| People v Leduc |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 04466 [140 AD3d 1305] |
| June 9, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vClaude Y. Leduc, Appellant. |
Martin J. McGuinness, Saratoga Springs, for appellant.
Andrew J. Wylie, District Attorney, Plattsburgh (Jaime A. Douthat of counsel), forrespondent.
Lynch, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Clinton County (Ryan, J.),rendered January 15, 2014, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, criminal possession of acontrolled substance in the seventh degree and conspiracy in the fourth degree.
In the early morning hours of October 20, 2012, defendant and Danny Spear were onSpear's property when police officers driving by noticed smoke coming from a shed onthe property. Upon the officers' arrival, Spears exited the shed, which contained materialscommonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, as well as substancescontaining methamphetamine. After a brief search of the area, defendant was discoveredin the driver's seat of his Pontiac Grand Prix, which was parked approximately 15 feetfrom the shed. In his car the officers found two vials of morphine in defendant's coatpocket and two bottles of drain cleaner, commonly used in the manufacture ofmethamphetamine.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the fourth degree for possessing one-half ounce or more ofmethamphetamine, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degreefor possession of morphine and conspiracy in the fourth degree for conspiring to possessone-half ounce or more of methamphetamine. County Court sentenced him to4
We affirm. Although Spear was defendant's accomplice, defendant could beconvicted on the basis of Spear's testimony if it was supported " 'by corroborativeevidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of [the charged]offense[s]' " (People vGodallah, 132 AD3d 1146, 1149 [2015], quoting CPL 60.22 [1]). It is notnecessary that the corroborating evidence prove that defendant committed the chargedcrimes, rather the evidence is sufficient "if it tends to connect the defendant with thecommission of the crime[s] in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that theaccomplice is telling the truth" (People v Reome, 15 NY3d 188, 191-192 [2010] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Myrick, 135 AD3d 1069, 1070 [2016]).
At trial, Spear testified that defendant was inside the shed with him, that theymanufactured and smoked methamphetamine together before the police officers arrivedon October 20, 2012 and that, immediately before the officers arrived, defendant ranfrom the shed to his car. Spear's testimony was corroborated by the trial testimony of twopolice officers who, when they initially drove by Spear's property, saw two men standingnear the doorway of the shed and, after searching the area near the shed, found defendantin his vehicle with the bottles of drain cleaner in the back seat. Taken together with thecontents of the shed, the early hour and defendant's implausible explanation to police thathe had just arrived and was taking a nap, this evidence was sufficient to corroborateSpear's testimony (see People v Moses, 63 NY2d 299, 307 [1984]; People v Rodriguez, 52 AD3d1047, 1048 [2008]; Peoplev Patchen, 46 AD3d 1112, 1113 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 814[2008]).
When viewed in the light most favorable to the People, we find that the evidence waslegally sufficient to support defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the fourth degree. Constructive possession of a controlled substance occurswhere "the defendant exercised 'dominion or control' over the [contraband] by asufficient level of control over the area in which the contraband [was] found" (Peoplev Manini, 79 NY2d 561, 573 [1992], quoting Penal Law § 10.00 [8];see People v Turner, 27AD3d 962, 963 [2006]). Defendant's proximity to the shed, his possession of thedrain cleaner and the timing of events, coupled with Spear's testimony, provided areasoned basis for the jury to conclude that defendant constructively possessed the morethan one-half ounce of a substance containing methamphetamine recovered from Spear'sshed (see Penal Law §§ 10.00 [8]; 220.09 [2]; People v Crooks, 129 AD3d1207, 1208-1209 [2015], lv granted 26 NY3d 966 [2015]; People v Sawyer, 23 AD3d845, 846 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 852 [2006]). As an agreement can beinferred "by circumstances indicating that defendant engaged in a common effort oracted in concert with others to achieve a common goal," this evidence was also legallysufficient to support the conviction of conspiracy in the fourth degree by demonstratingthat defendant entered into an agreement with another to engage in conduct constitutingthe class C felony of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree,i.e., the possession of one-half ounce or [*3]more of asubstance containing methamphetamine (People v Parsons, 275 AD2d 933, 934[2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 937 [2000], cert denied 532 US 998 [2001][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Penal Law§§ 105.10 [1]; 220.09 [2]; People v Harris, 288 AD2d 610,618 [2001], affd 99 NY2d 202 [2002]). With regard to the weight of theevidence, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, as Spear's trial testimonywas inconsistent with both his grand jury testimony and his original statement to thepolice, as well as the potential for bias due to his favorable plea deal juxtaposed againsthis criminal history. These "issues were fully developed at trial and highlighted to thejury" (People v Brooks, 127AD3d 1407, 1408-1409 [2015]; see People v Magee, 135 AD3d 1176, 1180 [2016]). Afterindependently reviewing the evidence and considering it in a neutral light, and accordingdeference to the jury's credibility determinations, we conclude that the verdict was notagainst the weight of the evidence (see People v Brooks, 127 AD3d at 1409;People v Patchen, 46 AD3d at 1113-1114).
Finally, defendant contends that the sentence imposed by County Court was harshand excessive. The fact that defendant's aggregate prison sentence and postreleasesupervision were greater than his pretrial plea offer, which defendant rejected," 'is not proof that defendant was penalized for exercising his right to a jurytrial' " (People vYoung, 86 AD3d 796, 800 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 905 [2011],quoting People v Robinson,72 AD3d 1277, 1278 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 809 [2010]). Further, thefact that Spear received a more lenient sentence than defendant does not warrant areduction in defendant's sentence, especially given that Spear entered into a plea bargainand testified at defendant's trial (see People v Camaj, 299 AD2d 595, 597 [2002],lv denied 99 NY2d 613 [2003]). We find that County Court properly balanceddefendant's lack of criminal history with the seriousness of the crimes, and noextraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion exist warranting a modification in theinterest of justice (see People vFarnsworth, 103 AD3d 982, 984 [2013]; People v Cruz, 244 AD2d 803,804-805 [1997]).
Garry, J.P., Egan Jr., Clark and Mulvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote *:Defendant makes noargument in relation to his conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance inthe seventh degree.