| People v Etkin |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 50115(U) [50 Misc 3d 1216(A)] |
| Decided on January 7, 2016 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County |
| Qui�ones, J. |
| As corrected in part through February 8,2016; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on January 7, 2016
The People ofthe State of New York against Leonid Etkin, Defendant |
2015CK002606
For the People:
ADA Cassandra Pond
For the Defense:
Igor Niman, Esq.
Joanne D. Quiñones, J.
Defendant is before the court charged with three counts each of Climbing, Jumpingor Suspending Oneself from Structures Prohibited, in violation of Administrative Code(AC) section 10-167(b)(ii), Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree, in violation of PenalLaw (PL) section 140.10(a), and Trespass, in violation of P.L. section 140.05.
A combined Huntley/Dunaway/Wade hearing was conducted before thiscourt on January 6, 2016. The sole witness at the hearing was Police Officer RobertWhite, who testified on behalf of the People. I find the officer to be credible. At the endof the testimony, the court heard oral arguments from both sides and adjourned thematter for decision.
I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
OfficerWhite has been a police officer with the New York City Police Department for 9 ½years. On August 25, 2015, he was working on an anti-crime assignment which hedescribed as a plainclothes unit that travels in unmarked vehicles and conducts pro-activepolice work. He was working with a partner when he received a radio run atapproximately 2:30 PM of someone climbing a radio antenna at 500 19th Street in KingsCounty. The officer arrived at the location and saw that it was Bishop Ford High Schooland there was a large TV antenna, which exceeded 50 feet, right next to it. When hearrived at the location, Officer White saw members of the Fire Department speaking to aman on the sidewalk who he later identified at the hearing as the defendant Leonid Etkin.Officer White approached the firefighters and was told by the [*2]firefighters that the defendant was the person who they sawclimb down the antenna. Officer White then asked the defendant why he climbed theladder and whether he wanted to hurt himself or jump off the tower to which thedefendant responded that he climbed it for thrills. At the time of defendant's statement,he was not under arrest, he was not in handcuffs, there were no guns drawn, and nopromises or threats had been made to him. When asked where his partner was when thedefendant made the statement, Officer White answered "probably next to me."
The firefighters directed Officer White to the individuals who called 911. Within oneto two minutes after speaking to the firefighters and the defendant, Officer White wentover to the individuals who he identified as Juan Morales and Peter Goyco, both ofwhom work for the owner of the antenna. Mr. Morales and Mr. Goyco were standingtogether on the sidewalk approximately 10 to 15 feet away from where the defendantstood with the firefighters. When Officer White went over to speak to Mr. Morales andMr. Goyco, his partner remained with the defendant.
Officer White asked Mr. Morales and Mr. Goyco what happened and they respondedthat they saw the defendant climb the antenna, yelled for him to come down and that theycalled 911. They also told the officer that they took pictures of the defendant andwatched him climb all the way down. Both Mr. Morales and Mr. Goyco pointed at thedefendant as the person who they saw climb up and down the antenna. At the time theypointed out the defendant, the defendant was standing some 10 to 15 feet away with thefirefighters and Officer White's partner. At the time, the defendant was not in handcuffs,the partner was not gesturing to the defendant in any way and the partner did not have hishands on the defendant. After speaking to Mr. Morales and Mr. Goyco, Officer Whiteplaced the defendant under arrest.
The Dunaway portion
With respect to the Dunaway portion, the People have the initial burden ofgoing forward to show by credible evidence that the police acted lawfully in their arrestof the defendant. "Probable cause [to arrest] requires the existence of facts andcircumstances which, when viewed as a whole, would lead a reasonable personpossessing the same expertise as the arresting officer to conclude that an offense hasbeen or is being committed and that the defendant committed or is committing thatoffense" (People v. Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417 [1985]; People v. McRay, 51NY2d 594, 602 [1980]). Here, Officer White received a radio run of a person climbing aradio antenna at 500 19th Street. At the scene, he was informed by firefighters that theysaw the defendant climb down from the antenna. The defendant admitted that he climbedthe antenna for thrills. Furthermore, Officer White spoke to two individuals, namely JuanMorales and Peter Goyco, who told him that they saw the defendant climb and all theway down the antenna, and that they called 911. The information provided by thefirefighters and civilian eyewitnesses and the defendant's statement established sufficientprobable cause for the defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the motion to suppress thedefendant's statement or any identification as the fruit of an unlawful arrest isdenied.
The Huntley portion
With respect to the Huntley portion, the People have the burden of provingbeyond a reasonable doubt that the statements made by the defendant were voluntary. Itis manifest that a [*3]defendant who is in custody maynot be interrogated by law enforcement without being advised of his constitutional rights(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). "However, both the elements of police custody' and police interrogation' must be present before law enforcement officialsconstitutionally are obligated to provide the procedural safeguards imposed upon themby Miranda" (People v. Huffman, 41 NY2d 29, 33 [1976]). The test ofwhether a person is in custody is not whether he would have been restrained if heattempted to leave the scene (People v. Rodney P., 21 NY2d 1, 10 [1967]), butrather whether a reasonable person, innocent of any wrongdoing, would have believedthat he was free to leave (People v. Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969]). Thedetermination of custody neither depends on the subjective intent of the law enforcementofficer-interrogator (Rodney P., 21 NY2d at 8-9), nor on the subjective beliefs ofthe defendant (Yukl, 25 NY2d at 589). Here, the defendant, who was nothandcuffed or otherwise physically deprived of his freedom, was not in custody at thetime the statement was made.Moreover, while defendant's statement was made inresponse to the officer's question as to why the defendant climbed the antenna andwhether the defendant wanted to hurt himself, the question that immediately precededdefendant's statement was investigatory in nature (see Huffman, 41 NY2d at 34[single question asked of defendant by officer was designed to clarify the nature of thesituation and thus did not fall within the ambit of Miranda]; see also People v . Gore, 117AD3d 845, 846 [2nd Dept 2014] [initial questioning by police at hospital afterDWI-related car accident were investigatory in nature]). As such, Mirandawarnings were not required. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to suppress thestatement on the grounds of involuntariness is denied.
The Wade portion
Before addressing the Wade portion of the hearing, the court will address thetimeliness of the identification notice served and filed by the People on January 6, 2016.
On August 26, 2015, the defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaintwhich listed Juan Morales as the informant who allegedly observed the defendant climb atelevision antenna enclosed within a barbed wire fence on August 25, 2015 at 2:35 PM at500 19th Street. At his initial arraignment, the People filed and served written noticepursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) section 710.30(1)(b) of a point-outidentification of the defendant made by Mr. Morales.
On October 26, 2015, the People filed and served a superseding information (SSI)which replaced the name of Juan Morales with Peter Goyco. That SSI alleged thatinformant Peter Goyco observed the defendant climb a television antenna enclosedwithin a barbed wire fence on August 25, 2015 at 2:35 PM at 500 19th Street. No CPLsection 710.30(1)(b) notice accompanied that superseding information.
On January 6, 2016, the People served and filed a superseding information whichalleged an additional fact, specifically the height of the structure that the defendantallegedly climbed. The People also served notice pursuant to CPL section 710.30(1)(b)of a point-out identification of the defendant made by Peter Goyco and re-served noticeof a point-out identification of the defendant made by Juan Morales. Notably, thedefendant did not raise any issue regarding the timeliness or sufficiency of the People's710.30(1)(b) notice regarding a prior identification of the [*4]defendant by Peter Goyco, the court however raised theissue of timeliness with the parties at a bench conference at the hearing and invited bothparties to address the issue in their closing arguments at the hearing. At the hearing, thedefense elicited testimony from Officer White regarding Mr. Goyco's identification of thedefendant. In their closing argument, the defense did not address the timeliness of theadditional identification notice and did not move for preclusion, but rather moved forsuppression. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court invited both parties to submitcase law or brief the issue of the timeliness of the notice regarding Mr. Goyco'sidentification by submitting an email to the court's court attorney with a carbon copy toopposing counsel by 4 pm on January 6, 2016.
On January 6, 2016 at 3:31 pm, the court received via email the People's writtensubmission which was copied to the defense. On January 6, 2016 at 4:10 pm, the courtreceived via email the defendant's written submission which was copied to the People. Intheir written submission, the People submit that because the defendant was arraigned ona superseding information on January 6, 2016, any notices filed within fifteen (15) daysof that arraignment are timely. In his written submission, the defendant moves to strikeany and all testimony elicited by the defense counsel from Officer White as well asdefense counsel's request to suppress the identification made by Peter Goyco, argues thatthe identification notice was untimely and then concludes "the identification made by Mr.Goyco of Mr. Etkin shall be suppressed" (see Email and 1 page attachment ofDefense Counsel received on 1/6/16 at 4:10 pm). The email submissions of the partieshave been made a part of the court file and were considered by the court in its decision,an abridged version of which it rendered orally on the record on January 7, 2016, atapproximately 10:30 am.[FN1]The court further advised the parties that its full written decision setting forth the court'sfindings of fact and conclusions of law would be mailed and faxed to the parties laterthat day.
CPL section 710.30(2) requires that the People serve identification notice upon thedefendant within fifteen (15) days of arraignment and before trial. There are only twoexceptions to this requirement: "the fifteen (15) day time provision may be waived forgood cause and the notice may be excused if the defendant has in fact moved forsuppression" (People v. Lopez, 84 NY2d 425, 428 [1994]). Where, as in theinstant matter, an SSI has been filed, courts have held that arraignment on a supersedinginformation which replaces a defective instrument by adding new facts or which chargesnew offenses re-triggers the People's opportunity to serve statement [*5]or identification notice under CPL section 710.30(People v. Lopez, 159 Misc 2d 264, 268 [Crim Ct, NY County 1993]; People v. Iavarone, 12 Misc 3d1158[A], *3 [Crim Ct, NY County 2006]; see also People v. Littlejohn, 184AD2d 790, 791 [2nd Dept 1992] [court rejected defense argument that notice filed afterdefendant's arraignment on second indictment was untimely reasoning that followingarraignment on a superseding instrument defense may file new pre-trial motions];People v. Paimas, 139 Misc 2d 262, 264 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1988] [15-dayperiod for notices begins to run from date of defendant's arraignment on indictmentwhich replaced criminal court complaint]). In People v. Lopez, the People filedand served an SSI to replace the original accusatory instrument which was defectivebecause it failed to set forth essential elements of an offense charged. Together with theSSI, the People for the first time served notice pursuant to CPL section 710.30(1)(a) of astatement made by the defendant. The court found that because the SSI added new factsand different charges and replaced a defective instrument, the People's fifteen (15) dayperiod to file notices under CPL section 710.30 was re-triggered.
Of course, where the People file a pretextual superseding information in an effort tocircumvent the provisions of CPL section 710.30, the serving of statement oridentification notice will not be permitted (see, e.g., People v. Iavarone, 12 Misc 3d 1158[A]; People v. Porter, 33 Misc 3d791 [Geneva City Ct 2011]). For example, in People v. Iavarone, the courtdid not allow the People to serve CPL section 710.30 notice upon the filing of an SSIwhere the SSI "add[ed] nothing to the original complaint by way of fact or charges [andthe two documents were] virtually identical except that the original was signed by thecomplainant ... and the superseding information was signed by a detective"(Iavarone, 12 Misc 3d at *4). Similarly, in People v. Porter, the courtfound that the CPL section 710.30(1)(b) notice served by the People together with a newaccusatory instrument was untimely where the new instrument did not charge a differentoffense, nor allege different facts and as such, did not qualify as an SSI (Porter,33 Misc 3d at 793).
In the instant case, the People filed an SSI to correct a defective instrument. Both theoriginal complaint and the first superseding complaint failed to allege that the televisionantenna that the defendant was allegedly climbing was over fifty (50) feet in height, arequired element of the crime of Climbing, Jumping or Suspending Oneself fromStructures Prohibited (see AC § 10-167[a]). By failing to include thisnecessary element of the charged offense, both the original and the first supersedinginformation were facially insufficient (see People v. Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 730[1986] ["The factual part of a misdemeanor complaint must allege facts of an evidentiarycharacter demonstrating reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the crimecharged"]). The facts of the instant case are akin to those of Lopez, 159 Misc 2d264. The People filed an SSI alleging an additional fact which addressed the facialinsufficiency of the two prior accusatory instruments. The filing of the SSI triggered anew fifteen (15) day clock during which the People could file statement or identificationnotice under CPL section 710.30(1). Accordingly, the court finds that the CPL section710.30(1)(b) notice served by the People on January 6, 2016 together with the SSI wastimely.
Nevertheless, assuming that the People's additional notice was untimely, it issignificant that when the People served the additional CPL section 710.30(1)(b) noticethe defendant did not challenge the timeliness or sufficiency of the notice. Contrary todefendant's position, the facts [*6]here are not analogousto those in People v. Bernier, 141 AD2d 750 (2nd Dept 1988), aff'd 73NY2d 1006 [1989]. In Bernier, the defense, during jury selection, learned thatthere had been a show up identification of the defendant. The defendant moved topreclude admission of the identification on the grounds that he had not been given noticepursuant to CPL section 710.30(1)(b). The trial court denied the motion to preclude andconducted a Wade hearing. After the hearing, the trial court granted defendant'smotion to preclude the identification on the grounds that the notice was untimely and thatthe identification procedure was unduly suggestive, but then allowed the People, overdefense objection, to re-open the hearing to establish an independent source for thein-court identification testimony and ultimately allowed the admission of an in-courtidentification based on an independent source. The Second Department foundunpersuasive the People's claim that the defendant had waived his right to preclusion ofthe identification by participating in the hearing and reversed the trial court. Similarly theCourt of Appeals, in affirming the Second Department, found the waiver argumentmeritless. The Court reasoned "the waiver exception cannot become operative in a casesuch as this when the defendant clearly moved initially to preclude and lost"(Bernier, 73 NY2d at 1008).
Unlike in Bernier, the defendant here did not initially move to preclude theidentification made by Mr. Goyco or otherwise challenge the notice of said identification.In fact, it was the court, not the defendant, who raised a concern over the timeliness ofthe People's additional 710.30 notice as well as the sufficiency of it because the notice,which was amended prior to the commencement of the hearing, did not specify the timeof the identification. The defendant did not move to preclude or otherwise challenge thenotice in any way prior to the hearing. He fully participated in the hearing and elicitedtestimony from Officer White regarding the reasonableness of the police conduct in thepre-trial identification procedure made by both Mr. Morales and Mr. Goyco. Moreover,even after the court invited the parties to argue the timeliness issue at the close of thehearing, the defendant did not address it and instead moved to suppress, not preclude, theidentification. By doing so, the defendant waived any deficiency in the notice (seeCPL § 710.30[3]; see also People v. Kirkland, 89 NY2d 903, 905[1996] [where "defendant ... moved to suppress the identification testimony and receiveda full hearing on the fairness of the identification procedure, any alleged deficiency in thenotice provided by the People was irrelevant"]; People v. Lazzaro, 62 AD3d 1035, 1036 [2nd Dept 2009][despite inadequate notice, statements found admissible where they were identified at ahearing addressing their voluntariness and defendant moved to suppress them]; People v. Henderson, 74 AD3d1567, 1569 [3rd Dept 2010] ["While defendant did not receive the required notice ofhis oral statements pursuant to CPL 710.30(1), they were disclosed at the Huntleyhearing in which he fully participated, thereby waiving any deficiency in thenotice"]).
The court will now turn to its conclusions of law regarding the Wade portionof the hearing. At a Wade hearing, the People have the initial burden ofestablishing that the pre-trial identification procedure was not constitutionallyimpermissible and the defendant has the ultimate burden of proving that the pre-trialidentification procedure was unduly suggestive (People v. Jackson, 98 NY2d555, 559 [2002]). In the instant case, Officer White arrived on the scene and spoke with agroup of firefighters who were standing with the defendant. The [*7]firefighters advised Officer White that the defendant wasthe person who they saw climb down the antenna. They then directed the officer to JuanMorales and Peter Goyco, the two individuals that made the 911 call, who were standingtogether on the sidewalk about 10 to 15 feet away from the firefighters and thedefendant. When Officer White asked Mr. Morales and Mr. Goyco what happened, theypointed out the defendant and stated that they saw the defendant climb the antenna andthat they watched him climb all the way down and took pictures of him climbing down.
An identification procedure is not arranged by the police when the identification"result[s] from mere happenstance, such as where a witness is present in policeheadquarters for some purpose other than to effectuate an identification, and by chanceviews and identifies a suspect who is being processed in another room" (People v.Dixon, 85 NY2d 218, 223 [1995]). The record herein lacks any indication that eitherMr. Morales or Mr. Goyco remained at the scene at the behest of law enforcement inorder to make an identification. Accordingly, the court finds that the identificationprocedure was not police arranged.
The court also finds that the identification procedure here was not unduly suggestive.Although it is clear that Mr. Morales and Mr. Goyco pointed out the defendant as theindividual that climbed the antenna while standing near each other, the point-out by bothindividuals was "prompt [and a part] of an unbroken chain of fast-paced events" (People v. Wilburn, 40 AD3d508, 509 [1st Dept 2007]). In People v. Wilburn, the police transported twoeyewitnesses to the defendant's location for a show-up. The First Department reasonedthat "while the better practice, when feasible, is not to conduct a show-up before multiplewitnesses, the procedure here was tolerable in the interest of prompt identification' "(id.; see also People v. Love, 57 NY2d 1023, 1025 [1982] [show-upbefore a group of witnesses was tolerable in the interest of prompt identification"particularly so ... in view of the proximity of the apprehension of the defendant in timeand space to the scene of the crime"]). In the instant case, Officer White arrived inresponse to a radio run of an individual climbing a tower. At the time of his arrival,firefighters were still at the scene with the defendant and the eyewitnesses were still thereas well. Within one to two minutes of speaking to the firefighters and the defendant, theOfficer spoke with the eyewitnesses who both indicated they saw an individual climb upand down the antenna and then pointed out the defendant as that individual. The courtfinds "no reason to believe that one witness influenced the other's identification"(Wilburn, 40 AD3d at 509). Accordingly, the defendant's motion to suppress theidentification is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated: January 7, 2016
Brooklyn, New York
_______________________________
Joanne D. Quiñones
Judge ofthe Criminal Court
Footnote 1:On January 7, 2016 at11:36 am, after the court had rendered its abridged decision on the record, defensecounsel advised the court via email, copied to the People, that due to a clerical error, thecourt only received one page of his submission and that due to a computer glitch theentire two page document wasn't received and that for the purposes of preserving therecord, he wanted to include his entire memo. Annexed to that email was the same onepage letter the court had received on January 6, 2016 at 4:10 pm.
On January 7, 2016 at 11:40 am, the court received from thedefense an email, with a copy to the People, advising the court that " apparently due to acomputer glitch [defense counsel] is unable to resend the entire two page document tothe Court" but that defense counsel "will hand deliver [the] two page documentimmediately for the purposes of preserving the record." No document was hand deliveredto the court on January 7, 2016. On January 7, 2016 at 2:13 pm, the defense sent the court anemail containing a 2 page letter in the body of the email. The People were not copied onthe email so the court will not consider said ex parte communication.