| Matter of County of Chemung v Shah |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 00267 [124 AD3d 963] |
| January 8, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of County of Chemung, Respondent, vNirav R. Shah, as Commissioner of Health, et al., Appellants. |
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino of counsel), forappellants.
Whiteman Osterman & Hanna, LLP, Albany (Christopher E. Buckey ofcounsel) and Nancy Rose Stormer, PC, Utica (Nancy Rose Stormer of counsel), forrespondent.
Lynch, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (O'Shea, J.), enteredNovember 21, 2013 in Chemung County, which granted petitioner's application, in acombined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment,to, among other things, annul a determination of respondents' denying petitioner's claimsfor certain Medicaid reimbursements.
Petitioner commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratoryjudgment action seeking, in part, to annul a determination of respondent Department ofHealth (hereinafter DOH) denying its May 2013 claim for reimbursement of pre-2006overburden expenditures pursuant to Social Services Law § 368-a. SupremeCourt, among other things, granted the petition to annul DOH's determination andcompelled respondents to reimburse petitioner for the pending claims, as well as allremaining overburden reimbursements that may still be due pursuant to Social ServicesLaw § 368-a (1). Respondents appeal.
At issue is the constitutionality of the April 1, 2012 amendment to the so-calledMedicaid Cap Statute (see L 2005, ch 58, § 1, part C,§ 1), which purported to immediately bar any further claims of counties forreimbursement of overburden expenses (see L 2012, ch 56, § 1, partD, § 61) (hereinafter the 2012 amendment). On November 26, 2014, thisCourt decided, in Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Shah (124 AD3d 88 [2014]), that [*2]the 2012 amendment was notunconstitutional, and we established a six-month grace period from the date of thedecision authorizing "any social services district to file a claim for reimbursement of anypre-2006 overburden expenditures, with the 2012 amendment barring as untimely anyclaims submitted thereafter" (id. at *3). We also determined that "Supreme Courtdid not err in directing DOH to identify, verify and pay the total unpaid overburdenexpenditures that petitioner incurred prior to 2006" (id.).[FN*]
Applied here, these principles confirm that Supreme Court properly grantedpetitioner's application, except insofar as the court declared the 2012 amendmentunconstitutional. We also note that, as in Matter of County of St. Lawrence vShah (supra), respondents' challenge to petitioner's capacity to bring thisclaim was waived by respondents' failure to raise capacity as a defense in their answer ora pre-answer motion to dismiss (id. at *2).
Peters, P.J., Rose and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified, onthe law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as declared L 2012, ch 56,§ 1, part D, § 61 to be unconstitutional; it is declared that L2012, ch 56, § 1, part D, § 61 is constitutional with a graceperiod of six months commencing November 26, 2014; and, as so modified,affirmed.
Footnote *:At oral argumentcounsel acknowledged that this matter involves the same issue presented in Matter ofCounty of St. Lawrence v Shah (supra).