| People v McCabe |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 02288 [182 AD3d 772] |
| April 16, 2020 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1](April 16, 2020)
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Chauncey R. McCabe, Appellant. |
Robert M. Cohen, Ballston Lake, for appellant.
Chad W. Brown, District Attorney, Johnstown (Kathleen M. Hofmann of counsel),for respondent.
Reynolds Fitzgerald, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of FultonCounty (Hoye, J.), rendered July 8, 2015, upon a verdict convicting defendant of thecrimes of assault in the first degree, strangulation in the first degree and criminalpossession of a weapon in the fourth degree.
Defendant was charged by indictment with attempted murder in the second degree,assault in the first degree, strangulation in the first degree and criminal possession of aweapon in the fourth degree based upon allegations that he strangled his girlfriend(hereinafter the victim) on August 9, 2014. After a jury trial, defendant was acquitted ofattempted murder in the second degree and convicted of the remaining charges. CountyCourt sentenced defendant to a prison term of 15 years, with five years of postreleasesupervision, for his assault conviction and his strangulation conviction and to a term ofone year for his criminal possession conviction, all sentences to run concurrently.Defendant appeals.
Defendant contends that his convictions for assault in the first degree andstrangulation in the first degree were not supported by legally sufficient evidence andwere against the weight of evidence as the People failed to prove the requisite intentnecessary for both crimes. "When considering a challenge to the legal sufficiency of theevidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and evaluatewhether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could leada rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trialand as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of thecrime charged" (People vHernandez, 180 AD3d 1234, 1235 [2020] [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted]). In contrast, "[w]hen undertaking a weight of the evidence review, wemust first determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, a different findingwould not have been unreasonable and then weigh the relative probative force ofconflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may bedrawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of theevidence. When conducting this review, we consider the evidence in a neutral light anddefer to the jury's credibility assessments" (People v Gill, 168 AD3d 1140, 1140-1141 [2019] [internalquotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Vega, 170 AD3d 1266, 1268 [2019], lvdenied 33 NY3d 1074 [2019]).
As relevant here, to convict defendant of assault in the first degree, it was thePeople's burden to prove that defendant, "[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury toanother person, . . . cause[d] such injury . . . by means of adeadly weapon or a dangerous instrument" (Penal Law § 120.10 [1]). A" '[d]angerous instrument' means any instrument, article or substance. . . which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be usedor threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physicalinjury" (Penal Law § 10.00 [13]). As to strangulation in the first degree, thePeople had to prove that defendant intended "to impede the normal breathing orcirculation of the blood of another person . . . [by applying] pressure on thethroat or neck of such person" and "thereby caus[ing] serious physical injury to such. . . person" (Penal Law §§ 121.11, 121.13)." 'Serious physical injury' means physical injury which creates a substantial riskof death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protractedimpairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a[ ] bodilyorgan" (Penal Law § 10.00 [10]).
The relevant testimony adduced at trial reflected that when Lucas Nellis, a policeofficer, arrived at the scene, defendant was seated in the driveway of the residence. Whendefendant saw Nellis, he told him, "I take full responsibility for what I've done." Whenthe officer entered the residence, he found the victim lying on the floor with blood on herface, bruising on the right side, convulsing and making a gurgling sound. A seniorinvestigator testified that she collected evidence at the scene, including a rope on thecouch and rope fibers around the room. She further testified that defendant had scratcheson his right forearm and lacerations on the inside of his right arm. The emergencyphysician who treated the victim testified that the victim had what appeared to be ropemarks around her neck. The surgeon who treated her testified both to her numerousbroken bones and the "strangulation type" abrasions. The People also introduced proofthat defendant had sent a Facebook message to a friend on the night of the incident thatread, "OMG I need H-R-L-P . . . my gf attack me, and I fought back. Ichoked her. I swear I didn't mean it." The victim testified that she had no memory of theincident. Defendant claimed that the victim was the initial aggressor and that the majorityof her injuries were the result of a fall.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find that the proofwas legally sufficient to support the convictions of assault in the first degree andstrangulation in the first degree (see People v Ackerman, 173 AD3d 1346, 1349 [2019],lv denied 34 NY3d 949 [2019]). Further, although a contrary result would nothave been unreasonable, viewing the record evidence in a neutral light, we find that theverdict as to these convictions was supported by the weight of the evidence (see People v Greenfield, 167AD3d 1060, 1062 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1204 [2019]).
Next, defendant contends that County Court committed reversible error in denyinghis motion to suppress the statements that he made to Nellis while he was handcuffed inthe back of the patrol vehicle prior to being read his Miranda rights. In general,statements obtained by the police from a suspect in custody are only admissible if madeafter the individual has been advised of his or her constitutional rights and knowinglyand intelligently waives them. "A suspect's custodial status is a fact-driven determinationthat is largely dependent on the circumstances that existed when the statements weremade" (People v Vieou, 107AD3d 1052, 1053 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Theburden is on the People to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the individual was notin custody before Miranda rights were given (see People v Moore, 162 AD3d 1123, 1125 [2018]). "[T]heultimate question to be answered is whether a reasonable person innocent of anywrongdoing would have believed that he or she was not free to leave at the time he or shewas being questioned" (People vMcCoy, 89 AD3d 1218, 1219 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted], lv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012]).
The facts here are largely uncontroverted. After Nellis arrived at the scene anddiscovered defendant in the driveway, he entered the residence and found the victimbeing treated by defendant's mother. The victim was convulsing and making gurglingsounds, and Nellis observed bruises and dried blood on her face. Nellis radioedemergency services to respond immediately, exited the residence and informed defendantthat he was being detained for questioning. The officer did not immediately askdefendant what happened, but, after defendant was handcuffed and placed in thebackseat of the patrol car, Nellis asked defendant, "What happened?" In response,defendant told him that he "snapped" and he "wanted her to feel the pain he had."Defendant also admitted, "I choked her with a rope but never struck her in the face."County Court allowed the statements, reasoning that the purpose of Nellis' questioningwas to clarify the nature of the volatile situation rather than to elicit evidence of a crime.We disagree.
The incident had been completed, the parties had been identified and medicalassistance requested; defendant had been cooperative and responsive. "[W]here criminalevents have been concluded and the situation no longer requires clarification of the crimeor its suspects, custodial questioning will constitute interrogation" (People vRifkin, 289 AD2d 262, 263 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 759 [2002]). ThePeople's assertion that a reasonable person in this situation would have believed that heor she was not in police custody and was free to leave at any time begs credulity. Rather,we find that once defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of Nellis' vehicle, hewas in custody and, as such, his responses to Nellis' questions, made prior to theMiranda warnings, should have been suppressed as they were "the product ofcustodial interrogation" (People v Evans, 294 AD2d 918, 919 [2002], lvdismissed 98 NY2d 768 [2002]; see People v Rifkin, 289 AD2d at 263).Given Nellis' testimony regarding the sequence of events that occurred after arriving atthe scene, particularly that Nellis had already generally asked defendant what hadoccurred and had already called for emergency medical services, which had not yetarrived, we do not find that the emergency exception is applicable (compare People v Lang, 164AD3d 963, 965 [2018]).
Having found that there was error, we must now determine whether the error washarmless. The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by both the US and NYConstitutions (see US Const 5th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6). Aconstitutional error can only be harmless if it is found to be harmless beyond a reasonabledoubt—i.e., the evidence of the defendant's guilt, without reference to the error, isoverwhelming such that there is no reasonable possibility that the error might havecontributed to the defendant's conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230,237 [1975]; People vHarris, 93 AD3d 58, 71 [2012], affd 20 NY3d 912 [2012]). Here, thestatements of defendant given in response to Nellis' questioning while he was handcuffedand in the back of the patrol car are clear admissions.[FN*] We cannot say beyond a reasonabledoubt that these statements did not contribute to defendant's conviction and, as such, theerror was not harmless. Since the jury should not have received all of the evidence it did,the judgment must be reversed (see People v Slocum, 133 AD3d 972, 974 [2015],appeal dismissed 29 NY3d 954 [2017]).
In light of the foregoing, the remaining issues have been rendered academic.
Lynch, J.P., Clark, Devine and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isreversed, on the law, defendant's motion to suppress statements made while in the policevehicle granted, and matter remitted to the County Court of Fulton County for furtherproceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.
Footnote *:These were the onlyadmissions that the jury was guaranteed to hear since the written statements given bydefendant were suppressed, except for impeachment purposes.