| People v Nelligan |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 00218 [135 AD3d 1075] |
| January 14, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Gloria Nelligan, Appellant. |
Sandra M. Colatosti, Albany, for appellant.
Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), forrespondent.
Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County(Drago, J.), rendered November 8, 2013, convicting defendant following a nonjury trialof the crimes of murder in the second degree and manslaughter in the first degree.
Defendant's eight-year-old grandson died as a result of hemorrhaging caused bymultiple blunt force injuries sustained while in her care. She was indicted on charges ofmurder in the second degree (depraved indifference murder of a child) and manslaughterin the first degree. Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty as charged.County Court sentenced her to concurrent prison terms of 25 years to life on thesecond-degree murder conviction and 25 years to be followed by three years ofpostrelease supervision on the first-degree manslaughter conviction. Defendant appeals,and we now affirm.
Defendant initially argues that the convictions are not supported by legally sufficientevidence and, moreover, are against the weight of the evidence. To briefly review, herchallenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence requires us to evaluate "whether there isany valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational personto the conclusion reached by [the finder of fact] on the basis of the evidence at trial andas a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of thecrime charged" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; see People v Denson, 26 NY3d179, 188 [2015]). A weight of the evidence review, in contrast, requires us to make athreshold determination as to "whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable"(People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 348 [2007]; [*2]see People vBleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Where it would not have been, this Court "must, like thetrier of fact below, weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and therelative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" todetermine if the factfinder was justified in finding the defendant guilty (People vBleakley, 69 NY2d at 495 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; seePeople v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348; People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]).
Defendant asserts that the proof at trial established neither that she intended tophysically injure the victim nor that she recklessly created a grave risk of serious physicalinjury and death (see Penal Law §§ 125.20 [4]; 125.25 [4]; People v Baker, 14 NY3d266, 271-272 [2010]). In that regard, the victim was living with defendant duringthe events at issue and was on school break. He went to a store with defendant and histhree aunts—who also lived with defendant and testified at trial as to theirobservations of the events at issue—and stole a pack of gum. Defendant learned ofthe theft, spanked him with a wooden back scratcher and made him return to the store toconfess the theft and pay for the pack of gum. Defendant further made the victim writetwo essays on his transgression.
The punishment, however, did not stop there. Defendant made the victim do a varietyof exercises the next day, which was Friday. Defendant was displeased with the mannerin which the victim was doing pushups and, according to two of his aunts, bent him overa chair and began beating him with the back scratcher. The beating began around noonand continued well into the night—with the victim deprived of food and theseverity of the blows worsening during that time—and defendant eventuallylashed him to the chair with rope. Defendant further advised one of the victim's aunts thatshe "could do this all night" and that she had no intention of "stopping until she sawblood." Defendant was still thrashing the victim when that aunt went to bed around 11:00p.m., and defendant later pulled the victim from his bedroom and forced him downstairsso that the assault could continue. The assault finally ended when the victim wet himselfand, around 3:00 a.m., he was cleaned in the shower and put to bed in a wet T-shirt.
The victim awoke on Saturday morning and begged one of his aunts, who noted that"the whole side of him was purple," to help him after he fell and was unable to lifthimself off of the floor. Defendant, at that point, came up to the victim's room andordered that he be left "alone because he was looking for sympathy." Defendant rebuffedthe plea of one of the aunts to seek medical attention for the victim, instead saying thatshe would take him for a mental health evaluation on Monday. Defendant relented afterthe victim lost consciousness and collapsed, at which point he was transported to thehospital and was observed to have "bruises over his face, chest [and] abdomen and. . . a large bruise . . . wrapping around the buttock to the frontof his hip." Medical professionals testified that at least several dozen blows hard enoughto inflict serious injury were required to cause those bruises, which would have appearedsoon after the blows and were indicative of the internal disruption in blood circulationthat led to the victim's death.[FN*] The foregoing evidence, when viewedin the light most favorable to the People, was legally sufficient to sustain the findings ofCounty Court that defendant intended to physically injure the victim and recklesslycreated a grave risk of serious physical injury and death (see People v Varmette, 70AD3d 1167, 1169 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 845 [2010]; People v Beckingham, 57AD3d 1098, 1098-1099 [2008], lv denied 13 NY3d 742 [2009]). Moreover,to [*3]the extent that a different result could reasonablyhave been reached from the proof submitted at trial, we reject defendant's claim that thefindings of County Court were against the weight of the credible evidence (seePeople v Varmette, 70 AD3d at 1171).
Defendant's similar challenges to the finding of County Court that the circumstancesof the death "evinc[ed] a depraved indifference to human life" on her part are alsounavailing (Penal Law § 125.25 [4]). Depraved indifference "is bestunderstood as an utter disregard for the value of human life" (People v Suarez, 6 NY3d202, 214 [2005]), and may be found where the facts "reflect wanton cruelty,brutality or callousness directed against a particularly vulnerable victim, combined withutter indifference to the life or safety of the helpless target" (id. at 213; see People v Barboni, 21NY3d 393, 400 [2013]; People v McLain, 80 AD3d 992, 997 [2011], lvdenied 16 NY3d 897 [2011]). Defendant inflicted brutal injuries upon a helplesschild over a prolonged period, and County Court was free to conclude from her initialrefusal to summon medical aid and her later failure to tell medical professionals treatingthe victim what had happened "that [she] evinced a wanton and uncaring state of mind"(People v Barboni, 21 NY3d at 402; see People v Suarez, 6 NY3d at 212;People v McLain, 80 AD3d at 997). In our view, legally sufficient evidenceexisted to make that finding, which was not against the weight of the evidence.
Defendant lastly contends that the sentences imposed were harsh and excessive. Inlight of the inhuman nature of her acts, her prior criminal history and her disturbing lackof remorse, that claim is wholly without merit.
Peters, P.J., Garry, Egan Jr. and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote *:The forensic pathologistwho performed an autopsy on the victim noted that brain swelling had contributed to hisdeath, although the pathologist could not say with certainty whether that swelling wascaused by blood loss or head trauma.