| People ex rel. Hamilton v Brann |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 50392(U) [67 Misc 3d 1205(A)] |
| Decided on April 2, 2020 |
| Supreme Court, Bronx County |
| Fabrizio, J. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on April 2, 2020
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. RUTH HAMILTON, Esq, on behalf of RAFAEL MARTINEZ, against CYNTHIA BRANN, COMMISIONER OFCORRECTIONS FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, And anyone having custody ofRafael Martinez, Respondents. |
Index No. 260188/2020
Ralph Fabrizio, J.
I, Andrew Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York, by virtue of the authorityvested in me by the Constitution of the Laws of the State of New York, hereby find . . .that a disaster is impending in New York State . . . and I do hereby declare a Statedisaster emergency for the entire state of New York . . . until September 7, 2020.
Executive Order, No. 202, March 7, 2020.
We have therefore made the assessment that COVID-19 can be classifiedas a pandemic.Statement of Director-Counsel of the World HealthOrganization, March 11, 2020.
In accordance with the Directive of the Chief Judge of the State of NewYork to limit court operation to essential matters during the pendency of the COVID-19health crisis, any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legalaction, notice, motion or other process or proceeding, as provided for by the procedurallaws of the state, including, but not limited to, the criminal procedure law . . . is herebytolled . . . until April 19, 2020.Executive Order 202.8, March 20,2020.
Pursuant to authority vested in me, in light of the emergency circumstancescaused by the continuing COVID-19 outbreak in New York State and the nation . . . Idirect that, effective immediately and until further notice, no papers shall be accepted forfiling by a county clerk or a court in any matter of a type not included on the list ofessential matters annexed as Ex. A. Chief Judge Janet DiFiore, Administrative Order,AO/78/20 dated March 22, 2020.
Exhibit A . . .Essential Proceedings . . . (A) Criminal matters: (1) arraignments, (2), bail applications,reviews and writs, (3) temporary orders of protection, (4) resentencing of retained andincarcerated defendants, (5) essential sex offender registration act (SORA) matters.Chief Judge Janet DiFiore, Administrative Order, AO/78/20 datedMarch 22, 2020
On March 25, 2020, petitioner was arraigned before a local criminal court judge on afelony complaint charging him, inter alia, with Assault in the Second Degree.Penal Law §120.05. This is a violent felony and a qualifying offense, CPL510.10(4), and bail was set by the arraignment judge. Petitioner has not posted that bail.He has moved via writ filed on March 31, 2020, for his immediate release from custody.The People filed a written response, and the City, via the Law Department, submittedinitial documents. Petitioner's attorney, a Bronx County Assistant District Attorney, andan attorney for the City, all appeared before me in open court, via video on April 1, 2020.This Court held the final decision on the application in abeyance pending the receipt ofmedical records relating to the petitioner's care while he has been held in jail. However,the writ raised significant non-medically related due process arguments that, if this Courtwere to find them valid, would entitle petitioner to immediate release. This Court hasconsidered those non-medical arguments and issues this interim decision relating to thosegrounds only. It denies the application for release on those grounds, as explained below,but continues to hold the final decision in abeyance pending further submissionsinvolving petitioner's medical condition and treatment.
Petitioner initially raises legal and constitutional challenges to his continuedconfinement that have nothing to do with his health but have everything to do with themonumental COVID-19 health crisis. He does not argue that his bail is excessive, or thatthe arraignment judge abused her discretion in setting it. He does not seek review of thebail itself. His challenge via this writ is that he is entitled to immediate release on severalgrounds. First, he argues that because the CPL 180.80time has passed, and he is notindicted, he is entitled to release by operation of law because he claims Executive Order202.8 does not apply to 180.80 release deadlines. Second, he argues that a judge of thecriminal court denied his access to court when he requested that the case be calendaredso he could make his 180.80 release application before a judge of that court, and also todemand a preliminary hearing under CPL 180.10. In a related argument, he claims that,even if Executive Order 202.8 does suspend statutory 180.80 deadlines, his continuedconfinement violates due process because there has been no judicial finding via thepreliminary hearing route of holding him for grand jury action. Fourth, he argues that heis entitled to immediate release due to personal health concerns and the prevalence ofCOVID-19 in his jail facility. It is a decision on this fourth ground that is held inabeyance.
Petitioner does not argue that the governor lacked any authority under ExecutiveLaw §§ 29-a and 29-b to suspend CPL 180.80 or other procedural deadlines inthe Criminal Procedure Law. Simply put, he does. See People v. Bey, 44 AD3d 1065, 1066 (2nd Dept 2017);People v. Fuller, 8 AD3d 204, 205 (1st Dept. 2004); People v. Haneiph, 191Misc 3d 738, 742-43 (Crim. Court Kings County 2002). While counsel is correct thatExecutive Order 202.8 does not mention CPL 180.80 in its text, it also does not mentionCPL 30.10 (statute of limitatons), or CPL 30.30 (speedy trial), or CPL 255.20 (filing ofpre-trial motions), or CPL 460.10 (time to take an appeal), or any other specific statutefrom the myriad of statutes that have time and action limitations imposed under theCriminal Procedure Law, whose time limits are also suspended. This Court does not findthat the Governor needed to be so specific. The language of this order sweeps up everyprocedural time limit imposed in the Criminal Procedure Law and packages them in abroad order that is easy for a court to interpret. The words chosen and the time limitssuspended are implicated in each and every one of the statutes at issue in this writ. Forexample, even if grand juries were being empaneled, and the People could meet thedeadline imposed to vote an indictment, the People still have to "file with the court awritten certification that an indictment has been voted." CPL 180.80 (2)(a). The filing ofsuch a document divests the lower courts of jurisdiction to provide over the matter andessentially "commences" the prosecution in the Supreme Court. In terms of a preliminaryhearing, a judge must file an order that results in holding a defendant in custody forgrand jury action and "promptly transmit to" the Supreme Court the order itself. CPL180.70(1). The specific language of Executive Order 202.8 tolls the time for doing all ofthis.
Petitioner's due process rights have not been violated by the criminal court's refusalto calendar this case for making a CPL 180.80 release application. Such an application isnot part of the "emergency" situations covered in the Chief Judge's operational order.This order has not denied petitioner due process by preventing him from making anargument for his release from custody. He is being afforded due process because thisargument is being considered, and properly so, in the adjudication of this writ. His rightto be heard remains; the forum and [*2]mechanism hasbeen changed because of the very emergency that has hit the entire state, and its citizens,in unprecedented ways. His access to court has neither been denied, nor significantlydelayed. Petitioner states that his 180.80 period would have expired at 9:35 p.m. onMarch 31, 2020; this writ was calendared and heard in Court hours later, on the morningof April 1, 2020. When petitioner was arraigned, the judge did not set a 180.80 date, andadjourned the case until April 28, 2020.[FN1] Petitioner was arraigned by an attorney not affiliated with the Bronx Defenders, whonow represent him. It is not known if that attorney raised a challenge to the date selectedby the criminal court judge. Nonetheless, this Court does not find that an arraignmentjudge needs to calendar any case for a 180.80 compliance date because the ExecutiveOrder suspends that time and that adjournment for that purpose would be a drain on theemergency operations in place for that court.
In terms of his due process argument relating to the lack of a preliminary hearing, itis correct that the petitioner has not been afforded an opportunity to have a judgeconsider non-hearsay evidence subject to cross-examination and possible testimonyunder CPL 180.60. However, it is incorrect to say that he is being held in in the absenceof any judicial finding of probable cause. That finding was, and had to be made, at thetime of the defendant's arraignment on the felony complaint. CPL Section 140.45;See People v. Hernandez, 98 NY2d 8, 10 (2002). That complaint is not beforethis Court and counsel makes no challenge to the sufficiency of that felony complaint.However, by law, at every arraignment, the judge is required to inspect the accusatoryinstrument to ensure that there is reasonable cause to continue the case past that stage,whether for conversion of a criminal court complaint to an information via a supportingdeposition or other required documents, or to hold a defendant for grand jury action orpreliminary hearing. See People v. Machado, 182 Misc 2d 194, 194-95 (SupCourt Bronx County 1999). The grand jury process is constitutionally essential for thecase to proceed to trial; the preliminary hearing process provides a procedural mechanismto hold a defendant in custody on a felony complaint prior to trial. The grand jury as wellas a judge at a preliminary hearing each must make reasonable cause determinations forthe case to proceed from that point. The reasonable cause determination made by anarraignment judge provides due process protections and prevents a defendant from beingheld in custody awaiting indictment on less than reasonable cause. See County ofRiverside v. McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56-57 (1991). That is the same standard uponwhich defendants can be held in custody post-indictment. Therefore, based on theunchallenged finding by the arraignment judge that the allegations in the felonycomplaint provided reasonable cause, the Court finds due process is satisfied and the lackof an indictment or a preliminary hearing at this time does not constitute a due processviolation for this petitioner.
A ruling on the petitioner's argument that he is being deprived of due process bybeing held in a jail facility where there is a risk to his health is held in abeyance pendingthe submission of medical records from the New York City Department of Corrections.Petitioner is 30 years old, and states he suffers from asthma. His attorney has not beenable to schedule a [*3]video visit with her client becauseit appears that DOCCS does not have this capability at this time. This Court has signed asubpoena directing DOCCS to provide her client's records. Petitioner also alleged that hewas not receiving any medical treatment while in custody, but the Court is satisfied basedon initial information provided by the City's attorney that the defendant has been seen bymedical personnel while he has been in custody on more that one occasion. The Court isalso satisfied that the City has set up protocols for isolating and treating any seriously illinmates. Nonetheless, it is important to know whether this petitioner's personal medicalsituation requires a legal remedy. This Court will continue to receive and review all theinformation as it comes in relating to this part of the application and will rule on this partof the writ when those records are received or the Court receives any other informationrelevant to defendant's medical condition.
However, in terms of the legal arguments for release based on due process, CPL180.10, 180.60. 180.70, 180.80, Executive Order 202.8, and the Chief Judge'sOperational Order, the writ is denied.
ENTER
Dated: April 2, 2020
Bronx, New York
Footnote 1:The Court noted duringthe hearing that this date, of course, takes place long after the expiration date ofExecutive Order 202.8. The defendant may refile for this relief after that date.