| Jeter v Seagull Assoc., Inc. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 06638 [43 AD3d 871] |
| September 11, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Andre Jeter, Respondent, v Seagull Associates, Inc.,Defendant, and Robert Latronica et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Goldblatt & Associates, P.C., Mohegan Lake, N.Y. (Spencer M. Fein of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Robert Latronica andRepad Management, Ltd., appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Kings County (Harkavy, J.), dated May 17, 2006, as denied those branches oftheir motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as assertedagainst them.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying thatbranch of the appellants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaintinsofar as asserted against the appellant Robert Latronica, and substituting therefor a provisiongranting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealedfrom, without costs or disbursements.
The defendant Robert Latronica demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as amatter of law by establishing, as conceded by the plaintiff, that he was an out-of-possessionlandlord (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Inopposition, the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence of either a specific statutory violation or asignificant structural or design defect. Therefore, the right of reentry provision in the subjectlease was an insufficient basis on which to hold Latronica liable, and the Supreme Court erred indenying that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaintinsofar as asserted against him (seeLowe-Barrett v City of New York, 28 AD3d 721, 722 [2006]; Ingargiola v Waheguru Mgt., 5 AD3d732, 733 [2004]; Eckers v Suede, 294 AD2d 533 [2002]).
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the motion which was for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Repad Management,Ltd. (hereinafter Repad). The equivocal deposition testimony of Repad's president wasinsufficient to establish either that Repad was not responsible for the allegedly malfunctioninggarage door that caused the plaintiff's injuries, or that Repad had no notice of the allegeddangerous condition (see e.g. Bachurski v Polish & Slavic Fed. Credit Union, 33 AD3d 739[2006]; see generally Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837[1986]; see also Lee v Bethel First Pentecostal Church of Am., 304 AD2d 798, 799[2003]). Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Krausman and McCarthy, JJ., concur.