People v Tubbs
2015 NY Slip Op 00578 [124 AD3d 1094]
January 22, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 4, 2015


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vJohn M. Tubbs, Appellant.

Teresa C. Mulliken, Harpersfield, for appellant.

Richard D. Northrup Jr., District Attorney, Delhi (John L. Hubbard of counsel), forrespondent.

Garry, J. Appeal from an order of the County Court of Delaware County (Lambert,J.), entered February 26, 2013, which classified defendant as a risk level III sex offenderpursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sexual act in the second degree andwas sentenced pursuant to the agreement to a prison term of 11/2 years and10 years of postrelease supervision. Thereafter, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenderssubmitted a risk assessment instrument and case summary to County Court pursuant tothe Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C [hereinafterSORA]) that presumptively classified defendant as a risk level III sex offender, with nodeparture recommended. In the course of a brief hearing, County Court subtracted pointsassessed under one of the factors and added points for another, ultimately also resultingin a risk level III classification. Defendant appeals.

First considering the specific risk factors challenged upon appeal, we find thatCounty Court's addition of 20 points under risk factor 3 for two victims was notsupported by the requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence (seeCorrection Law § 168-n [3]; People v Bateman, 59 AD3d 788, 789 [2009]). The courtassessed these points based upon the People's assertion that defendant had been chargedwith crimes involving two victims. Defendant argues that his underlying guilty pleainvolved only one victim. It is well established, and the court properly held, thatdetermining the number of victims for purposes of SORA is not limited to the crime ofconviction, but may be based upon other reliable sources, specifically including a [*2]defendant's admissions (see People v Callan, 62 AD3d 1218, 1219 [2009]; SexOffender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 5 [2006]).Here, the preplea investigation report included defendant's admission that, at anunspecified time several years earlier, he had approached another potential victimrequesting that she engage in a sexual act.[FN*] However, the admission is quitelimited, as defendant also stated that this potential victim refused his request, and thatnothing further occurred. There is no evidence of any nature that could support a findingof any sexual conduct or contact with a second victim (see Penal Law§ 130.00 [3], [10]). The People failed to supplement defendant's limitedadmission with any proof whatsoever from the alleged second victim (compare People v Radage, 98AD3d 1194, 1194 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 855 [2012]; People v Ramirez, 53 AD3d990, 990 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 710 [2008]). Thus, the record does notcontain clear and convincing evidence supporting the court's determination as to asecond victim, and 20 points should not have been scored.

Defendant was correctly assessed 10 points on risk factor 8 for being under the ageof 20 when he committed his first act of sexual misconduct, as—contrary to hiscontention—the current offense is properly included in this determination (see People v Filkins, 107AD3d 1069, 1070 [2013]; Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk AssessmentGuidelines and Commentary at 13). As for risk factor 12, defendant was correctlyassessed 10 points for failing to accept responsibility. Initially, upon his arrest andinterview with the Probation Department, defendant admitted that he had repeatedlymolested the victim and had approached the second individual with a sexual request.However, he later repudiated these statements, claiming that the accusations were falseand that he had pleaded guilty only because his former defense counsel had advised himto do so. These later statements constituted clear and convincing evidence that he failedto accept responsibility for his conduct (see People v Shackelton, 117 AD3d 1283, 1284 [2014]; People v Carman, 33 AD3d1145, 1146 [2006]).

Defendant's claim that the manner in which the hearing was conducted violated hisdue process rights was unpreserved; in any event, the requisite standards were met(see People v Brooks, 308 AD2d 99, 103 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 502[2003]; Doe v Pataki, 3 F Supp 2d 456, 471-472 [SD NY 1998]). Defendant'sargument that County Court failed to consider mitigating evidence that would havewarranted a lower risk level was also unpreserved. We note that the modificationrequired by our finding above requires a change in assessment from 120 points, with acorresponding risk level three designation, to an assessment of 100 points, with acorresponding risk level II designation.

Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Rose and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order isreversed, on the law, without costs, and defendant is classified as a risk level two sexoffender under the Sex Offender Registration Act.

Footnotes


Footnote *:The time periodsreferenced in defendant's admission are inconsistent with the indictment, which did notcharge defendant with any crimes occurring before 2011.


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