| People v Badalov |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 50368(U) [42 Misc 3d 1235(A)] |
| Decided on March 6, 2014 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County |
| Qui�ones, J. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
The People ofthe State of New York against Ruben Badalov, Defendant. |
2013KN043203
Amy Dallas, Esq., The Legal Aid Society, for the Defendant
John Carroll, Esq., Kings County DA's Office, for the People
Joanne D. Qui�ones, J.
Defendant is charged with Assault in the Third Degree, in violationof Penal Law (P.L.) section 120.00(1), Attempted Assault in the Third Degree, inviolation of P.L. sections 110/120.00(1), Menacing in the Third Degree, in violation ofP.L. section 120.15, and Harassment in the Second Degree, in violation of P.L. section240.26(1). Defendant now moves to dismiss the information on the grounds that he hasbeen denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (C.P.L.)section 30.30(1)(b). The People oppose the motion.
Defendant's motion is based on the premise that thecomplainant, Shmaya Reichman, does not understand any English, and that without acertificate of translation "affirming that the complainant understood the complaint, and ...that the form notice was properly translated to the complainant by an official interpreterrecognized by the court," the supporting deposition signed by the complainant isinsufficient to convert the complaint (Defendant's Affirmation, ¶11). In support ofhis position, defendant cites People v. Camacho, 185 Misc 2d 31 (Crim Ct, KingsCounty 2000) and People v. Banchs, 173 Misc 2d 415 (Crim Ct, Kings County1997). Defendant submits that the People should be charged with the 244 days thatelapsed from the defendant's arraignment on June 7, 2013, to the date defendant filed theinstant motion on January 17, 2014.
The People, relying on Matter of Edward B., 80 NY2d 458 (1992) andPeople v. Maceda, 40 Misc 3d 1213(A), counter that the issue of whether thedefendant required a translator is a latent, rather than facial defect, which does notsubject the accusatory instrument to dismissal on facial insufficiency grounds. ThePeople, citing People v. Camacho, supra, further submit that "the court may onlybegin charging the People time pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30 after the court hasordered the People to provide an affidavit of translation, and the People have failed to doso [*2]within a reasonable amount of time" (People'sMemorandum of Law, p 2). It is the People's position that because they filed and servedan affidavit of translation before the court ordered the People to provide one, the Peoplecannot be charged any time pursuant to C.P.L. section 30.30.
Conversion
C.P.L. section 100.15(3) mandates that for an information to bejurisdictionally sufficient the factual portion of the instrument must contain facts of anevidentiary nature supporting or tending to support the charges. C.P.L. section100.40(1)(c) further requires that the "non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of theinformation and/or any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the ofthe offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (see also People v.Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]).
Here, the complainant signed a supporting deposition wherein he avers, under thepenalty of perjury, that he read the accusatory instrument and that the facts furnished byhim are true. Where there is no indication on the face of the instrument that thecomplainant could not read or understand it," the supporting deposition is not defectiveand suffices to convert the complaint (see Matter of Shaquana S., 9 AD3d 466, 466-7 [2nd Dept2004] People v. Maceda, 40 Misc 3d 1213[A], *2 [Crim Ct, Queens County2013]).
However, where there is evidence presented to a court sufficient to challenge thelegitimacy of the complainant's verification, the court's jurisdiction is no longer assuredand an inquiry must be undertaken to determine whether the complaint was properlyconverted (Camacho, 185 Misc 2d at 35-36, citing People v. Case, 42NY2d 98 [1977] People v. Honshj, 176 Misc 2d 170, 174 [Crim Ct, KingsCounty 1998], citing People v. Vasquez,NYLJ 11/25/94, at 32, col 1 [App Term,2nd Dept 1994] and People v. Darryl K., NYLJ 7/7/1993, at 24, col 6 [AppTerm, 2nd Dept], lv den sub nom People v. Khan, 82 NY2d 721 [1993]). In suchinstances, the court may order the People to file a certificate of translation (seeCamacho, 185 Misc 2d at 35-36; Banchs, 173 Misc 2d at 418).
In People v. Camacho, which both sides have cited in their respective papers,the court was presented with a similar issue. During the pre-trial stages ofCamacho, defense argued that without a certificate of translation, the supportingdeposition of the complainant, who did not read English, was insufficient to convert thecomplaint into an information. Five months after the supporting deposition was signed,the People submitted an affirmation from an assistant district attorney which stated thaton the date the supporting deposition was signed, the assistant translated the complaintinto Spanish for the complainant, explained to the complainant the meaning and legalconsequences of signing the supporting deposition, and that the complainant signed thesupporting deposition in the assistant's presence. The defense moved to dismiss theaccusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds alleging that the certificate of translation,which was needed to properly convert the complaint into an information, was filed afterthe speedy trial time had expired.
The court in Camacho held that once the legitimacy of a supportingdeposition is called into question, "[t]he People should be allowed a reasonable period oftime ... to file and serve the certificate [of translation]" (Camacho, 185 Misc 2d at36). The court found that the certificate of translation later filed in the case establishedthat the complainant understood the complaint and [*3]supporting deposition before he signed the supportingdeposition. In denying the defendant's speedy trial motion, the court reasoned that "if thecourt finds that the complaint and supporting deposition were adequately translated, thenthe court must conclude that the complaint was properly converted at the time of serviceand filing of the signed supporting deposition" (id.).In this matter, the latentdefect regarding this complainant's inability to read, speak or understand English was notbrought to the court's attention until January 17, 2014, when the defendant filed theinstant motion. On that same date, the People filed a certificate of translation signed bythe complainant's wife [FN1] wherein she avers, under the penalty ofperjury, that she is fluent and literate in the languages of English and Hebrew, that onJune 17, 2013, the date the complainant signed the supporting deposition, she translatedthe accusatory instrument and the supporting deposition from English to Hebrew for thecomplainant, that the complainant understood the meaning of those documents and didnot have any questions, and that the complainant then signed the supporting deposition.Although the interpreter's supporting deposition is not dated, it does relate back to thedate on which the supporting deposition was signed and the translation took place. Theabsence of a date is therefore not fatal (cf. People v. Concepcion, 36 Misc 2d551, 554 [Crim Ct, NY County 2012] [undated supporting deposition, properlysubscribed and verified, is sufficient to convert complaint as "neither C.P.L. §§100.20 or 100.30 require that a valid supporting deposition bear the date it wassubscribed and verified").
The court finds that the certificate of translation confirms that before signing thesupporting deposition, the complainant was read the complaint and the supportingdeposition and understood both documents. Accordingly, the information isjurisdictionally sufficient (see Camacho, 185 Misc 2d at 38). The complaint wasproperly converted on the date the People filed and served the supporting deposition andthe People's statement of readiness, filed together with the supporting deposition, was avalid statement of readiness.
Speedy Trial
In this case, the highest crime charged against the defendant is a class Amisdemeanor (see P.L. §120.00). Class A misdemeanors are punishable by asentence of imprisonment not to exceed one year (P.L. §70.15). Where thedefendant is charged with a class A misdemeanor, a motion to dismiss on speedy trialgrounds must be granted where the People are not ready for trial within 90 days ofcommencement of the criminal action (C.P.L. §30.30 [1][b]).
The defendant has the initial burden of showing, through sworn allegations of fact,that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time allotted by the statute, in thiscase 90 days (People v. Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986]). Once the defendanthas made that showing, the People bear the burden of demonstrating sufficientexcludable time in order to withstand a motion to dismiss (id.).
Based on a review of the official court file and the submissions of the parties, thecourt finds as follows:
[*4]June 7, 2013 - July 22, 201319days
On June 7, 2013, defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint and releasedon his own recognizance. The matter was adjourned to July 22, 2013, for a supportingdeposition.On June 26, 2013, the People filed with the court and served on defensecounsel a supporting deposition accompanied by a Statement of Readiness (SOR).
The People are ready for trial when they communicate their actual readiness in opencourt or file with the court and serve on defense counsel a certificate of actual readiness(see People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985]). The People's act in filing andserving an SOR served to toll the speedy trial clock for the remainder of the adjournment(People v. Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434, 440 [1998]).
The People are chargeable, however, with the 19 days preceding their declaration ofreadiness.
July 22, 2013 - October 9, 20130 days
On July 22, 2013, the matter was adjourned to October 9, 2013, for discovery bystipulation (DBS).
An adjournment for discovery is excludable (C.P.L. §30.30 [4] [a] Peoplev. Dorilas, 19 Misc 3d 75, 76-77 [App Term, 2nd Dept 2008] [time attributable toDBS is excludable] People v. Khachiyan, 194 Misc 2d 161, 166 [Crim Ct, KingsCounty 2002] [An adjournment for DBS which "is in lieu of motion practice anddiscovery practice in Kings County" is excludable).
October 9, 2013 - December 12, 20130 days
On October 9, 2013, the People filed and served DBS, and the matter wasadjourned to December 12, 2013, for hearings and trial.
The People are entitled to a reasonable adjournment to prepare for hearings and trialonce hearings are ordered (see People v. Greene, 223 AD2d 474 [1st Dept],lv den 88 NY2d 879 [1996] People v. Hernandez, 268 AD2d 344 [1stDept], lv den 95 NY2d 253 [2000] People v. Lucas, 25 Misc 3d1213[A], [Crim Ct, Kings County 2009]). Accordingly, this entire adjournment isexcludable.
December 12, 2013 - January 17, 20147 days
On December 12,2013, the People answered not ready for trial and requested aone-week adjournment. The matter was adjourned to January 17, 2014, for hearings andtrial.
When a case is in a post-readiness posture, adjournments that extend beyond thedelay requested by the People are not chargeable to the People (People v. Bruno,300 AD2d 93, 95 [1st Dept 2002], lv den 100 NY2d 641 [2003] People v.Dushain, 247 AD2d 234, 236 [1st Dept], app den 91 NY2d 1007 [1998]).The People are thus only charged with their specific request.
January 17, 2014 - March 6, 20140 days[*5]
On January 7, 2014, the People filed andserved a certificate of translation and the defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss theaccusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds. The court directed the People to file andserve their response off-calendar by February 7, 2014, and adjourned the matter to March6, 2014, for decision. An adjournment for motion practice and the period during whichdefendant's motion is "under consideration by the court" is excludable (C.P.L.§30.30[4][a] see People v. Shannon, 143 AD2d 572, 572-573 [1st Dept],lv den 73 NY2d 860 [1988] [time while speedy trial motion under considerationby court is excludable]).
Intotal, the People are charged with 26 days, which does not exceed the allowabletime set forth in C.P.L. section 30.30(1)(b). Accordingly, the defendant's motion todismiss the accusatory instrument for lack of a speedy trial isdenied.
This shall constitute the decision and order of this Court.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York____________________________
March 6, 2014
JOANNE D. QUI�ONES
J.C.C.
Footnote 1: An official interpreter isnot required for a certificate of translation, absent a mandate of the court to that effect(Banchs, 173 Misc 2d at 418; see also Camacho, 185 Misc 2d at38 [court found that complaint and supporting deposition which were translated intoSpanish by an Assistant District Attorney were adequately translated]).