| People v Mercer |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 00929 [169 AD3d 1112] |
| February 7, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v ArthurMercer, Appellant. |
Kathy Manley, Selkirk, for appellant, and appellant pro se.
D. Holley Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Joan Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel), forrespondent.
Rumsey, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Williams, J.), renderedAugust 27, 2015, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal sale of acontrolled substance in the third degree.
In satisfaction of a two-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlledsubstance in the third degree and waived his right to appeal, both orally and in writing. Under the termsof the plea agreement, he was to be sentenced as a second felony offender to six years in prison,followed by three years of postrelease supervision. County Court advised defendant at the time of theplea that a condition of sentencing was that he provide truthful answers consistent with the statementsthat he made during the plea colloquy when interviewed for the presentence report and that his failure todo so could result in the enhancement of the sentence.
At his next court appearance, defendant expressed his desire, unbeknownst to his then-counsel, towithdraw his guilty plea. County Court proceeded to order an Outley hearing to determine ifdefendant had violated the sentencing condition by giving inconsistent statements during the presentenceinvestigation interview. At the conclusion of the hearing, County Court found that defendant hadviolated the sentencing condition and that enhancement of the sentence was warranted. At defendant'snext court appearance, he indicated that he wished to terminate his counsel's services, which requestwas granted by County Court. After new counsel was assigned, defendant reiterated his desire towithdraw his guilty plea and submitted certain pro se documents to the court, including onedenominated an omnibus motion.[FN1] County Court declined to allow defendant towithdraw his guilty plea, denied his pro se omnibus motion and sentenced defendant as a second felonyoffender to eight years in prison, followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant nowappeals.
Defendant contends, among other things, that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary andintelligent because he suffers from bipolar disorder and was rendered unable to fully understand theproceedings as he was not taking his prescribed medication at the time that he entered his guilty plea.Although not precluded by his uncontested waiver of the right to appeal, we find that this claim isunpreserved as defendant did not make an appropriate postallocution motion challenging thevoluntariness of his guilty plea on this basis despite having an opportunity to do so (see People v McClain, 165 AD3d1345, 1346 [2018]; People vBlackburn, 164 AD3d 960, 961 [2018]).[FN2] Furthermore, the narrow exception to thepreservation rule is inapplicable as defendant did not make any statements during the plea colloquy thatnegated his guilt or called into question the voluntariness of his plea (see People v Lopez, 71NY2d 662, 665-666 [1988]; People v Blackburn, 164 AD3d at 961). Defendant furtherasserts that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because neither of the two attorneyswho represented him made a motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on his mental illness. Althoughthis claim is not foreclosed by defendant's appeal waiver insofar as it impacts the voluntariness of hisguilty plea, it is also unpreserved given defendant's failure to make an appropriate postallocution motionon this basis (see People v Williams, 163AD3d 1172, 1173-1174 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1009 [2018]; People v Park, 159 AD3d 1132, 1134[2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1085 [2018]). We have considered the remaining contentionsraised by defendant in his pro se supplemental briefs and find them to be unavailing.
Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Devine and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Footnote 1:Defendant's new counsel declined toadopt defendant's pro se motion.
Footnote 2:The record reveals that defendant'sfirst pro se request to withdraw his guilty plea was premised upon the alleged unconstitutionality of hisprior convictions. His second pro se request to withdraw his guilty plea was based upon the sameground, as well as an unspecified claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Notably, defendant did notassert either in his oral applications or his written submissions that he should be permitted to withdrawhis guilty plea due to his alleged mental incapacity.