| Argyle Farm & Props., LLC v Watershed Agric. Council ofthe N.Y. City Watersheds, Inc. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 00559 [135 AD3d 1262] |
| January 28, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| Argyle Farm and Properties, LLC, Appellant, vWatershed Agricultural Council of the New York City Watersheds, Inc., et al.,Respondents. |
Young/Sommer, LLC, Albany (Kevin M. Young of counsel), for appellant.
Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Albany (Robert H. Feller of counsel), forWatershed Agricultural Council of the New York City Watersheds, Inc., respondent.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Jane L. Gordon ofcounsel), for City of New York and another, respondents.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Becker, J.), entered October15, 2014 in Delaware County, which granted defendants' motions to dismiss thecomplaint.
In 2002, plaintiff purchased a 475-acre farm in the Town of Andes, Delaware Countyat auction for $860,000. The property lies within the Pepacton Basin of the New YorkCity watershed and is subject to the Surface Water Treatment Rule (see 40 CFR141.70-141.75). Although the cited rule requires defendant City of New York tomaintain adequate control over land use activities occurring within its watershed, theCity is precluded—except in certain limited circumstances—fromregulating the day-to-day activities of upstate farmers operating within the variouswatershed districts (see Agriculture and Markets Law § 305-a). Tostrike an appropriate balance between these interests and to ensure a quality water supply,the City—consistent with the provisions of the 1997 New York City WatershedMemorandum of Agreement and through defendant Watershed Agricultural Council ofthe New York City Watersheds, Inc. (hereinafter WAC), a not-for-profit corporationcomprised primarily of local farmers—enters into voluntary agreements withupstate farmers known as Whole Farm Plans (hereinafter WFPs). WFPs, in [*2]turn, require that farms implement best managementpractices in order to avoid pollution of the watershed. In addition to developing WFPs,WAC also administers—through its Easement Committee—a conservationeasement program that permits it to purchase development rights to agricultural landbased upon the fair market value thereof. The conservation easement allows theindividual farms to continue operating while granting the Easement Committee controlover further residential or commercial development of the relevant properties. Aconservation easement is only available, however, if the land in question is covered by aWFP.
In December 2006, plaintiff and WAC entered into a contract of sale for aconservation easement covering plaintiff's property. Plaintiff was to be paid $1,600 peracre—resulting in a purchase price in excess of $750,000.[FN*] Thereafter, in January 2007, WACadvised plaintiff that a WFP for the property would need to be in place prior to closing.Because plaintiff was, at the time, leasing a small portion of the property to aneighboring farmer for haying operations, WAC offered to extend the neighbor's WFP toplaintiff's property. Although plaintiff declined to do so, it appears that the neighbor'sWFP nonetheless was incorporated by reference into the deed conveying theconservation easement when the closing occurred in January 2008.
Prior to closing, plaintiff was in the process of converting an existing barn on theproperty into a residence, which, in turn, required the installation of a septic system. Adispute thereafter arose between plaintiff, WAC and defendant New York CityDepartment of Environmental Conservation as to whether, in accordance with theprovisions of section 14 of the conservation easement between plaintiff and WAC, theseptic system could be installed outside of the property's Acceptable Development Areas(hereinafter ADAs)—as such areas were described in the Baseline DocumentationReport, which also was incorporated by reference into the conservation easement.Despite ongoing negotiations and disagreements on this point, the requested permit wasissued in January 2011, and plaintiff thereafter installed the septic system—asplanned—outside of the property's identified ADAs.
In November 2013, WAC issued program guidelines for the locating of septicsystems and generally concluded that such systems must be located within a property'sADAs; that said, a septic system could be installed outside of a property's ADAs, butonly with WAC's prior written approval. Recognizing what WAC acknowledges is aninconsistency between the guidelines and certain of the conservation easementspreviously conveyed—including plaintiff's easement—the guidelinesprovide for the amendment of a property's ADAs with the cost and expense thereof to beborne by WAC. According to WAC, plaintiff was offered but did not avail itself of thisoption. Instead, plaintiff commenced this action in December 2013 seeking, among otherthings, rescission of the easement, a declaration of its rights thereunder andcompensatory damages for breach of contract. WAC and the municipal defendantsseparately moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, that plaintifflacked standing, that plaintiff's claims were time-barred and that plaintiff's claims shouldbe dismissed for failure to join a necessary party, i.e., the Attorney General. SupremeCourt granted defendants' respective motions and dismissed the complaint, promptingthis appeal.
We affirm. Assuming, without deciding, that (1) plaintiff has standing to maintaincauses of action one through nine, (2) certain of those causes of action are not barred bythe applicable statute of limitations, and (3) all of those causes of action should nototherwise be dismissed for failure to join the Attorney General as a necessary party, itnonetheless is clear that [*3]causes of action one throughnine are barred by the provisions of ECL 49-0307 and were appropriately dismissed onthat basis. "Conservation easements are of a character wholly distinct from the easementstraditionally recognized at common law and are excepted from many of the defenses thatwould defeat a common-law easement" (Stonegate Family Holdings, Inc. v Revolutionary Trails, Inc., BoyScouts of Am., 73 AD3d 1257, 1261 [2010] [citation omitted], lv denied15 NY3d 715 [2010]; see ECL 49-0305 [2], [5]; Matter of Friends ofShawangunks v Knowlton, 64 NY2d 387, 392 [1985]). Pursuant to ECL 49-0307(1), "[a] conservation easement held by a not-for-profit conservation organization mayonly be modified or extinguished" (1) pursuant to the terms of the instrument creating theeasement, (2) in a proceeding pursuant to RPAPL 1951, or (3) by eminent domain.Notably, ECL 49-0307 provides the exclusive means by which a conservation easementmay be modified or extinguished (see ECL 49-0305 [2]).
There is no question that WAC is a not-for-profit conservation organization(see ECL 49-0305 [3] [a]; 49-0307) and, further, that the action before us is notin the nature of either an RPAPL 1951 proceeding or an eminent domain proceeding.Hence, the subject easement cannot be modified or terminated except under the terms setforth therein. In this regard, the easement provides that it may be amended or modifiedupon the written consent of plaintiff and WAC, but a "material[ ] amend[ment]" thereofrequires the additional consent of the Attorney General. Termination of the easementitself is permitted in only two instances—in the context of a condemnationproceeding upon notice to plaintiff, WAC, the Attorney General and the City or,alternatively, upon the joint request of such parties if—preliminarily—the"conditions on or surrounding the [p]roperty change so much that it becomesimpracticable to fulfill" the purpose of the easement.
Here, plaintiff's first five causes of action seek rescission of the easement upon basiccontract principles, i.e., mutual mistake, intentional misrepresentation, negligentmisrepresentation and frustration of contract. None of these grounds are set forth ineither ECL 49-0307 or the easement itself and, as the statutes and legislative historymake clear, defenses that exist at common law have no application in the context of aconservation easement (see ECL 49-0305 [2], [5]; 49-0307 [1]; Mem in Support,Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 1020). Similarly, to the extent that plaintiff asserts that causes ofaction six through nine merely seek an "interpretation" of its rights under theconservation easement and, hence, would not run afoul of the provisions of ECL49-0307, we disagree. Plaintiff effectively is seeking to reform the easement, and it isreadily apparent that the "interpretation" advanced by plaintiff in this regard would resultin either the termination of the easement itself or a material amendment thereto. Asnothing in the record suggests that the conditions on or surrounding the property havechanged to the point that it has become impracticable to fulfill the terms of theconservation easement, and as no other statutorily recognized grounds exist for thetermination or modification thereof, Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiff's firstnine causes of action as barred by the provisions of ECL 49-0307.
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to plaintiff's cause of action premisedupon the alleged violation of General Business Law § 349. "A cause ofaction to recover damages pursuant to [this statute] has three elements: first, that thechallenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in amaterial way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act"(Benetech, Inc. v Omni Fin.Group, Inc., 116 AD3d 1190, 1190 [2014] [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted], lv denied 23 NY3d 909 [2014]). For purposes of the statute,consumers are defined "as those who purchase goods and services for personal, family orhousehold use" (id. at 1191 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).Although plaintiff alleged that WAC's conduct relative to the procurement of theconservation easement was misleading and deceptive and that plaintiff, in turn, sustained[*4]damages as a result thereof, noticeably absent is anyallegation that WAC's actions and practices were directed at or had "a broader impact onconsumers at large" (id. at 1190 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).Inasmuch as plaintiff failed to satisfy this threshold requirement, Supreme Court properlydismissed this particular cause of action (see id. at 1191).
Turning to plaintiff's remaining causes of action (10, 11 and 12), plaintiff essentiallyalleges that it has been damaged—primarily in the form of a reduction in itsoverall property value—by virtue of WAC's voting procedures (specifically withreference to applications placed before its Easement Committee) and its policies relativeto the siting of septic systems outside of the property's ADAs. Supreme Court dismissedthese causes of action, finding that plaintiff lacked standing to maintain them. "Standingis a threshold issue requiring an actual legal stake in the outcome of the action, namely aninjury in fact worthy and capable of judicial resolution" (Matter of Ferran v City ofAlbany, 116 AD3d 1194, 1195 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]). Absent any indication that plaintiff has sought WAC's approval to site anotherseptic system outside of the ADAs identified on its property, that WAC has thwartedplaintiff's efforts to place such an application before the Easement Committee or that anyapplication so submitted has been denied, plaintiff's alleged injuries and claimeddamages are entirely speculative, as they are predicated upon hypothetical, future eventsthat may or may not come to pass (see generally Schulz v Cuomo, 133 AD3d 945, 947[2015]). While it arguably may be more accurate to say that plaintiff's claims—asset forth in these particular causes of action—are not justiciable (see id. at947), the fact remains that they were properly dismissed. Plaintiff's remaining arguments,to the extent not specifically addressed, have been examined and found to be lacking inmerit.
Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order isaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote *:The basis for thediscrepancy between the purchase price set forth in the contract of sale ($770,400) andthe sum allegedly received by plaintiff ($757,920) is not readily apparent.