| People v Chaplin |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 08869 [134 AD3d 1148] |
| December 3, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Scott Chaplin, Appellant. |
Theresa M. Suozzi, Saratoga Springs, for appellant.
Thomas J. O'Connor, Special Prosecutor, Albany, for respondent.
McCarthy, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County(Ceresia, J.), rendered September 10, 2012, upon a verdict convicting defendant of thecrime of murder in the second degree.
On a morning in March 1994, the victim was found bludgeoned to death at her placeof employment, inside of a staff apartment of a residence for the developmentallydisabled. Interviews with the victim's family members indicated that defendant, who was17 years old at the time, had been sexually involved with the victim. Shortly thereafter,defendant made various statements to the police denying any involvement in thehomicide. In 2004, DNA analysis of evidence obtained from the crime scene revealedthat saliva left on a paper towel roll matched defendant's DNA profile. In April 2011,additional DNA analysis revealed that defendant could not be excluded as a contributorto the DNA obtained from a piece of paper towel that had been wrapped around thebedroom doorknob of the staff apartment. In May 2011, a witness was located whoimplicated defendant and a codefendant in the victim's murder and robbery. After grandjury indictment and then a jury trial, defendant was convicted of murder in the seconddegree and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.
Defendant's contention that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated iswithout merit. "In determining whether there is an undue delay, the trial court mustconsider '(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of theunderlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrialincarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has beenimpaired by reason of the delay' " (People v [*2]Montague, 130AD3d 1100, 1101 [2015], quoting People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445[1975]). Where, as here, the delay is extraordinary, "close scrutiny of the other factors,especially the question of why the delay occurred," is required (People v Romeo, 12 NY3d51, 56 [2009], cert denied 558 US 817 [2009]).
The People introduced evidence indicating that DNA technology in 1994 would haverequired the destruction of the two samples of biological material that had been collected.Further evidence established that technology at the time that the samples weretested—in 2004 and 2011—did not require such destruction. In addition tothis physical evidence becoming probative, a witness came forward in May 2011implicating defendant in the murder. Such evidence demonstrated a good faith basis forthe delay in proceeding with the prosecution (see People v Decker, 13 NY3d 12, 16 [2009]; People v Gaston, 104 AD3d1206, 1206-1207 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1156 [2014]).
Turning to the remaining factors, the charge of murder in the second degree is"inarguably a very serious offense" (People v Decker, 13 NY3d at 15). Further,defendant was never incarcerated during the 17-year delay (see People v Swan, 90 AD3d1146, 1147 [2011]). In addition, defendant's generic claim that witnesses may havemoved and that their recall of events is no longer as strong as it once was is toospeculative to carry significant weight in the analysis (see People v King, 62 AD3d1162, 1163 [2009]). Although defendant faced a substantial delay, upon consideringthese factors, we find that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated(see People v Vernace, 96 NY2d 886, 888 [2001]; People v Tuper, 118 AD3d1144, 1146 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 954 [2015]; People v Chatt, 77 AD3d1285, 1285 [2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 793 [2011]).
The introduction of certain statements made by defendant to law enforcementofficials did not violate his constitutional rights. Miranda safeguards "are nottriggered unless a suspect is subject to 'custodial interrogation' " (People vBerg, 92 NY2d 701, 704 [1999], quoting Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436,444 [1966]). "The standard for assessing a suspect's custodial status is whether areasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing would have believed that he or she wasnot free to leave" (People vPaulman, 5 NY3d 122, 129 [2005] [citations omitted]). This inquiry is informedby many factors, including " 'the location, length and atmosphere of thequestioning, whether police significantly restricted defendant's freedom of action, thedegree of defendant's cooperation, and whether the questioning was accusatory orinvestigatory' " (Peoplev Henry, 114 AD3d 1025, 1026 [2014], lv dismissed 22 NY3d 1199[2014], quoting People vPagan, 97 AD3d 963, 966 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 934 [2012]).
Defendant's first interview with police took place at his home, in the presence ofdefendant's father, and it lasted approximately 20 to 30 minutes. The evidence indicatesthat defendant's movements were not restrained and that he could have ended theinterview at any time. Defendant's second interview took place over a 90-minute periodafter defendant and his father spontaneously and voluntarily appeared at a police station.According to an interviewing police officer, defendant informed him that he wanted to"clear the air." Defendant's third and final interview—which included a polygraphexamination and occurred in 2011—took place upon defendant's request. Furtheruncontested evidence established that defense counsel conducted substantial negotiationsregarding the conditions upon which defendant would participate in such an interview.The interview took place over 3
Defendant's conviction was based on legally sufficient evidence, and it was notagainst the weight of the evidence. As relevant here, to convict defendant of murder inthe second degree on a felony murder theory, the People were required to prove thatdefendant committed or attempted to commit a robbery "and, in the course of and infurtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, ifthere [were] any, cause[d] the death of" the victim (Penal Law § 125.25 [3];see People v Henderson, 25NY3d 534, 539 [2015]; People v Jackson, 100 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2012], lvdenied 21 NY3d 1005 [2013]). Proof of defendant's intent to murder the victim wasnot necessary; rather, the People were required to show that defendant specificallyintended to commit the predicate felony (see People v Stokes, 88 NY2d 618, 623[1996]). To establish that defendant committed a robbery, the People were required toshow that defendant forcibly stole property from the victim for the purpose of retainingthe same (see Penal Law § 160.00). Notably, intent to commit arobbery may be inferred from defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances (see People v Gordon, 23 NY3d643, 650 [2014]).
Proof implicating defendant included the introduction of DNA evidence relating totwo samples of DNA, which, when considered together, strongly indicated that defendanthad been at the scene of the murder on the night in question. This DNA evidence, alongwith other overwhelming evidence confirming that defendant had a romantic relationshipwith the victim, could be considered evidence of defendant's consciousness of guilt, as itutterly contradicted defendant's prior repeated claims that he had not had any relationshipwith the victim. Testimony also indicated that the victim generally carried a purse withlarge sums of cash and that such purse was not with the victim after her death. Anindividual who was defendant's neighbor and friend in 1994 testified that defendantexplained to him, shortly after the victim's death, that the police would not find thevictim's purse and that witnesses were incorrect in their belief that a certain car had beenat the scene of the crime. That same witness explained that defendant, prior to thevictim's death, had also told him that the victim had a significant amount of money.
Contrary to defendant's contention, the People were not required to prove the valueof the contents of the victim's purse (see People v Acevedo, 40 NY2d 701, 707[1976]). The aforementioned evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictionof murder in the second degree on a felony murder theory (see People v Ramos, 129AD3d 1205, 1206-1207 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 971 [2015]; People v Griffin, 122 AD3d1068, 1069-1070 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1164 [2015]).[FN*] Further, deferring to thejury's resolution of credibility issues, the conviction was not against the weight of theevidence (see People vCallicut, 101 AD3d 1256, 1257-1259 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1096[2013]; People v Jackson, 100 AD3d at 1259-1261).
Defendant's contention that the People should not have elicited testimony thatdefendant committed the bad acts of buying and smoking marihuana is unpreserved (see People v Cox, 129 AD3d1210, 1214 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 966 [2015]) and does not warrantany corrective action in the interest of justice. Contrary to certain of defendant'scontentions regarding the best evidence rule, defendant's written statements to lawenforcement were not introduced as photographs or photocopies. The writings that wereintroduced were carbon copies, which are [*4]originalsfor the purposes of the best evidence rule (see People v Sims, 127 AD2d 712,713 [1987]; People v Kolp, 49 AD2d 139, 141 [1975]). Defendant's remainingargument regarding the best evidence rule is also without merit, as the writing that itregards was not entered into evidence.
Defendant's assertions that Brady materials were improperly withheld fromhim is without support in the record, and his speculation that such evidence exists isinsufficient to establish a Brady violation (see People v Parkinson, 268AD2d 792, 793 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 801 [2000]). In addition, given thatdefendant supplied the language that County Court used in its circumstantial evidencecharge to the jury, his current contention that such a charge was improper is unpreserved(see People v Sabines, 121AD3d 1409, 1411-1412 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1171 [2015]; People v Davis, 105 AD3d1095, 1097 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1003 [2013]). In any event andcontrary to defendant's contention, County Court was not required to use the phrase"moral certainty" in its circumstantial evidence charge (People v Sanchez, 61NY2d 1022, 1024 [1984]; see People v Gonzalez, 54 NY2d 729, 730 [1981]). Tothe extent not already discussed herein, defendant's remaining contentions are withoutmerit.
Egan Jr., Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Footnote *:Defendant does notcontest the jury's conclusion that the predicate murder occurred.