| Fahs Rolston Paving Corp. v County of Chemung |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 06564 [43 AD3d 1192] |
| September 6, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Fahs Rolston Paving Corporation, Respondent-Appellant, v Countyof Chemung, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent. McFarland-Johnson,Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. |
—[*1] Levene, Gouldin & Thompson, L.L.P., Binghamton (Michael R. Wright of counsel), forthird-party defendant-appellant. Pope, Schrader & Sacco, L.L.P., Binghamton (Alan J. Pope of counsel), forrespondent-appellant.
Rose, J. Cross appeals from an order of the Supreme Court (Mulvey, J.), entered April 6,2006 in Chemung County, which, inter alia, partially denied defendant's motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint.[*2]
Pursuant to a written contract with defendant, plaintiffagreed to reconstruct taxiways and runways at the Elmira/Corning Regional Airport. Third-partydefendant, McFarland-Johnson, Inc. (hereinafter MFJ), an engineering firm, designed andsupervised the project. Before reconstruction of one of the work areas began, the parties executeda change order providing that, rather than excavate the existing pavement, plaintiff would mill itand then apply new pavement over the milled surface. When plaintiff's subcontractor haddifficulty milling the area, MFJ authorized an alternate method of milling, but the resulting basesurface was very uneven. Although plaintiff finished paving over the uneven milled surface bythe September 18, 2000 contract deadline, the work was formally rejected by MFJ on October 5,2000 because the pavement did not meet contract specifications for thickness, smoothness andgrading. Plaintiff then proposed remedial milling and paving to correct the defective work andcompleted the remedial work later in October.
After defendant rejected plaintiff's claims for additional compensation for what plaintiffconsidered to be extra work in the initial milling by its subcontractor and in the remedial millingand paving, plaintiff commenced this action alleging breach of contract, and defendant brought athird-party action against MFJ. As is relevant here, defendant moved for summary judgmentdismissing plaintiff's complaint based upon plaintiff's failure to comply with the constructioncontract's notice provisions, and MFJ joined in the motion. Supreme Court found that plaintiffhad no viable claim for the initial milling work, but did give proper notice and raise an issue offact as to its claim to payment for the remedial work. As a result, Supreme Court granted partialsummary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims for additional compensation except as to theremedial work, and otherwise denied the motions. Defendant and MFJ appeal, and plaintiffcross-appeals.
In order to claim additional compensation, section 50-16 of the contract required plaintiff to"notify [MFJ] in writing of [plaintiff's] intention to claim such additional compensation before[plaintiff] begins the work on which [it] bases the claim." Notice provisions such as this "requirethe contractor to promptly notice and document its claims [and] are therefore conditionsprecedent to suit or recovery" (A.H.A. Gen. Constr. v New York City Hous. Auth., 92NY2d 20, 30-31 [1998]; see KingsleyArms, Inc. v Sano Rubin Constr. Co., Inc., 16 AD3d 813, 814 [2005]; Green Is.Constr. Co. v County of Chenango, 212 AD2d 853, 855-856 [1995], lv denied 86NY2d 705 [1995]). Failure to strictly comply with such provisions generally constitutes waiverof a claim for additional compensation (see Kingsley Arms, Inc. v Sano Rubin Constr. Co.,Inc., supra at 814; F. Garofalo Elec. Co. v New York Univ., 270 AD2d 76, 80[2000], lv dismissed 95 NY2d 825 [2000]). Here, plaintiff relies upon a letter to MFJdated September 27, 2000 as notice of its intention to claim additional compensation for theinitial milling work. However, because this letter addressed only work previously performed andit was written after that work was completed, it plainly was insufficient to give the advancenotice required by the contract provision quoted above.
As for the remedial work, plaintiff also failed to comply with the contract's notice provisionfor additional compensation. In this regard, Supreme Court cited plaintiff's letter dated October 6,2000, which set forth the details of the remedial work that plaintiff proposed to perform to bringthe work into compliance with contract specifications. This letter stated that the work proposedwas understood to be corrective work and it disagreed that plaintiff was in default, but it did notexpress an intention to claim additional compensation for the proposed remedial work.[*3]
Even if we were to consider this letter to be a propernotice of intent, plaintiff also failed to comply with the contract's further requirement that"[w]hen the work on which the claim for additional compensation is based has been completed,[plaintiff] shall, within ten (10) calendar days, submit [its] written claim to [MFJ]." The recordclearly reflects that plaintiff did not submit its written claim for the remedial work until February14, 2001, long after the 10-day period had expired. While a letter dated November 8, 2000 tardilycommunicated plaintiff's intention to make a claim for additional compensation, it did notpurport to be the prescribed written claim itself and it lacked any monetary demand whatsoever.As a result, Supreme Court should have granted the motions of defendant and MFJ for dismissalof plaintiff's claims for additional compensation for any work performed in 2000. To the extentthat defendant and MFJ also contend that Supreme Court erred in stating that they did not raisean issue regarding compliance with the contract's claim requirements as to work performed byplaintiff in 2001, we find that the record supports Supreme Court's conclusion.
Finally, plaintiff's claim letters and appellate brief suggest that its claims include contractpayments improperly withheld by defendant for liquidated damages and engineering costs.Inasmuch as such a claim would not be subject to the contract's notice provisions for additionalcompensation, and the motions by defendant and MFJ did not address these items, we havetreated the motions as seeking dismissal only of plaintiff's claims for extra work. As a result, anyclaim for contractually agreed-upon amounts improperly withheld survives our granting of themotions.
Mercure, J.P., Carpinello, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified,on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied the motions of defendant andthird-party defendant for summary judgment dismissing the claims for additional compensationfor work performed in 2000; motions granted to that extent and said claims dismissed; and, as somodified, affirmed.