| People v Teixeira-Ingram |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 06575 [199 AD3d 1240] |
| November 24, 2021 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Marcel Teixeira-Ingram, Appellant. |
David E. Woodin, Catskill, for appellant.
Paul Czajka, District Attorney, Hudson (Joyce Crawford of counsel), for respondent.
Garry, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Columbia County (Nichols, J.),rendered March 7, 2019, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the third degree.
Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by the State Police for speeding.Troopers arrested defendant and the four other occupants of the vehicle after discovering 6.5ounces of cocaine. Defendant was charged by indictment with criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the thirddegree. Following a hearing, County Court denied suppression of defendant's statements. He thenpleaded guilty to both counts. County Court sentenced defendant, in his absence, to a prison termof eight years followed by five years of postrelease supervision for criminal possession of acontrolled substance in the second degree and to a lesser concurrent term for the remainingconviction. Defendant appeals.
Defendant first argues that County Court erred in declining to suppress the statements hemade to police.[FN1] Whensuppression is sought, "the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that thedefendant's statement to police was voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogationwas preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or herMiranda rights" (People vDawson, 195 AD3d 1157, 1158 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted];see People v Davis, 196 AD3d918, 919-920 [2021]). As it is undisputed that defendant's statements—made inresponse to questioning about the subject crimes at the State Police barracks followingdefendant's arrest—were obtained during a custodial interrogation, our analysis hinges onwhether defendant was advised of his rights and validly waived them before making hisstatements.
County Court deemed all of the hearing witnesses credible, and we defer to that finding(see People v Davis, 196 AD3d at 922). At the suppression hearing, a state troopertestified that he stopped the vehicle and spoke with the driver but did not converse with any ofthe passengers. A second state trooper testified that he spoke with the driver and a femalepassenger and read them their Miranda rights, but he did not speak with defendant or readhim his Miranda rights. A State Police investigator testified that he spoke with all thepassengers but spoke more with defendant "because he waived his right to counsel." Theinvestigator further testified that he spoke with defendant after defendant was read his rights.When asked who read defendant his Miranda rights, the investigator testified that the firsttrooper did so. The prosecutor then asked, "Did you speak with him?" to which the investigatorresponded, "Yes."[FN2] Inresponse to more questions, the investigator relayed the substance of the [*2]conversation that he had with defendant. On cross-examination, theinvestigator confirmed that he did not read defendant his rights, nor was the investigator presentwhen defendant was read his rights.
In sum, the People rely on the investigator having talked to the trooper and, apparently, aninference that the trooper told the investigator that he read defendant his rights. However, thetrooper did not testify to having read defendant his rights; he instead testified that he had noconversation with defendant. Although hearsay is admissible in suppression hearings (seeCPL 710.60 [4]), this inference based on hearsay is insufficient for the People to prove beyond areasonable doubt that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights before beingquestioned. The investigator did not actually testify to what he heard the trooper say during theirout-of-court conversation—that is, the investigator did not actually offer hearsay evidencethat the trooper read defendant his Miranda warnings. Even if the People had proven thatfact, the investigator's conclusory assertion that defendant waived his right to counsel supplied nofacts from which County Court could have rationally concluded that defendant's waiver of hisright to counsel—or any of his other rights—was knowing, voluntary and intelligent(compare People v Smith, 193AD3d 1260, 1264-1265 [2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 968 [2021]; People v Butcher, 192 AD3d 1196,1197-1198 [2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1118 [2021]). As the People failed to meet theirburden at the hearing, defendant was entitled to have his statements suppressed.
"It is unusual for a conviction rendered after a guilty plea to be amenable to harmless erroranalysis for the simple reason that an appellate court is rarely in a position to determine whetherdenial of a suppression motion played any part in a defendant's decision to plead. . .. [A]bsent proof that [the defendant] would have [pleaded guilty] even if his [or her] motion hadbeen granted, harmless error analysis is inapplicable" (People v Henry, 133 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2015] [internal quotationmarks and citations omitted]; see Peoplev Wells, 21 NY3d 716, 718-719 [2013]). Although it bears noting that exceptions exist,such that "a concession of guilt may be treated as valid if the defendant articulates a reason for itthat is independent of the incorrect preplea court ruling or an appellate court is satisfied that thedecision to accept responsibility was not influenced by the error" (People v Wells, 21NY3d at 719 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Holz, 35 NY3d 55, 62-63 [2020]), this record does notsupport any such exception (see People v Wells, 21 NY3d at 719-720; compare People v Clanton, 151 AD3d1576, 1578-1579 [2017]). Accordingly, County Court's failure to suppress defendant'sstatements cannot be deemed harmless, and the guilty plea must be vacated and defendantrestored to his preplea status (see People v Harris, 141 AD3d [*3]1024, 1028 [2016]).
Based on our resolution of this issue, defendant's remaining arguments are academic.
Lynch, Clark, Pritzker and Colangelo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, onthe law, defendant's statements suppressed and matter remitted to the County Court of ColumbiaCounty for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.
Footnote 1:The People and defendantentered a stipulation in lieu of motions that consented to County Court holding a hearing todetermine whether defendant's statements to police should be suppressed on the same groundsnow asserted on appeal. Contrary to the People's assertion, no further action or objection wasnecessary for defendant to preserve a challenge to the denial of suppression (see People v Hassell, 175 AD3d1427, 1428 [2019]; People vJohnson, 135 AD3d 960, 960 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1070 [2016]). Further,defendant may appeal the denial of suppression notwithstanding his guilty plea (see CPL710.70 [2]).
Footnote 2:This question was vague,rendering it unclear whether the "him" referred to defendant or the first trooper.