| A. Cappione, Inc. v Cappione |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05230 [119 AD3d 1121] |
| July 10, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| 1 A. Cappione, Inc., et al., Respondents, v Marc J.Cappione et al., Appellants. |
Menter, Rudin & Trivelpiece, PC, Syracuse (Julian B. Modesti of counsel), forappellants.
Hodgson Russ, LLP, Buffalo (Ryan K. Cummings of counsel), for respondents.
Egan Jr., J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Demarest, J.), enteredMay 28, 2013 in St. Lawrence County, which, among other things, granted plaintiffs'cross motion for summary judgment declaring, among other things, that defendant MarcJ. Cappione was required to sell his shares in plaintiff A. Cappione, Inc., (2) from anorder of said court, entered November 6, 2013 in St. Lawrence County, which, amongother things, granted plaintiffs' motion to compel Marc J. Cappione's compliance with theprior order, and (3) from an order of said court, entered December 4, 2013 in St.Lawrence County, which, among other things, partially denied defendants' motion forreconsideration.
At all times relevant, defendant Marc J. Cappione (hereinafter Cappione) andplaintiffs David P. Cappione and John R. Cappione each owned a one-third shareholderinterest in plaintiff A. Cappione, Inc., a closely held, family corporation engaged in thebusiness of wholesale beer distribution, which includes an exclusive distributionagreement with Anheuser-Busch, Inc. As a distributor of alcoholic beverages, thecorporation was subject to the licensing requirements, rules and regulations of the StateLiquor Authority (see Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 17).Following Cappione's felony conviction of attempted dissemination of indecent materialsto a minor in the first degree, for which he currently is serving a term of imprisonment,the corporation's board of directors voted in July 2011 to retroactively terminateCappione's employment effective March 30, 2011. Pursuant to the shareholders'agreement, Cappione's [*2]involuntary loss ofemployment entitled the corporation to purchase his ownership interest therein. To thatend, an independent valuation of the corporation was conducted in accordance with theterms of the shareholders' agreement and, in May 2012, a report was issued valuingCappione's shares in excess of $911,000 as of March 31, 2011.
Subsequent efforts to redeem Cappione's shares met with resistance, promptingplaintiffs to commence this declaratory judgment action seeking, among other things, tocompel Cappione to sell his ownership shares pursuant to the terms of the shareholders'agreement.[FN*]Defendants' pre-answer motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint, wherein defendants argued that the corporationfailed to exercise its purchase option in strict compliance with the time limits set forth inthe shareholders' agreement and, therefore, Cappione should be permitted to retain hisownership interest. Plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment noting, among otherthings, that Cappione, as a convicted felon, was precluded from engaging in thetrafficking of alcoholic beverages (see Alcoholic Beverage Control Law§ 126 [1]). By order entered May 28, 2013, Supreme Court, among otherthings, granted plaintiffs' cross motion, without prejudice to defendants' right—asper the shareholders' agreement—to dispute the valuation of the shares.Defendants thereafter appealed from the May 2013 order.
Plaintiffs subsequently moved, by order to show cause, to enforce the May 2013order, and defendants cross-moved for a stay pending appeal. By order enteredNovember 6, 2013, Supreme Court, among other things, granted plaintiffs' motion anddirected that Cappione's shares be turned over to plaintiffs' counsel within seven days.Defendants appealed from the November 2013 order and, further, moved before thisCourt for a temporary restraining order and a stay of enforcement of both the May 2013and November 2013 orders. A Justice of this Court denied the requested temporaryrestraining order and set a return date for the motion. Defendants then moved beforeSupreme Court seeking, among other things, to renew their application for a stay pendingthis Court's determination of their motion. By order entered December 4, 2013, SupremeCourt, among other things, granted defendants' motion to the extent that enforcement ofthe prior orders was stayed until a determination of defendants' then pending motionbefore this Court. This Court thereafter denied the requested stay and, pursuant to theterms of Supreme Court's December 2013 order, Cappione's shares immediatelytransferred to plaintiffs. Defendants now appeal from the December 2013 order aswell.
We affirm. A shareholders' agreement—like any other contract—shouldbe enforced according to its terms (see Matter of Penepent Corp., 96 NY2d 186,192 [2001]). In so doing, "[t]he contract must be read as a whole to determine its purposeand intent, and it should be interpreted in a way [that] reconciles all its provisions, ifpossible" (Matter of El-RohRealty Corp., 74 AD3d 1796, 1799 [2010] [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted]). To that end, "the goal should be a practical construction of thelanguage used so that the reasonable expectations of the parties are realized" (Currier, McCabe & Assoc.,Inc. v Maher, 75 AD3d 889, [*3]891-892[2010]), and "the contract must be interpreted so as to give effect to, not nullify, itsgeneral or primary purpose" (Matter of El-Roh Realty Corp., 74 AD3d at 1799[internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Here, the shareholders' agreement reflects "[t]he shareholders['] desire to establish amarket value for their shares, to effectively control the management of the company, fortheir mutual best interests, and to protect against divisive relationships which would ariseif outsiders with incompatible management philosophies gained interests in thecompany." Consistent with that stated objective, the agreement further recognizes that"[t]he company is dependent upon and derives substantial benefit from the continuedactive interest and participation of those shareholders who participate in the managementof the company." In an attempt to preserve the closely held nature of the corporation, theagreement provides that when a shareholder's employment with the corporation ceases,"he or she shall be treated as though he or she were selling all of his or her shares underparagraph A of . . . [s]ection [t]wo [of the agreement]," which outlines theprocedures to be followed when a shareholder, during the course of his or her lifetime,"transfer[s] any of his or her shares to anyone other than a family member." In such case,the shareholder is to give notice of his or her intention to sell and, "[f]or a period of thirty[30] days after the notice is delivered, the [corporation] shall have an option to purchaseall or any part of the offered shares on the payment terms specified in [s]ection [f]our [ofthe agreement]." If the corporation does not exercise such option, then the remainingshareholders are granted an additional 30-day option to purchase any or all of theavailable shares.
Here, the corporation's board of directors voted to purchase Cappione's shares onJuly 5, 201—the same day Cappione was terminated from his employment due tohis criminal conduct. According to defendants, because Cappione's termination wasmade retroactive to March 30, 2011, the corporation necessarily did not exercise itsoption to purchase his shares within the 30-day period set forth in the shareholders'agreement and, therefore, he is entitled to retain his ownership interest in the corporation.Assuming, without deciding, that the retroactive termination date adopted by thecorporation necessarily rendered its option to purchase untimely, the underlyingshareholders' agreement nonetheless is not amenable to the strained construction nowurged by defendants.
There is no question that the shareholders' agreement does not expressly address theprecise situation posed here—namely, where the corporation (in the form of DavidCappione and John Cappione) purportedly fails to exercise its purchase option within theinitial 30-day window, there are no "other shareholders" remaining to exercise thepurchase option outlined in section two, paragraph A of the agreement and theshareholder whose shares are sought to be purchased not only is no longer employed bythe corporation but, more to the point, by virtue of his underlying felony conviction, isstatutorily precluded from trafficking in alcoholic beverages. That said, reading theagreement as a whole and affording it a practical construction that is consistent with andgives proper effect to the parties' stated intentions (see Currier, McCabe &Assoc., Inc. v Maher, 75 AD3d at 891-892), we are satisfied that Supreme Courtproperly granted plaintiffs' motion to compel Cappione to sell his shares to thecorporation—even if that option to purchase was not timely exercised. To holdotherwise and permit Cappione to retain his shares due to the asserted noncompliancewith the time period set forth in the shareholders' agreement not only would effectivelyrewrite the parties' agreement and undermine its stated purpose, i.e., to retain managerialcontrol within the closely held family corporation, but would place the corporation at riskof losing its distributor's license, thereby rendering its stock worthless. Furthermore, asaptly noted by Supreme Court, there is no discernible prejudice flowing from the [*4]corporation's asserted failure to strictly comply with thetime period set forth in the agreement. Accordingly, Supreme Court's orders directing thetransfer of Cappione's shares in the corporation are affirmed. In light of this conclusion,we need not address the remaining arguments raised by defendants on appeal, includingtheir claimed entitlement to an automatic stay under CPLR 5519 (a) (4).
Peters, P.J., Stein, Rose and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders are affirmed,with costs.
Footnote *:Shortly thereafter,plaintiffs received notice that the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control hadcommenced a proceeding to cancel or revoke the corporation's license based upon thefact that Cappione, as an officer of the corporation, had been convicted of a felony(see Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 126 [4]).