things, that the marital residence and its accompanying debt should beequally divided between the parties. A judgment of divorce subsequently incorporatedSupreme Court's earlier findings and this appeal by the wife ensued.
The wife contends that Supreme Court erred in denying her a separate propertyorigination credit in the amount of $165,000 for the estimated value of the maritalresidence at the time that she transferred it to herself and the husband jointly. In denyingsuch credit, Supreme Court indicated that it was bound by our prior decision in Campfield v Campfield (95AD3d 1429 [2012], lv dismissed 20 NY3d 914 [2012], lv denied 21NY3d 857 [2013]). Specifically, Supreme Court referred to the portion ofCampfield that differentiated between a credit for marital property that is"acqui[red]" from separate property—i.e., by using the proceeds of the sale ofseparate property to purchase marital property—and marital property thatoriginates from the "transmut[ation]" of separate property—i.e., by transferring thedeed of separately held property into joint names (id. at 1430). On appeal, thewife urges the overruling of this portion of Campfield, arguing that it isinconsistent with the general principles of equitable distribution law.
Unlike the appellant in Campfield, the wife here admits that the property inquestion is marital. In particular, she agrees that the residence became marital propertysubject to equitable distribution upon her transfer of the deed into the parties' joint namesin 2005 (see Alecca vAlecca, 111 AD3d 1127, 1128 [2013]; Murray v Murray, 101 AD3d 1320, 1321 [2012], lvdismissed 20 NY3d 1085 [2013]). Therefore, this case is distinguishable fromCampfield. As such, we need not address the wife's argument that transfer of thedeed was intended " 'solely for the purpose of convenience,' " aconsideration that is relevant only in determining whether property is marital or separatein the first instance (Currie vMcTague, 83 AD3d 1184, 1185 [2011], quoting Kay v Kay, 302 AD2d711, 713 [2003]).
However, to the limited extent that Campfield may be read to limit a court'sdiscretion to award a separate property credit to a spouse, like the wife, who transmutesseparate property into marital property without changing the nature of the property itself,it should no longer be followed. As we have subsequently noted without reference to theway in which a marital asset was acquired, credits are often given for the value of theformer separate property (see Murray v Murray, 101 AD3d at 1321). We havealso subsequently explained that the decision to award a separate property originationcredit in such a situation is a determination left to the sound discretion of Supreme Court(see Alecca v Alecca, 111 AD3d at 1128; Murray v Murray, 101 AD3d at1321). Therefore, our own jurisprudence subsequent to Campfield indicates thatsuch credit is not precluded as a matter of law when separate property has beentransmuted into marital property.
Despite the foregoing, we are nonetheless unpersuaded that the denial of the wife'srequest for a separate property origination credit under the specific circumstances hereinconstitutes an abuse of discretion. Supreme Court's thorough decision properlyconsidered the relevant statutory factors required of a decision awarding equitabledistribution (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d]) andfound that "the overall picture is of the parties engaging generally in a financialpartnership, of which the marital residence, and the loans thereupon, was simply oneagreed-upon portion." In this regard, a review of the record reveals that the fundsreceived from the mortgage, as well as the subsequent refinancing and home equity loan,enabled the wife and the husband to consolidate their debts, go on numerous familyvacations, make [*3]improvements to the maritalresidence and, generally, live a lifestyle that may have been above their means. Notably,the wife's individual debt was eliminated by the proceeds of a new, jointly-held debtwhich, in turn, was primarily paid from the husband's income for a number of years.Inasmuch as a separate property origination credit "is not strictly mandated since theproperty is no longer separate, but is part of the total marital property" (Murray vMurray, 101 AD3d at 1321), we cannot say that Supreme Court improperly deniedthe wife a credit based upon the entirety of the record before us. Accordingly, welikewise find no error in Supreme Court's determination that the marital residence and itsassociated debt should be equally divided between the parties.
Lahtinen, J.P., Stein, Egan Jr. and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote *:Based upon her limitedincome, the wife was unable to qualify for a mortgage on her own.