| People v Morris |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 02864 [138 AD3d 1239] |
| April 14, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Brady D. Morris, Appellant. |
Allen E. Stone Jr., Vestal, for appellant.
Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Jordan J. Yorke of counsel), forrespondent.
Clark, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Hayden,J.), rendered December 17, 2012, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of thecrime of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
At roughly 9:40 p.m. on June 24, 2012, a police officer observed defendant riding abicycle on the sidewalk in the City of Elmira, Chemung County in violation of a cityordinance. The officer activated his vehicle's lights and repeatedly directed defendant tostop. Despite the officer's commands, defendant continued to ride the bicycle on thesidewalk while shouting obscenities at the officer and stating that the officer had noreason to stop him. The officer drove alongside defendant and ultimately pulled hisvehicle into a parking lot in defendant's path, causing defendant to fall off of the bicycle.At some point as the officer exited his vehicle and approached defendant, defendantstood up, attempted to flee and informed the officer that he had a weapon. During thischaotic exchange, the officer subdued defendant, asked him where the weapon waslocated, directed him not to move and retrieved the weapon from defendant's waistband.Upon being questioned as to whether he had anything further on his person, defendantdirected the officer to his coat pocket where he had a substance that was later identifiedas cocaine. Defendant was ultimately indicted for criminal possession of a weapon in thesecond degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventhdegree.
Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the physical evidence recovered from hisperson as the product of an illegal search and seizure. Following a Mapp hearing,at which defendant presented no evidence, County Court denied the motion. Defendantlater pleaded [*2]guilty to attempted criminal possessionof a weapon in the second degree, and County Court sentenced defendant, in accordancewith the plea agreement, to a prison term of two years, followed by two years ofpostrelease supervision. Defendant appeals, solely contesting County Court's denial ofhis suppression motion, a challenge which survives his guilty plea (see CPL710.70 [2]).
We affirm. A police officer may forcibly stop and detain an individual without awarrant if the officer has "a reasonable suspicion that the particular individual wasinvolved in a felony or misdemeanor" (People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 499 [2006]; see People vRoque, 99 NY2d 50, 54 [2002]; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223[1976]). Similarly, police pursuit is justified if the officer has a "reasonable suspicionthat a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed" (People v Holmes,81 NY2d 1056, 1058 [1993]; see People v Woods, 98 NY2d 627, 628 [2002]; People v Morris, 105 AD3d1075, 1077-1078 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1042 [2013]). Reasonablesuspicion is "the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent andcautious [person] under the circumstances to believe [that] criminal activity is at hand"(People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112-113 [1975]; accord People v Brannon, 16NY3d 596, 601-602 [2011]). Once a lawful stop has been effectuated, a policeofficer may conduct a protective frisk if he or she reasonably suspects that the suspect isarmed and poses a threat to his or her safety (see People v Batista, 88 NY2d 650,653-654 [1996]; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223; People v Morrow, 97 AD3d991, 992 [2012]).
Here, the police officer's undisputed testimony established that he witnesseddefendant riding a bicycle on the sidewalk in violation of a city ordinance.[FN*] Having witnessed theviolation, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that defendant may have engaged incriminal activity and was, therefore, justified in directing him to stop for the purpose ofconducting a limited investigation and determining the appropriate penalty and, by thesame token, pursuing him once he fled (see People v Sierra, 83 NY2d 928, 930[1994]; People v Basono,122 AD3d 553, 553 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1069 [2015]; People v Simms, 25 AD3d425, 425 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 838 [2006]).
As further established by the police officer's uncontradicted testimony, the ensuingpursuit culminated in defendant's forcible detention, an encounter that rapidly escalatedas defendant ignored the officer's repeated commands to stop, continued his efforts toflee and announced that he had a gun. As these circumstances unfolded, the policeofficer quickly developed a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed andjustifiably conducted the search of defendant's waistband that resulted in the discovery ofthe firearm (see People vWilliams, 25 AD3d 927, 929 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 840 [2006]; People v Winchester, 14 AD3d939, 940-941 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 796 [2005]). The officer'ssubsequent search of defendant's coat pocket was also justified, given that the discoveryof the firearm gave rise to probable cause for an arrest and that defendant answered in theaffirmative when asked if he had anything else on his person and directed the policeofficer to the location of the illicit substance (see People v Winchester, 14 AD3dat 941). As a final matter, we note that the manner and duration of the seizure, whichlasted a matter of minutes and ended in a formal arrest, did not exceed the scope [*3]of a permissible investigatory stop (see People vAllen, 73 NY2d 378, 379-380 [1989]; People v Williams, 305 AD2d 804,806-807 [2003]). In view of the foregoing, County Court did not err in denyingdefendant's motion to suppress.
Peters, P.J., Garry, Rose and Lynch, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote *:The city ordinance atissue here provides that an individual's first two violations within a one-year period are"deemed a violation of law" punishable by a fine, while "each consecutive violationthereafter within the same one-year period" is deemed a misdemeanor punishable by afine and/or a period of incarceration (Elmira City Code § 20-3 [b] [2] [c]).