| Matter of Riel v State of N.Y. Off. of Children & FamilyServs. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 06575 [175 AD3d 1166] |
| September 17, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Joanne B. Riel, Appellant, v State ofNew York Office of Children and Family Services et al.,Respondents. |
Janet Sabel, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Karen Cacace of counsel), for appellant.
Letitia James, Attorney General, New York (Blair J. Greenwald of counsel), forrespondents.
Determination of respondent New York State Office of Children and Family Services, datedMarch 27, 2018, which, after a hearing, revoked petitioner's license to operate a family day carehome, confirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78(transferred to this Court by order of Supreme Court, New York County [W. Franc Perry, J.],entered January 17, 2019), dismissed, without costs.
The facts are essentially set forth in the dissent and will not be referenced here except wherenecessary for clarification or amplification.
The first issue to be decided is whether the agency's decision is supported by substantialevidence.
A court's review of an agency determination made after an administrative hearing is limitedto whether the challenged determination is supported by substantial evidence (Matter ofO'Rourke v Kirby, 54 NY2d 8, 14 [1981]). A reviewing court must defer "to the fact-findingand credibility determinations of the agency" (Matter of Nelke v Department of Motor Vehs. of the State of N.Y., 79AD3d 433, 434 [1st Dept 2010]). The "substantial [evidence] threshold" is met by theexistence of "some credible evidence" (Matter of Borenstein v New York City Employees'Retirement Sys., 88 NY2d 756, 760 [1996] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Respondent Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) is tasked by statute andregulation with supervision of day care providers. To ensure that children in day care areadequately supervised, OCFS "may make announced or unannounced inspections of the recordsand premises of any child day care provider, whether or not such provider has a license from, oris registered with, [OCFS]" (Social Services Law § 390 [3] [a]). OCFS has theauthority to temporarily suspend a day care provider's registration without a hearing based on afinding that the provider prevented OCFS from effectively assessing whether the public health, oran individual's safety or welfare, is in imminent danger by refusing to provide inspectors withaccess to the child day care program, premises or children during the program's hours ofoperation (18 NYCRR 413.5 [a] [3] [i]).
There are two different legal determinations and standards between a license suspension andrevocation. For a temporary suspension, there must be a finding of "imminent danger" as notedabove. For a license revocation, the applicable standard is set out in Social Services Law§ 390 (10): "Any violation of applicable statutes or regulations shall be a basis todeny, limit, suspend, revoke, or terminate a license of registration."
Petitioner does not contest her suspension and thus the "imminent danger" standard does notapply. That leaves us to consider whether there was substantial evidence to support the agency'sdetermination to revoke petitioner's registration.
18 NYCRR 417.15 (b) (10) (i) and (ii) require petitioner to give the inspector free access tothe day care, the children, and program records and to cooperate with the inspector during theinspection. The inspection conducted on February 9, 2018 was conducted on a day and during thehours of operation listed in petitioner's registration. There is no question that petitionerrepeatedly asked Inspector Richards to leave, even though there were two children and two adultson site at that time, during the listed hours of operation. It is also uncontroverted that Richardsremained in the entryway the entire hour she was on site and was not permitted to enter any otherroom that formed part of the day care premises. Although petitioner did give Richards a folderwith documents upon request, the first document was a blank sign-in sheet, despite there beingchildren and adults present inside the day care.
Petitioner contends that because a "Mommy and Me" program was being conducted duringthe listed hours of operation, Richards' inspection was inappropriate because no "day care"services were being provided at that time and thus, the regulations do not apply. This argumentfails on several levels.
First, if petitioner's argument is accepted, it would undermine the purpose of the inspectionrequirement in the regulations. Any provider who is in violation of any regulation can simplyclaim to any inspector that it is not conducting "day care" at the time of the inspection, thusundermining the child-protective purposes of the inspection regulations.
Second, such an interpretation shifts the burden of determining whether a day care isoperating, and which program is being performed at the time of an inspection, to the inspector.To the contrary, by using the stated operating hours as listed in the registration, there can be noquestion that whatever program is being performed during those hours, compliance with section417.15 is mandated. It must be kept in mind that it is the provider who determines whatprogram it will run at a particular time. By making any program run during the hours of operationset forth in the registration certificate subject to the inspection provisions of the regulations, thereis certainty to both the agency inspectors and providers as to the applicability of the inspectionprovisions of the regulations. Such an approach does not add any additional burdens toproviders.
In sum, we conclude that substantial evidence supports respondent's findings that petitionerviolated relevant regulations regarding the management and administration of her family day carehome. The record clearly shows that petitioner failed to admit an inspector onto the premises tocomplete an inspection (18 NYCRR 417.15 [b] [10] [i]), failed to cooperate with the inspector(18 NYCRR 417.15 [b] [10] [ii]), and failed to operate in compliance with day care laws andregulations (18 NYCRR 417.15 [a] [1] [ii]; see Clarke v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 91AD3d 489 [1st Dept 2012]). Contrary to petitioner's contention, she did not properly notifyrespondent of any changes to her day care program operating hours.
We now turn to the question as to whether the penalty of revocation is fair andproportionate.
An administrative determination should be set aside "only if the measure of punishment ordiscipline imposed is so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as tobe shocking to one's sense of fairness" (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free SchoolDist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222,233 [1974] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Shocking to one's sense of fairness" is, ofcourse, a "purely subjective" standard. Nevertheless, it can be said that "a result is shocking toone's sense of fairness if the sanction imposed is so grave in its impact on the individualsubjected to it that it is disproportionate to the misconduct" (id. at 234).
We lack any discretionary authority or interest of justice jurisdiction in reviewing the penaltyimposed by OCFS, and annulment and remittal to the agency for reconsideration of therevocation would be appropriate only if the penalty violated the rigorous Pell standard(see Matter of Featherstone v Franco, 95 NY2d 550, 554 [2000]).
We find that the penalty imposed here does not meet the Pell standard and does notshock our sense of fairness (see Matterof Unity Home Care Agency, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Health, 171 AD3d 419,420 [1st Dept 2019]; Simpson v NewYork State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 93 AD3d 588 [1st Dept 2012]).
The dissent posits that our decision in Unity is distinguishable from the instant caseand does not support our conclusion. While the facts in Unity are different and theviolations more egregious than here, the standard of review of the penalty imposed remains thesame, i.e. a challenge to the penalty imposed must meet the Pell standard. Here, it is notmet.
Both petitioner and our dissenting colleague rely heavily on Matter of Grady v New York State Off. ofChildren & Family Servs. (39 AD3d 1157 [4th Dept 2007]). In Grady theCourt found the penalty of license revocation was "shocking to one's sense of fairness" (id.at 1158). The violations there involved two instances of overenrollment of children onseparate days and the failure to maintain proper attendance records. Both cases of overenrollmentoccurred through no fault of the petitioner and were beyond her control. In one case, theoverenrollment resulted from an unanticipated school early release, and the other involved a childbeing dropped off at day care after petitioner was advised that the child would not be attendingthat day. The petitioner immediately took action to reduce the overenrollment by contacting theparents to pick up the children dropped off there from the early release. The Grady Courtalso found that revocation would deprive both petitioner and her assistant of their livelihood, theday care being their only source of income. That is not the case here, as will be discussed infra.The only similarity to this case is the fact that in both cases, community letters of support weresubmitted on behalf of petitioners. Notably, the ALJ in this case had these letters before her andthey were presumably taken into consideration in arriving at her determination.
Our facts are quite different. Petitioner herself created the situation that caused the violationsby unilaterally changing her hours of operation without properly advising OCFS and failing tomaintain proper records. When Inspector Richards appeared during the hours of operation listedon petitioner's certificate, she was within her regulatory obligation to conduct an inspection atthat time, especially since children and adults were on the premises, a program was actually inprogress and she had been handed a blank sign-in sheet. It is of no significance that the "Mommyand Me" program does not have the same requirements as a day care program, because it wasbeing conducted during the hours listed for day care on petitioner's registration. To holdotherwise would defeat the entire purpose of the inspection requirements, as we notedabove.
There is no question that petitioner repeatedly asked Richards to leave and come back later. Itdoes her no credit to lay the blame on the parent who admittedly escalated the standoff andcreated a hostile situation for Richards by demanding identification, videotaping Richards byholding her cell phone approximately a foot from Richards's face and telling her to leave in a"strong" voice. During this confrontation, petitioner did nothing to defuse the situation. In fact,she continued to ask Richards to leave and come back later.
The fact that Richards was on the premises for approximately one hour is of no moment, anddoes not, as our dissenting colleague argues, constitute cooperation with the inspection. It isuncontroverted that Richards remained in the entranceway to the apartment and was notpermitted to complete her inspection of the premises as required by regulation.
On the issue of deprivation of livelihood, unlike Grady, this is not petitioner's sole oreven major source of income. In fact, petitioner, in a letter to the Department of Health statedthat she was mostly a music and movement teacher, that she essentially worked as a musicteacher and taught "Mommy and Me" classes from her day care space. Petitioner testified at herhearing that the play group was "a very part-time enterprise," later repeating that "I have a very,very part-time daycare program." Petitioner cannot have it both ways. To now argue thatrevocation is an overly harsh penalty because it would deprive her of her main source of incomesimply does not comport with the facts.
In short, we see no reason to disturb the penalty imposed.
We have considered petitioner's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.Concur—Sweeny, J.P., Manzanet-Daniels, Webber, Kern, JJ.
Gesmer, J., dissents in a memorandum as follows: I agree with the majority that substantialevidence supports the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) finding that petitioner violatedapplicable regulations by failing to fully cooperate with the inspection (18 NYCRR 417.15 [b][10] [i], [ii]). Indeed, petitioner does not contest that finding. However, I would find that therevocation of her day care registration is unduly harsh, particularly given that she had providednurturing and loving services to children in her community for many years, revocation woulddeprive her of a good portion of her livelihood, and the lives of the families who relied on her forday care would be disrupted (see Matterof Grady v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 39 AD3d 1157 [4thDept 2007]). Accordingly, I would remand the matter to respondent for further proceedings todetermine a more appropriate penalty.
Under the Social Services Law, family day care homes must be registered with respondentNew York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) (Social Services Law§ 390 [2] [b]). These programs are subject to annual inspection (Social ServicesLaw § 390 [4] [a]), and to "announced or unannounced inspections of the recordsand premises" (Social Services Law § 390 [3] [a]). "Any violation of applicablestatutes or regulations shall be a basis to deny, limit, suspend, revoke, or terminate a license orregistration" (Social Services Law § 390 [10]). In New York City, the New YorkCity Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOH) childcare division administers day careregistration pursuant to contract (seeMcLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194, 197 [2009]).
Petitioner Joanne B. Riel owned and operated a family day care program in her home, whichwas registered with respondent OCFS for a four-year period commencing October 18, 2015. Inher application, she listed the hours of operation of her day care program as 9:00 a.m. to 2:00p.m. on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Fridays. In addition, petitioner taught music and operated a"mommy and me" playgroup in her home. It is undisputed that the latter two activities are notrequired to be registered or licensed.
On February 9, 2018, an inspector came to petitioner's apartment to conduct an annualinspection and to determine whether she had cured violations identified in a January 22, 2018letter to petitioner from the DOH.[FN1] Petitioner advised the inspector that she was inthe middle of a playgroup with two children and their caregivers, and asked if the inspector couldcome back at another time to conduct the day care inspection. Nevertheless, she let the inspectorinto her apartment. The inspector stood in the entrance of the playspace, where she observed twochildren and two adults, in addition to petitioner. The inspector watched the children participatein a music activity with petitioner and their caregivers for about 15 minutes, and observed thatthe children seemed happy. Petitioner asked the inspector several times to come back at a latertime after she was finished with her "mommy and me" music class.[FN2] The inspector asked to see petitioner's visitor'slog, and petitioner handed it to her,[FN3] stapled to the top of a folder, which petitionertestified contained her other day care records.
At that point, one of the two adults interrupted, identified herself as a parent, and beganvideotaping the inspector with her cell phone. The inspector then called her supervisor. When shemade the call, the parent stopped videotaping her, and petitioner escorted both caretakers and thechildren to another part of the apartment, away from the inspector. The supervisor told theinspector to leave without completing the inspection, and she did so.
In all, the inspector was in petitioner's home for an hour. The inspector testified that it wasthe parent, not petitioner, who interrupted the inspection and created a "hostile situation" byvideotaping her and speaking to her in a "strong volume." She also testified that she was notaware at the time of the inspection that petitioner ran a "mommy and me" playgroup that was notrequired to be registered or licensed by OCFS, and that she did not understand why petitioner hadasked her to come back at another time.
By letter dated February 9, 2018, OCFS notified petitioner that her registration wassuspended and that they would seek to revoke it, because she failed to cooperate with theinspection that day.[FN4]Petitioner requested a hearing, which was held on March 9, 2018.
By decision dated March 27, 2018, the ALJ determined that petitioner had failed to cooperatewith the inspector and provide her with free access to the premises during the hours of day careoperation listed in petitioner's application, that she failed to operate in compliance withapplicable statutes and regulations because she had not advised OCFS in writing of a reduction inthe hours of operation of her day care services,[FN5] and that, therefore, OCFS properly revoked herregistration.
Petitioner then commenced the article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which transferredthe petition to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g).
Although petitioner's "mommy and me" playgroup is not subject to OCFS oversight, theinspector was entitled to rely on the day care operating hours which petitioner had listed on herapplication, and petitioner was obligated under the Social Services Law to provide the inspectorwith "free access to the building, the caregivers, employees and volunteers, the children and anyprogram records" during those times and to cooperate with the inspection (18 NYCRR 417.15 [b][10] [i], [ii]). However, in my view, the circumstances of this case do not justify revocation forfour reasons.
First, petitioner did cooperate with the inspection by admitting the inspector into herapartment, permitting the inspector to remain for an hour and to observe the playgroup, and byhanding the inspector the day care documents she understood the inspector to have requested.Indeed, the inspector testified clearly that it was a parent who interrupted her interaction withpetitioner, prevented her from looking at any of petitioner's day care records beyond the visitor'slog on the top of the folder, and created a "hostile situation" by videotaping her and demandingthat she identify herself. I disagree with the majority's statements that petitioner did not permitthe inspector to enter other rooms in her apartment or otherwise prevented the inspection fromtaking place. The inspector testified that she did not leave the entryway because it was her policyto stay by the door in the winter, unless she had plastic bags covering her shoes. She testified thatpetitioner asked her to "please" come back at another time to complete the inspection. When theinspector asked if petitioner was "obstructing" her, petitioner invited her in. Moreover, while themajority states that petitioner "did nothing to defuse the situation" after the parent interrupted, theinspector testified that petitioner took the children and adults to another part of the apartmentafter the parent interrupted the inspection.
Second, this case is not at all like the circumstances in Matter of Unity Home Care Agency, Inc. v New York State Dept. ofHealth (171 AD3d 419, 420 [1st Dept 2019]), cited by the majority. There, DOH wasprevented from inspecting on four separate occasions between 2009 and 2015, with the result thatit was unable to monitor the agency's operations at all for six years.
Third, petitioner presented six extremely enthusiastic letters of support at the hearing,attesting to petitioner's nurturing care for their children. The ALJ found that the parents ofchildren attending her programs are "extremely pleased" with her care of their children. Theseletters demonstrate that she has provided a valuable service to families in her community formany years, and that those families' lives would be disrupted, and petitioner's livelihooddiminished, by revocation of her license (see Matter of Grady, 39 AD3d at 1159[reversing revocation of day care registration based on these facts]).
Finally, petitioner does not challenge the ALJ's findings that she failed to fully cooperatewith the inspection. Rather, she only seeks imposition of a less harsh penalty. This indicates thatshe understands the seriousness of her conduct.
Under these circumstances, there is no "grave moral turpitude" or "grave injury to the agencyinvolved or to the public weal," and it is appropriate for this Court to ameliorate the overly harshsanction of revocation of petitioner's registration (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of UnionFree School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34NY2d 222, 235 [1974]; see also Matter of Grady, 39 AD3d at 1158-1159).
Accordingly, I would vote to remand the matter for imposition of a lesser sanction.
Footnote 1:The inspector testified that fouritems are required during an on site follow-up inspection: confirmation that (1) the visitor's log,(2) attendance records, and (3) emergency medical treatment consent forms for specific childrenwere maintained on site; and (4) that monthly fire drills were conducted. She testified that thebalance of the items in the letter could be addressed by petitioner's submission of documents bymail, which she had done when she completed and returned the corrective action plan formattached to DOH's letter.
Footnote 2:The same inspector had come toher home approximately two weeks earlier, on Wednesday, January 24, 2019 in the afternoon.Petitioner explained that her day care was in operation on Wednesday mornings from 9:30 to11:30 a.m., and asked that the inspector come back on a Wednesday during those hours to inspectthe day care program while it was in operation. After confirming that no children were presentthat day, the inspector left. Petitioner testified that she returned a call from the inspector'ssupervisor on January 24, 2018, and left him a message with the same information.
Footnote 3:The majority implies that theblank visitor sheets indicated a violation. However, applicable regulations require that any visitorto a family day care center who is not "a day care child, staff person, caregiver, volunteer,household member, employee, parent of a child in care, or person authorized to pick up or dropoff a child to the day care program" to sign in upon entry (18 NYCRR 413.2 [c] [14]; 417.8 [p]).As petitioner testified, because she had had no visitors as defined by the regulations, the log bookcontained no signatures.
Footnote 4:Petitioner does not challenge thesuspension. Accordingly, as the majority concedes, the suspension, and the ALJ's finding of"imminent danger" justifying it, are not before us (18 NYCRR 413.5 [a] [3] [i]).
Footnote 5:In fact, the ALJ did not cite toany regulation requiring a day care operator to advise the agency of any decrease in day carehours (cf. 18 NYCRR 417.15 [b] [2], [3] [requiring registrant to obtain written approvalbefore increasing hours of operation]).