Matter of Seon v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs.
2018 NY Slip Op 02240 [159 AD3d 607]
March 29, 2018
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 2, 2018


[*1](March 29, 2018)
 In the Matter of Wayne Seon, Petitioner,
v
New YorkState Department of Motor Vehicles et al., Respondents.

Armienti DeBellis Guglielmo & Rhoden LLP, New York (Mohammad M. Haque ofcounsel), for petitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York (Judith N. Vale of counsel), forrespondents.

In this proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order,Supreme Court, Bronx County [Kenneth L. Thompson, Jr., J.], entered on or about October 3,2016), to annul the determination of respondent New York State Department of Motor Vehicles(DMV), dated March 28, 2016, which, after a hearing, upheld the suspension of petitioner'sdriver's license for six months based on a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1146, the petition is granted, without costs, the determination of DMV is annulledand vacated, and petitioner's driver's license reinstated.

This proceeding arises out of a summons issued to petitioner, a New York City Transit busdriver, for allegedly failing, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (c), to"exercise due care to avoid colliding" with an 88-year-old pedestrian, causing the pedestrian'sdeath. A hearing was held to adjudicate the summons, at which Charlie Viera, the investigatingofficer, who is an accident reconstruction specialist, and petitioner both testified. The onlyexhibits submitted into evidence by DMV were two accident reports, one prepared at the sceneand one prepared a month later by Viera, after the pedestrian died, and a witness statementprovided by petitioner. Viera was not assigned to the matter until after the pedestrian's death.

According to the report prepared at the scene, the collision occurred on the evening ofNovember 13, 2014, at the intersection of Vyse Avenue and East 174th Street in the Bronx. Thebus was making a right turn onto Vyse Avenue, with a green light, and the pedestrian waswalking across Vyse Avenue, in the crosswalk, with the walk signal. The bus "had front tiresalready through the crosswalk when [the pedestrian] made contact, becoming pinned under thepassenger side door of the bus behind the front wheel." According to the report prepared by Vieraafter the pedestrian died and he was assigned the investigation, the pedestrian was admitted to St.Barnabas Hospital and died there "as a result of his injuries." The report does not explain on whatbasis Viera believed that the pedestrian's death, over one month after the accident, was directlycaused by the accident. Further, the report states that at the scene of the accident his injuries,which were to his legs, "were not considered life threatening."

Viera's direct testimony largely consisted of his reading or summarizing the contents of thereports. He concluded that petitioner "struck the pedestrian with the front right side of the bus,running over the legs of the pedestrian with the front passenger's side tire." Although Vieratestified that the pedestrian "suffered a severe leg injury" and "was transported by EMS to St.Barnabas where he later died as a result of his injuries," he did not identify on what basis heconcluded that the injury was severe or that, as implied, the pedestrian's death could be linked tothe accident. On cross-examination, Viera acknowledged that, when the accident occurred, it wasnighttime and it was raining heavily, and the crosswalk was very poorly lit. He further admittedthat the pedestrian was wearing a hoodie and carrying an open umbrella, and that these thingscould have obstructed his vision. As for the injury, Viera testified that the pedestrian's [*2]death "was determined complication from the collision of theaccident [sic]." Again, however, he did not explain who determined this. Further, he concededthat he did not know which part of the pedestrian's leg had been impacted, and that it could havepossibly been a foot. Injury to a foot, he acknowledged, is not generally considered lifethreatening. Finally, Viera stated that he did not read any medical reports, and that he did notknow whether there were "other medical complications" that caused the pedestrian to die.

Petitioner testified that as he made his right hand turn onto Vyse Avenue, a one-way street,he noticed parked cars on both sides of the street, and no pedestrians in the crosswalk. Hescanned his mirrors on the left and right side of the bus to make sure that he didn't hit anypedestrians or parked cars. After scanning his mirrors, he heard a thump on the right side of thebus, by the front door. He secured the bus, then stepped out, and saw the pedestrian "laying onthe side of the tire, just behind the tire itself, wearing a black hoodie (with the hood over hishead) and a big, large . . . black umbrella." Petitioner stated that he did not take anydrugs for 24 hours before the accident, and that 24 hours after the accident, he tested negative fordrugs and alcohol.

The Administrative Law Judge found that the charge had been established by clear andconvincing evidence that "the motorist failed to exercise due care and violated 1146C [sic] of theVehicle and Traffic Law." The Administrative Law Judge imposed a fine of $150 and, notingthat petitioner had no relevant convictions in the past 18 months, and "given the lightingconditions, the weather conditions, the motorist's record in the last 18 months," his license wouldbe suspended for 75 days "as per statute." The Administrative Law Judge did not mention thepedestrian's death in declaring that petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1146, other than to note the death in fashioning a penalty. The following dayDMV sent petitioner an order of suspension, stating that his license would be suspended for sixmonths pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 510 (2) for failure to exercise duecare with serious physical injury resulting. Petitioner appealed to the Traffic Violations BureauAppeals Board of DMV, which upheld the determination.

Petitioner commenced this article 78 proceeding, arguing that neither substantial evidencenor clear and convincing evidence supports the charge that he failed to exercise due care andviolated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (c); that his due process rights wereviolated because the admitted evidence was not provided to him prior to or during his hearing;and that his due process rights were further violated when, subsequent to affirmance by theAppeals Board, the DMV imposed a suspension of "at least 177 days" which wasunconstitutionally vague. The court stayed the suspension and transferred the proceeding to thisCourt for substantial evidence review.

This Court has described substantial evidence as a "minimal standard," constituting a "lowthreshold," and requiring less than "a preponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence orevidence beyond a reasonable doubt" (Matter of Shuman v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 40AD3d 385, 385 [1st Dept 2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[A]s a burden ofproof, it demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the mostprobable," and "the courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the conclusion of theadministrative agency where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists" (id.at 386 [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]). Petitioner acknowledges thatsubstantial evidence is the standard of review in this case, but insists that it must be applied inlight of the standard of review that the Administrative Law Judge was required to apply in theDMV proceeding. That standard was one of clear and convincing evidence (Vehicle and TrafficLaw § 227 [1]). In response, DMV cites Matter of Williams v Perales (156AD2d 697 [2d Dept 1989]). In that case, which dealt with a violation of the rules governing foodstamps, the court stated that "[a]lthough the applicable administrative standard of review indetermining whether a local agency has established an intentional program violation is 'clear andconvincing evidence,' the proper judicial standard of review of the Commissioner's determinationis whether the determination is based on substantial evidence" (156 AD2d at 698 [citationomitted]).

This Court does not appear to have addressed the issue directly. However, other SecondDepartment cases suggest that, notwithstanding Matter of Williams, the AppellateDivision is not [*3]required to ignore the underlying standard ofevidence when conducting a substantial evidence review pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g). Forexample, in Matter of Kaplowitz v Jackson (267 AD2d 239, 239-240 [2d Dept 1999]),the Court, in finding that a determination by DMV that the petitioner was guilty of speeding wassupported by substantial evidence, stated "that in finding clear and convincing evidence that atraffic infraction had been committed, the Administrative Law Judge properly relied upon theresults of radar testing and upon the arresting officer's visual estimate of the speed of thepetitioner's vehicle." Similarly, in Matter of Anthony Grace & Sons v New York StateDept. of Motor Vehs. (266 AD2d 284, 285 [2d Dept 1999]), the Court held that "[t]hedetermination that there was clear and convincing evidence . . . that the petitionerviolated [the Vehicle and Traffic Law] is supported by substantial evidence." Thus, while theappellate standard of review of substantial evidence requires great deference to findings that ahearing officer makes based on the evidence placed before it, it still calls for the reviewing courtto ensure that such findings are not made in the absence of evidence that could, again with theproper amount of deference, reasonably be called clear and convincing.

Here, DMV was required to establish that petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1146 (c) (1), which imposes liability on "[a] driver of a motor vehicle who causesserious physical injury as defined in article ten of the penal law to a pedestrian or bicyclist whilefailing to exercise due care." The referenced definition of "[s]erious physical injury" includes"physical injury . . . which causes death" (Penal Law § 10.00 [10]),which is presumably the basis for the charge against petitioner since he was not issued asummons until after the pedestrian died in the hospital. Thus, DMV was required to present clearand convincing evidence of both failure to exercise care and that such failure led to thepedestrian's demise. Petitioner claims that DMV failed in both respects. Regarding the accidentitself, petitioner posits that the evidence was not clear and convincing that he failed to exercisedue care, because it was equally plausible that the pedestrian, considering the lighting, theweather, and the hoodie and umbrella that may have obstructed his view, walked into the side ofthe bus. We reject this position. Under the substantial evidence standard of review, so long asthere was some evidence that the Administrative Law Judge could have reasonably deemed to beclear and convincing proof that petitioner should have seen the pedestrian, we may not disturbthe administrative finding. Based on the uncontested fact that the pedestrian had the right of way,and the testimony of an experienced accident reconstruction specialist that petitioner should haveseen him and allowed him to proceed before he drove through the intersection, theAdministrative Law Judge had ample evidence to find that petitioner failed to exercise duecare.

With regard to the requirement that DMV establish serious physical injury, however, we findthat there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the Administrative Law Judge'simplicit finding that clear and convincing evidence existed that the accident caused thepedestrian's death. This conclusion does not require us to weigh evidence, determine witnesscredibility, or otherwise second-guess educated findings made by the Administrative Law Judge,all of which are prohibited under the substantial evidence standard of review (Matter ofShuman, 40 AD3d at 385). Rather, it is a recognition that the DMV presented no evidence atall tying the pedestrian's death to the injuries suffered by him in the accident, not even a deathcertificate. Viera, the only witness presented by DMV, presented no medical evidencewhatsoever. He never stated that anyone medically qualified to do so told him that the pedestriandied because of his injuries, he merely stated that this was "determined." The only reference to adoctor in the investigative report he prepared merely states that a Dr. Carazas at St. BarnabasHospital pronounced the pedestrian dead. Further, the investigative report Viera prepared statedthat the pedestrian's injuries at the scene were not life threatening, and he imparted no knowledgeabout the severity of the injuries at any point before the death of the pedestrian, even admitting tonot knowing what part of the pedestrian's leg was impacted by the bus. Thus, there was no basisfor the Administrative Law Judge to even draw an inference that the pedestrian died as a result ofhis injuries.

The dissent states that "the record contains clear and uncontroverted evidence of how thisaccident occurred and the resulting serious injury sustained by the pedestrian," focusing on thestatement in the initial accident report that the pedestrian was "pinned under the passenger side[*4]door[FN*] of the bus behind the front wheel." This, ofcourse, ignores that DMV, at the hearing, did not proceed on the theory, much less offer anymedical proof, that the pedestrian sustained "serious and protracted disfigurement, protractedimpairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ" (PenalLaw § 10 [10]). The dissent's approach further ignores that the Administrative LawJudge made no findings concerning whether the pedestrian sustained a "serious physical injury."In any event, even were it proper for this Court, in performing its review, to uphold thedetermination on a ground not pursued at the administrative level, we cannot disregard thatpetitioner testified that when he exited the bus after hearing a "thump," the pedestrian was"laying on the side of the tire, just behind the tire itself." This is not consistent with the notionthat the pedestrian was "pinned," which would imply that the full, or a significant portion of, theweight of the bus had rendered the pedestrian's leg immobile. That would arguably imply asignificant injury, but the evidence is not clear and convincing that this was the case. Thus, it isan open question how the pedestrian's leg was impacted. Without minimizing the potential fordanger to an octogenarian who is hit by a bus, there is simply nothing in the record to suggestthat the accident, even if it did not cause the pedestrian's death, satisfied the requirement that thepedestrian suffered "serious physical injury" as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1146 (c).

To be sure, one could speculate, as does the dissent, that the pedestrian suffered a "seriousphysical injury." But to engage in speculation would be to ignore the underlying standard of clearand convincing evidence, which even the dissent agrees applied in the administrative proceedingand is relevant to our review. "Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that satisfies thefactfinder that it is highly probable that what is claimed actually happened . . . and itis evidence that is neither equivocal nor open to opposing presumptions" (Matter of Gail R. [Barron], 67 AD3d808, 811-812 [2d Dept 2009] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). Given thatstandard, and the remarkable lack of compelling evidence before us, we would be abdicating ourrole were we simply to defer to the conclusions drawn by the Administrative Law Judge, andraising a serious question as to the very purpose of having any appellate review in thismatter.

Because we find that the Administrative Law Judge's determination was not supported bysubstantial evidence, we need not consider petitioner's argument that his due process rights wereimpaired or that the penalty was unduly severe. Concur—Mazzarelli, Oing, Singh, JJ.

Tom, J.P., and Andrias, J., dissent in a memorandum by Tom, J.P., as follows: I agree withthe majority's discussion of the interplay between our standard of review on appeal and theunderlying clear and convincing standard in the DMV proceeding, and the majority's finding thatpetitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (c) (1) by failing to exercise duecare when he struck a pedestrian with his bus. However, I would find that substantial evidence inthe record supports the Administrative Law Judge's finding that clear and convincing evidenceexisted that the accident caused the pedestrian serious physical injury. Accordingly, I respectfullydissent.

The decedent Julian Porres Mendez was struck and run over by a bus at the crosswalk at theintersection of Vyse Avenue and East 174th Street in the Bronx. Decedent was taken to St.Barnabas Hospital by EMS and died a few weeks later.

New York State Department of Motor Vehicles issued petitioner Wayne Seon (the busdriver) a summons for violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (c) for failing to"exercise due [*5]care to avoid colliding" with and causing apedestrian to sustain "a serious physical injury."

The majority finds there was insufficient evidence to support a violation of section 1146 (c)because "there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the Administrative Law Judge'simplicit finding that clear and convincing evidence existed that the accident caused thepedestrian's death."

To sustain the Administrative Law Judge's finding we do not need to conclude that there wasclear and convincing evidence before the agency that the collision caused the pedestrian's deathor a substantial risk of death. Rather, under the statutory definition, it suffices where there is clearand convincing proof of the "protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment ofthe function of any bodily organ."

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (c) (1) provides in part: "A driver of a motorvehicle who causes serious physical injury as defined in article ten of the penal law to apedestrian . . . while failing to exercise due care . . . shall be guilty of atraffic infraction."

Penal Law § 10.00 (10) defines "serious physical injury" as: " 'Seriousphysical injury' means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causesdeath or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted lossor impairment of the function of any bodily organ."

Clearly, then, serious physical injury may be proven by demonstrating that an injury eithercreated a substantial risk of death or caused death, or caused protracted impairment of health orloss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.

The majority's contention that the basis for the charge against petitioner was the death of thepedestrian is without merit. The record is bare of any evidence to support this supposition. Themajority's conclusion that DMV charged petitioner under the death provision of the statute solelybecause the summons was served upon petitioner after the pedestrian's death is rank speculationand should be outright rejected. The evidence in this case clearly showed that DMV proceeded inits charge against petitioner under the entire provision of section 1146 (c). In fact, petitioner wascharged in the summons with violation of "section 1146 (c)" and the Administrative Law Judgeafter a hearing found in his decision that petitioner "violated 1146 (c) of the Vehicle and TrafficLaw." There was no mention of pedestrian's death in the charge or the holding of theAdministrative Law Judge. It is clear that the charge against petitioner and findings by the agencyrefer to section 1146 (c) as a whole and did not focus on a particular definition of seriousphysical injury.

It should be noted that "[h]earsay evidence can be the basis of an administrativedetermination," including documentary evidence such as photographs, police accident and anypolice investigative reports (Matter of Gray v Adduci, 73 NY2d 741, 742 [1988]; see also Matter of Guarino v New YorkState Dept. of Motor Vehs., 80 AD3d 697 [2d Dept 2011]; Matter of Fazzone vAdduci, 155 AD2d 540 [2d Dept 1989]). There is no requirement that a particular form ofmedical proof is needed to sustain a finding of a serious injury in this administrative hearing asurged by the majority. Further, given that hearsay evidence can be the basis of an administrativedetermination and may on its own constitute substantial evidence (see Matter of Café La China Corp. vNew York State Liq. Auth., 43 AD3d 280, 281 [1st Dept 2007]), no particular type ofevidence was required to be put forth at the hearing. Thus, it is inconsequential that the DMVpresented no medical evidence or medical reports so long as testimony of witnesses, and policeaccident and investigative reports, meet petitioner's burden of proof. Here, the evidence clearlyand convincingly supports the finding of a serious injury.

In this case, there was ample evidence to support the finding that decedent was struck andrun over by a bus, and sustained a serious physical injury in conjunction with section 1146 (c)under the clear and convincing standard of review by the Administrative Law Judge.

It appears that the majority is questioning whether the bus struck and ran over the pedestrianand whether he sustained a serious injury pursuant to Penal Law § 10.00 (10) as aresult of this accident.

Once again, the record contains clear and uncontroverted evidence of how this accident [*6]occurred and the resulting serious injury sustained by thepedestrian. Police Officer Casey prepared the accident report which was marked into evidence.The report states that the pedestrian was "pinned under the passenger side body of the bus behindthe front wheel." In light of this evidence with no proof to the contrary, the majority continues toquestion whether the pedestrian was run over by and pinned under the front tire of the bus. Themajority states the evidence is "not consistent with the notion that the pedestrian was 'pinned,'which would imply that the full . . . weight of the bus had rendered the pedestrian'sleg immobile." Once again, the fact that the pedestrian was pinned under the front wheel of thebus was reported in the accident report by the police officer at the scene of the accident. Theaccident report was admitted into evidence without objection. Even the petitioner does notcontest the pedestrian was pinned under the bus. Petitioner testified that as he was making a rightturn he heard a "thump" in front of the bus. The thump sound was significant enough of animpact for him to immediately stop and exit the bus to investigate. Petitioner then testified thathe observed the pedestrian "laying on the side of the tire, just behind the tire itself," which isconsistent with the information in the accident report that the pedestrian was pinned behind thefront tire. We can logically conclude that a person had to be first run over by a vehicle movingforward to be pinned under the back part of the front tire. Police Officer Charlie Viera, whoinvestigated the accident, testified that, based on his investigation, including reports of thewitnesses at the scene, the bus "struck the pedestrian with the front side of the bus, running overthe legs of the pedestrian with the front passenger's side tire." In response to the AdministrativeLaw Judge's question whether it was possible the pedestrian walked into the bus, Officer Viera,an accident reconstructionist, testified that it was the bus that struck the pedestrian.

The record also contains evidence to show by clear and convincing proof that the pedestriansustained a serious injury. Police Officer Viera sets forth in his investigative report, also markedinto evidence, that following the collision the pedestrian was admitted to St. Barnabas Hospitalwhere a month later he died as a result of his injuries. The majority states that Dr. Carazas merely"pronounced the pedestrian dead." This is inaccurate. The investigative report also marked intoevidence without objection provides that the pedestrian "died as a result of his injuries,pronounced by Dr. Carazas." Officer Viera testified that based on his investigation it wasdetermined that decedent's death was caused by "complication from the collision of the accident."This was based on contact with the physician who pronounced Mendez dead as a result of hisinjuries.

Once again, section 1146 (c) is not limited to death or a substantial risk of death but alsoapplies to the "protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ." Whether theinjured extremity was a leg or a foot, whether the injuries resulted in substantial risk of death ordeath, and whether additional complications occurred, any person, let alone an 88 year old,admitted to the hospital for a month based on injuries sustained after being run over and pinnedunder a bus, has suffered serious physical injuries. Moreover, before the bus ran over hisextremities there was the impact of the bus slamming into the pedestrian's body causing asignificant "thump" sound prompting the bus driver to stop the bus to investigate. Indeed, suchinjuries undoubtedly constitute a "protracted impairment of health or protracted loss orimpairment of the function of [a] bodily organ" under section 1146 (c) (1).

Notwithstanding the ample evidence submitted by respondent in support of its position, forthe majority to raise the issue of whether the elderly pedestrian sustained a serious injury as aresult of this horrific accident would defy logic and clearly life's realities. Here, the elderlypedestrian in this case would turn 90 years old in a little more than a year from the time of theaccident. A city bus carrying 30 to 35 passengers struck him and ran over his legs, pinning himbehind the right front tire of the bus. It would be a miracle even for a young, healthy person notto sustain a serious injury under such circumstances, and for a person of the decedent's age,serious injury would be inescapable. A person of such advanced age would most likely sustain aserious injury even by an accidental fall without the impact of a city bus striking and runningover him. The pedestrian was immediately transported to St. Barnabas Hospital where heremained for one month before his death. We should be mindful that this is an administrativehearing and not a judicial trial on the merits where the rules of evidence are strictly adhered to.[*7]The above factual scenario together with the accident report,the investigative report and the testimony of Officer Viera and petitioner clearly andconvincingly proved that the bus struck and ran over the pedestrian causing him at a minimum tosustain a serious injury of a "protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment ofthe function of any bodily organ" (Penal Law § 10.00 [10]; Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1146 [c]). To hold otherwise would make our appellate review process illogical,unsound and contrary to the law concerning administrative hearings.

Therefore, I would confirm respondents' determination, including the penalty, and deny anddismiss the petition.

Footnotes


Footnote *:The dissent reads the narrative inthe report as stating "passenger side body of the bus." The narrative is handwritten and the wordis admittedly not readily discernable.


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