| People v Williams |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 08130 [189 AD3d 1978] |
| December 31, 2020 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Shaka Williams, Appellant. |
Christian J. Root, Vestal, for appellant.
Letitia James, Attorney General, New York City (Matthew B. Keller of counsel), forrespondent.
Clark, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Main Jr., J.),rendered June 21, 2019, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of conspiracyin the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree andoffering a false instrument for filing in the first degree.
In 2017, defendant and 56 codefendants were indicted on various charges arising out of theirinvolvement in a multicounty narcotics distribution scheme. Defendant was specifically chargedwith one count of conspiracy in the second degree, two counts of criminal possession of acontrolled substance in the third degree, two counts of criminally using drug paraphernalia in thesecond degree and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Defendantthereafter moved, pursuant to CPL 210.20 (1) (b), for dismissal and/or reduction of the crimescharged in the indictment. County Court (Richards, J.) denied the motion.
Meanwhile, defendant—an alleged adherent of the so-called sovereign citizen'smovement—filed a Uniform Commercial Code financing statement against real propertyowned by Judge Richards, claiming a debt owed of up to $4.5 million. In light of this conduct,Judge Richards recused himself from presiding over defendant's prosecution on the 2017indictment; defendant was thereafter charged—in an indictment handed up in2018—with one count of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree, twocounts of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree and one count of obstructinggovernmental administration in the second degree. County Court (Main Jr., J.) denied thePeople's motion to join the 2017 indictment and the 2018 indictment for trial.
Thereafter, through various motions made either pro se or with the assistance of counsel,defendant unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the 2017 indictment. In February 2019, afterconferring with assigned counsel, defendant waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to abench trial. On the second day of trial, defendant accepted a plea deal. Specifically, in fullsatisfaction of the charges against him in the 2017 and 2018 indictments and in exchange for aspecific sentencing commitment, defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy in the second degree,criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and offering a false instrumentfor filing in the first degree. Defendant was also required to waive his right to appeal as part ofthe plea agreement. Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. CountyCourt denied the motion. In accordance with the plea agreement, County Court sentenceddefendant, as a second felony offender, to a prison term of 4
We affirm. Initially, we find that defendant validly waived his right to appeal. As reflected inthe [*2]plea colloquy, County Court informed defendant that anappeal waiver was a condition of his plea agreement and explained in detail the nature of theright to appeal, including that it was separate and distinct from the trial-related rights forfeited bya guilty plea. Although County Court was imprecise in stating that defendant would retain "only"the right to appeal speedy trial issues, matters of jurisdiction and a violation of the court'ssentencing commitment, County Court made repeated references to defendant's "non-waivablerights"; thus, the record reflects that defendant was informed of and understood the critical"distinction that some appellate review survive[s]" a waiver of the right to appeal (People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545,561 [2019]). Defendant asked intelligible questions throughout the colloquy and, after exhaustinghis questions, confirmed that he understood the waiver of appeal and its ramifications. Defensecounsel also affirmed that he had discussed the appeal waiver with defendant and believeddefendant to understand the consequences of such waiver. Considering the totality of thecircumstances, including defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system, we aresatisfied that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to appeal (see People v Couse, 178 AD3d1207, 1207 [2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 941 [2020]; People v Creighton, 137 AD3d1328, 1328-1329 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1130 [2016]).
Defendant also argues that, given his "delusional, confused, paranoid and agitated" behaviorthroughout the criminal proceedings, County Court should have, on its own initiative, conductedan inquiry into his competency to stand trial and to enter a guilty plea. Despite surviving hisguilty plea and valid appeal waiver (see People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 9 [1989]; People v La Brosse, 7 AD3d 924,924 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 642 [2004]), such argument is not preserved for ourreview, as defendant did not raise it in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea (see People v Borden, 91 AD3d1124, 1125 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 862 [2012]). Moreover, the narrow exceptionto the preservation requirement was not triggered here, given that defendant did not make anystatements during the plea colloquy that were inconsistent with his guilt or otherwise called intoquestion the voluntariness of his plea (see People v Hilts, 157 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2018]; People vBorden, 91 AD3d at 1125). In any event, were we to address the issue, we would find it to bewithout merit. A review of the record does not reveal a reasonable basis upon which to believethat defendant was incapable of understanding the proceedings, incompetent or otherwiseincapacitated (see People v Hilts, 157 AD3d at 1124; see generally People vMorgan, 87 NY2d 878, 880 [1995]). Rather, the record reflects that defendant selectivelyexhibited behavior associated with adherents of the sovereign citizen's movement,[FN*] as well as other obstructionistbehavior[*3].
Defendant further asserts that the 2017 indictment was jurisdictionally defective. Despitecloaking his argument as a jurisdictional challenge, defendant's assertions amount to a challengeto the factual sufficiency of the charges against him in the 2017 indictment. Such a challenge isprecluded by defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal, as well as his guilty plea (see People v Gannon, 167 AD3d1163, 1164 [2018]; People vDubois, 150 AD3d 1562, 1564 [2017]; People v Young, 100 AD3d 1186, 1188 [2012], lv denied21 NY3d 1021 [2013]). To the extent that we have not addressed any of defendant's remainingarguments, they have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
Garry, P.J., Lynch, Mulvey and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgmentis affirmed.
Footnote *:Adherents of the sovereigncitizen's movement " 'follow their own set of laws' and, accordingly, 'do not recognizefederal, state, or local laws, policies, or regulations' as legitimate" (United States vMcLaughlin, 949 F3d 780, 781 n 1 [2d Cir 2019], quoting Sovereign Citizens: A GrowingDomestic Threat to Law Enforcement, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin [2011]). Throughout theproceedings, defendant referenced the Uniform Commercial Code, maintained that SupremeCourt did not have jurisdiction over him and asserted that he was not "the defendant," but ratherwas a secured party creditor and a trustee of the defendant.