People v Sweet
2021 NY Slip Op 07031 [200 AD3d 1315]
December 16, 2021
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Friday, September 30, 2022


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Garry L. Sweet, Appellant.

Thomas F. Garner, Middleburgh, for appellant.

Lorraine C. Diamond, District Attorney, Fonda (Christina Pearson of counsel), forrespondent.

Reynolds Fitzgerald, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Montgomery County(Catena, J.), rendered April 19, 2019, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes ofmurder in the second degree and conspiracy in the second degree.

In June 2018, the victim was shot and killed on the porch of his apartment. In October 2018,defendant, Eric S. Rivera and Aaron Cockfield Jr. were each charged, by a joint indictment, withmurder in the second degree and conspiracy in the second degree.[FN1] Following a jury trial, defendant was convictedas charged. County Court thereafter sentenced him to a prison term of 25 years to life on themurder conviction, and 81/3 to 25 years on the conspiracy conviction.[FN2] Defendant appeals.

Defendant contends that his conviction for murder in the second degree is not supported bylegally sufficient evidence as the People failed to establish intent. Additionally, he alleges thatthe verdict on both counts is against the weight of the evidence, as the testimony of hiscodefendants was not credible, and the People failed to produce physical evidence connectinghim to the murder. "[A] legal sufficiency challenge requires this Court to view the evidence inthe light most favorable to the People and evaluate whether there is any valid line of reasoningand permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by thejury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burdenrequirements for every element of the crimes charged" People v Pentalow, 196 AD3d 871, 873 [2021] [internal quotationmarks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v Acosta, 80 NY2d 665, 672 [1993])."In contrast, when undertaking a weight of the evidence review, [this Court] must first determinewhether, based on all the credible evidence, a different finding would not have been unreasonableand then weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength ofconflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict issupported by the weight of the evidence" (People v McCabe, 182 AD3d 772, 773 [2020] [internal quotationmarks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]). As relevant here, "[a] person is guilty of murder in the second degree when[,]. . . [w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he [or she] causes the death ofsuch person or of a third person" (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). Murder in the seconddegree is a class A-I felony (see Penal Law § 125.25). "A person is guilty ofconspiracy in the second degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a class A felony beperformed, he [or she] agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance ofsuch conduct" (Penal Law § 105.15).

At trial, the victim's girlfriend testified that at around 8:00 p.m. on June 29, 2018, the victimleft the residence that they shared. The following morning, she discovered him dead [*2]outside on the porch lying on his back in a pool of blood. A friendof Rivera testified that she allowed Rivera and defendant to take her vehicle and that defendanttold her that they were going to "confront" the victim. Cockfield, who testified at trial as acondition of his plea bargain, stated that, prior to him meeting up with them, defendant andRivera had formulated a plan to harm the victim, which was, in essence, to "[get the victim]before he [got them]." In addition, defendant specifically stated that they needed to "shoot" thevictim. According to Cockfield's testimony, his role in the plan was to be the driver. He testifiedthat he drove defendant and Rivera to a barn, defendant entered the barn and then, after exiting,defendant fired a gun—which Rivera told him was a 9 millimeter—into the air fiveor six times. Defendant then instructed Cockfield to drive to a warehouse, where defendant andRivera changed their clothes, and then he drove to the victim's apartment where defendantinstructed him to park on a nearby street. Cockfield further testified that he heard multiplegunshots and, shortly thereafter, defendant and Rivera jumped into the car; he saw that Riverahad a gun on his hip. Defendant asked, "Did you see what I did?", to which Rivera responded,"Yeah[,] I was right there."

Defendant's employer, who also testified pursuant to a cooperation agreement with thePeople, stated that he owned a barn where he kept guns and pistols with ammunition, including aWalther 9 millimeter, that defendant had keys to the barn and that defendant also knew where aspare key was kept. He further testified that about two months after the murder, he anddefendant's girlfriend drove together to the intersection of Fox Road and Route 5 in MontgomeryCounty to retrieve the gun, which defendant's girlfriend took to her house. About a month later,defendant's girlfriend contacted defendant's employer requesting that the gun be removed fromher home. He and the girlfriend took the gun and drove to Starkville, Herkimer County wherethey buried what he believed to be his Walther 9 millimeter gun.

Defendant's girlfriend testified, pursuant to a plea deal, that on June 30, 2018, she went to theCity of Gloversville, Fulton County to the home of defendant's aunt and uncle for a cookout.During the course of the evening, defendant became aware that he was wanted by the police withregard to the victim's shooting, and he confessed to her that "he did it," specifically stating that"he shot [the victim] in the back of the head." Defendant then explained to her where the gun wasand asked her to contact his employer to "get rid of [the gun]." She further testified that she anddefendant's employer ultimately retrieved the 9 millimeter gun from Fox Road, she "cleaned itwith bleach and ammonia . . . [t]o get rid of fingerprints and evidence" and "[took]the clip out of the gun," at which point she "noticed that there was a bullet missing." [*3]She wrapped the gun in a towel and, on September 20, 2018, sheand defendant's employer buried the gun in Starkville.

Rivera, who testified for the People in accordance with a sentencing agreement reached after he was found guilty at his own trial, stated that heborrowed around $150 from the victim for marihuana and explained that he planned to repay themoney either directly to the victim or through defendant. As he had not repaid the money to thevictim, the victim threatened him on Facebook. On June 29, 2018, Rivera met defendant at afriend's house, and defendant suggested shooting the victim. After Cockfield arrived at thefriend's house, he, defendant and Rivera left and drove to a barn. Rivera and defendant enteredthe barn using defendant's key and defendant took a 9 millimeter gun and a .22 calibersemiautomatic gun, both of which were loaded with ammunition. Once outside the barn,defendant shot the 9 millimeter gun into the air about six times. Rivera and defendant returned tothe vehicle and the three of them drove to the victim's house; Cockfield parked the car andRivera and defendant exited the vehicle with their guns. He went to the victim's home andengaged him in a conversation on the porch. Defendant appeared behind the victim and, as thevictim was leaving the porch, defendant "shot him in the back of the head" with the 9 millimetergun. Rivera and defendant then ran to the vehicle and the three of them drove to Cockfield'sgirlfriend's house.

A State Police investigator testified that a search for the 9 millimeter gun was conductedseveral times, but the gun was not recovered. A state trooper testified that he was called to collectevidence from the barn and recovered seven bullet casings. A second investigator with the StatePolice testified that he performed mobile forensics on defendant's cell phone where he found textmessages related to transportation from "G-ville" and "Fox Road," Google searches dated June30, 2018 relative to whether the police could "ping" his phone, and Google searches dated July 1,2018 regarding the safety mechanisms of a "Walther P99" weapon. The last witness was anindividual incarcerated with defendant during December 2018, who testified that defendant toldhim about his and his codefendants' plan to "execute" the victim and admitted to shooting thevictim with a "Walther [9] millimeter P88."

As the intent to commit murder may be inferred from defendant's actions and surroundingcircumstances (see People v Rouse,34 NY3d 269, 274 [2019]; People vTaylor, 196 AD3d 851, 852 [2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1030 [2021]), we findlegally sufficient evidence to establish that defendant possessed the requisite intent to shoot andkill the victim (see People v Stover,178 AD3d 1138, 1143-1144 [2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1163 [2020]; People v Reese, 166 AD3d 1057,1060 [2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 953 [2019]). Cockfield and Rivera testified todefendant's plan to kill the victim, and a friend of Rivera confirmed the plan, specifically howdefendant[*4], Cockfield and Rivera would "shoot [the victim]up." Further, defendant confessed to committing the crime to both his girlfriend and anincarcerated individual. Turning to defendant's weight of the evidence claims, a different verdictwould not have been unreasonable given that many witnesses either testified against defendantpursuant to plea agreements or had substantial criminal records and the gun was never recovered.Nevertheless, as the testimony was not inherently unbelievable or incredible as a matter of lawand was fully explored during cross-examination, we accord due deference to the jury'scredibility determinations and find that the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence (see People v Delbrey, 179 AD3d1292, 1294-1295 [2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 969 [2020]; People v Nunes, 168 AD3d 1187,1189-1190 [2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 979 [2019]).

Defendant next asserts that he was prejudiced and deprived of his right to a fair trial by theintroduction of data from his cell phone. At the time of defendant's trial, CPL former 240.20 (1)(f) provided that the People have an ongoing obligation to, upon defendant's demand, disclose"[a]ny other property obtained from the defendant, or a co[ ]defendant to be triedjointly."[FN3] Additionally,CPL former 240.40 (1) (c) permits a trial court to order discovery "with respect to any otherproperty . . . [that] the [P]eople intend to introduce at trial," so long as suchdiscovery is "material to the preparation of [defendant's] defense" and "the request is reasonable."Where the People fail to timely comply with discovery demands, "the trial court has discretion toimpose a broad range of sanctions, including preclusion" (People v O'Brien, 140 AD3d 1325, 1327 [2016]; see CPLformer 240.70 [1]; People v Jenkins, 98 NY2d 280, 284 [2002]).

Following jury selection on the first day of trial, the People indicated that they wereattempting to download data from defendant's cell phone but had so far been unsuccessful indecoding the phone's password. Defendant noted that this information had previously beenrequested via discovery demands. On the second day of trial, the People advised County Courtand defendant that they obtained information from defendant's cell phone and intended tointroduce a screenshot, text messages and two Google searches. Defendant moved to precludethis information arguing that the State Police had the cell phone for nine months, defense counselhad prepared a theme, theory and cross-examination on the evidence that he had at the time, anddefendant would be prejudiced. Defendant further argued preclusion was the only viablecure.

We do not find that the People violated any discovery statute, as the People promptly turnedover the cell phone evidence to defendant as soon as it was received. Moreover, the Peopleprovided a plausible explanation for the late submission due to the arduous, slow and complexprocess of discovering the correct password and downloading data from [*5]defendant's cell phone. Here, County Court attempted to cure anypotential prejudice to defendant by only permitting the admission of a limited amount ofevidence stemming from the data—as opposed to hundreds of pages of text messages andtelephone calls generated from the forensic search—and offered a one-day continuance fordefendant to review the newly disclosed evidence to prepare an appropriate defense.Accordingly, County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to precludethe evidence (see People v Jenkins, 98 NY2d at 284; People v O'Brien, 140 AD3dat 1328). To the extent that defendant argues that the People's disclosure on the eve of trialimpacted his ability to secure a favorable plea bargain, we find this contention similarlyunavailing. The record reflects that the People initially advised defendant that his cell phone wassubject to a forensic search by the State Police, the data did not provide evidence of defendant'sinnocence, defendant was aware of the contents of the data on his cell phone and the Peopledisclosed the data immediately upon receiving it. As such, defendant was aware of the requisitediscoverable information at the time of plea negotiations and prior to trial (see CPL245.25 [2]; People v Pizarro, 185AD3d 1092, 1093 [2020]). Finally, defendant, who only sought preclusion, now asserts thathis constitutional due process rights were violated. However, this claim is unpreserved asdefendant raises it for the first time on appeal (see People v Kernahan, 117 AD3d 619, 620 [2014], lvdenied 23 NY3d 1064 [2014]).

Defendant lastly contends that his sentence is harsh and excessive as County Court failed toconsider his lack of prior violent criminal convictions in imposing the maximum sentence and,therefore, it was based solely in retribution. "It is well settled that a sentence that falls within thepermissible statutory ranges will not be disturbed unless it can be shown that the sentencing courtabused its discretion or that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting a modification in theinterest of justice" (People v Barzee,190 AD3d 1016, 1021 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lvdenied 36 NY3d 1094 [2021]; seePeople v Marshall, 162 AD3d 1110, 1115 [2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1150[2018]). "In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the trial court is required to weigh and considersocietal protection, rehabilitation and deterrence, as well as the circumstances that gave rise tothe conviction" (People v Johnson,197 AD3d 61, 72 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Pigford, 148 AD3d1299, 1302 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1085 [2017]). Here, County Court expresslyconsidered defendant's lengthy criminal history, the nature of the crime committed, theoverwhelming evidence at trial and the retributive and deterrence goals of the sentence.Accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion or extraordinary circumstances warranting [*6]a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice (see People v Copp, 194 AD3d1194, 1195 [2021]; People vGilmore, 177 AD3d 1029, 1029-1030 [2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 970[2020]).

Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Aarons and Colangelo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Cockfield was also charged withcriminal facilitation in the second degree.

Footnote 2:County Court did not specify ifthe sentences were to run consecutively or concurrently. Pursuant to Penal Law§ 70.25 (1) (a), if the court does not specify the manner in which the sentencesimposed are to run, the sentences shall run concurrently.

Footnote 3:In April 2019, New York passedsweeping criminal justice reform legislation that included discovery reform (see L 2019,ch 59, § 1, part LLL, § 2, [eff Jan. 1, 2020]). However, thenow-abrogated CPL article 240 remained in effect for cases commenced prior to the effectivedate of the new legislation (see L 2019, ch 59, § 1, part LLL,§ 2, [eff Jan. 1, 2020]).


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