| Matter of School Adm'rs Assn. of N.Y. State v New York StateDept. of Civ. Serv. |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 00676 [124 AD3d 1174] |
| January 29, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of School Administrators Association ofNew York State et al., Appellants, et al., Petitioner, v New York State Department ofCivil Service et al., Respondents. |
Arthur P. Scheuermann, School Administrators Association of New York State,Latham (Jennifer L. Carlson of counsel), for appellants.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Julie M. Sheridan of counsel), forNew York State Department of Civil Service, respondent.
Lamb & Barnosky, LLP, Melville (Jeffrey Mongelli of counsel), for BrentwoodUnion Free School District, respondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Teresi, J.), entered May10, 2013 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioners' application, in a combinedproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to, amongother things, review a certain policy memorandum issued by respondent Department ofCivil Service.
Respondent Brentwood Union Free School District (hereinafter District) is aparticipating agency in the New York State Health Insurance Program (hereinafterNYSHIP), which is administered by respondent Employee Benefits Division ofrespondent Department of Civil Service, and by respondent Jerry Boone, president of theCivil Service Commission (hereinafter collectively referred to as the State respondents).On May 15, 2012, the Employee Benefits Division issued policy memorandum No.122r3, which delineated the circumstances under which an employee of a participatingagency may decline health insurance enrollment in [*2]NYSHIP in exchange for a cash payment or other benefit.Specifically, the policy memorandum provided—insofar as is relevanthere—that such an employee could opt out of NYSHIP coverage in exchange for amonetary payment only if he or she had health insurance coverage available underanother employer-sponsored group other than NYSHIP. In other words, an employeecould not receive an opt-out payment if, for example, he or she had health insurancecoverage through a spouse who also was covered under NYSHIP. The policymemorandum further provided that it would take effect immediately.
Petitioner Daniel Robinson is an administrator employed by the District, a member ofpetitioner Brentwood Principals and Supervisors Organization, whose president ispetitioner Richard Loeschner, and a member of petitioner School AdministratorsAssociation of New York State. Although not contractually obligated to do so, theDistrict had offered a buyout program for a number of years that enabled its employees todecline NYSHIP coverage in exchange for a monetary payment representing 50% of thepremium that the District otherwise would have paid to NYSHIP to provide healthinsurance coverage for such employee. Robinson historically participated in the programand, for option year ending December 31, 2012, received a payment from the District inthe amount of $6,094.92. Under the May 15, 2012 policy memorandum, however,Robinson no longer was eligible for a monetary payment because his spouse, underwhose plan he was covered, obtained her health insurance coverage from NYSHIP.
On March 4, 2013, petitioners commenced this combined CPLR article 78proceeding and action for declaratory judgment seeking, among other things, to declarethe policy memorandum to be null and void and to enjoin the District and respondentBoard of Education of the Brentwood Union Free School District (hereinaftercollectively referred to as the Brentwood respondents) from discontinuing its pastpractice of offering the original NYSHIP buyout program. With respect to the Staterespondents, Supreme Court found that the four-month statute of limitations began to runon the effective date of the policy memorandum—May 15, 2012—and,accordingly, dismissed the proceeding/action against them as time-barred. As to theBrentwood respondents, Supreme Court found that petitioners' claim fell within theexclusive jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Board and, therefore,dismissed the petition/complaint against them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.Petitioners now appeal,[FN1] contending only that Supreme Courterred in dismissing the petition/complaint as time-barred.
The parties agree that this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and action fordeclaratory judgment is governed by the four-month statute of limitations set forth inCPLR 217 (1). In this regard, both the statute and case law make clear that the statute oflimitations period for a CPLR article 78 proceeding begins to run when "thedetermination to be reviewed becomes final and binding upon the petitioner" (CPLR 217[1]; accord Walton v New YorkState Dept. of Correctional Servs., 8 NY3d 186, 194 [2007]; Matter of Capital Dist. RegionalOff-Track Betting Corp. v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 97 AD3d1044, 1046 [2012]; seeMatter of Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Vil. Union Free Sch. Dist. v State of NewYork, 110 AD3d 1231, 1232-1233 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 861[2014]). Such determination, in turn, "becomes 'final and binding' when tworequirements are met: completeness (finality) of the determination and exhaustion ofadministrative remedies. First, the agency must have reached a definitive position on theissue that inflicts actual, concrete injury and second, the injury inflicted may not be. . . significantly ameliorated by further administrative action or by stepsavailable to the complaining party" (Walton v New York State Dept. of CorrectionalServs., 8 NY3d at 194 [*3][internal quotation marksand citation omitted]; see Matterof North Dock Tin Boat Assn., Inc. v New York State Off. of Gen. Servs., 96 AD3d1186, 1187 [2012]; Matterof Town of Olive v City of New York, 63 AD3d 1416, 1418 [2009]). In thecontext of quasi-legislative determinations such as the one at issue here, actual notice ofthe challenged determination is not required in order to start the statute of limitationsclock; rather, the statute of limitations begins to run once the administrative agency's"definitive position on the issue [becomes] readily ascertainable" to the complainingparty (Matter of Riverkeeper,Inc. v Crotty, 28 AD3d 957, 962 [2006]; see Matter of Owners Comm. onElec. Rates v Public Serv. Commn. of State of N.Y., 76 NY2d 779, 780 [1990],revg on dissenting op of Levine, J., 150 AD2d 45, 53 [1989]).
At the heart of the State respondents' statute of limitations defense is the May 15,2012 policy memorandum itself, which redefined the class of employees eligible toparticipate in buyout programs offered by participating agencies and, further, made clearthat such policy was "effective immediately."[FN2] Although the subject memorandumindeed contained a "grandfather clause" that, in effect, afforded a limited grace period tocertain participating agencies with an existing buyout program in place, the presence ofsuch clause did not render the decision of the Department of Civil Service as to employeeeligibility any less final, nor did it render the injury allegedly suffered by Robinson anyless concrete. We therefore are satisfied that the policy memorandum constituted a"definitive position" on the issue of buyout program eligibility—one that, as to theState respondents, could not be "significantly ameliorated by further administrativeaction" (Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 8 NY3d at194).[FN3]
As to the actual date upon which the four-month statute of limitations began to run,the State respondents correctly note that the "readily ascertainable" requirement is styledas a constructive notice standard; actual, in-hand notice of the underlying determinationis not required (see Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Crotty, 28 AD3d at 961-962). Inthis regard, the State respondents delineated the procedures followed in disseminating thesubject policy memorandum, including mailing copies to the chief executive officers ofall participating agencies, as well as to any individual who had requested a copy via theparticipating agency "Courtesy List," posting the memorandum on a website for healthbenefit administrators (to which union representatives could request access) anddiscussing the memorandum at the participating agency regional meetings hosted by theDepartment of Civil Service in October 2012—an event "attended by over 650representatives of the approximately 900 local governments that participate in NYSHIP."Under these circumstances, we are of the view that petitioners' claimsaccrued—and the statute of limitations began to run—upon the effectivedate of the policy memorandum, i.e., May 15, 2012 (see Lenihan v City of NewYork, 58 NY2d 679, 681 [1982]). Moreover, even if we were to defer the triggeringof the statute of limitations until [*4]the October 2012regional meetings, the instant proceeding and action—commenced in March2013—still would be time-barred. Petitioners' remaining arguments as to thetimeliness of this matter, to the extent not specifically addressed, have been examinedand found to be lacking in merit. Further, in light of our conclusion that this matter istime-barred, we need not address the State respondents' alternative ground for dismissal.Accordingly, Supreme Court's judgment is affirmed.
McCarthy, J.P., Devine and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs. [Prior Case History: 2013 NY Slip Op 30998(U).]
Footnote 1:All petitioners exceptRobinson are named in the notice of appeal.
Footnote 2:There is no questionthat, as a participating agency, the District was required to comply with this directive inoffering buyout programs to its employees, including Robinson.
Footnote 3:Our conclusion in thisregard is in no way altered by petitioners' attempt to mitigate the impact of the policymemorandum by filing an improper practices charge against the District for unilaterallyaltering its buyout program without engaging in collective bargaining. The fact thatpetitioners might be able to obtain some measure of relief from the Brentwoodrespondents does not affect the finality of the Department of Civil Service'sdetermination vis-a-vis the State respondents.