| Katz v Masada II Car & Limo Serv., Inc. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 06641 [43 AD3d 876] |
| September 11, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Cecilia Katz et al., Respondents, v Masada II Car & LimoService, Inc., et al., Defendants, Juan Carlos Rosas et al., Respondents, and Wen Qin You et al.,Appellants. (Action No. 1.) Corrado Guzman, Respondent, v Juan Carlos Rosas, Respondent,Wen Qin You et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. (Action No. 2.) Juan Carlos Rosas,Respondent, et al., Plaintiff, v Ping Xing Xu et al., Appellants. (Action No.3.) |
—[*1] The Bongiorno Law Firm, PLLC, Mineola, N.Y. (Aaron C. Gross of counsel), for respondentJuan Carlos Rosas in action No. 3. Michael F. Troiano, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Louis R. Lombardi of counsel), for plaintiff-respondentCorrado Guzman in action No. 2.
In three related actions to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., Wen Qin You and PingXing Xu, defendants in action Nos. 1, 2, and 3, appeal from so much of an order of the SupremeCourt, Kings County (Schneier, J.), dated April 21, 2006, as denied their motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaints and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them inaction Nos. 1, 2, and 3.[*2]
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealedfrom, on the law, with one bill of costs, and the motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaints and all cross claims insofar as asserted against the defendants Wen Qin You and PingXing Xu in action Nos. 1, 2, and 3 is granted.
These actions arise out of a chain-reaction collision involving four vehicles. CorradoGuzman, a defendant in action No. 1, alleged that, immediately prior to the collision, he was ableto bring his vehicle (hereinafter the Guzman vehicle) to a complete stop behind an unidentifiedvehicle. Similarly, evidence of record supports the contention of the defendants Wen Qin Youand Ping Xing Xu (hereinafter the appellants) that the vehicle operated by Juan Carlos Rosas, adefendant in action Nos. 1 and 2, came to a complete stop behind the Guzman vehicle. In turn,the vehicle operated by the appellant Ping Xing Xu and owned by the appellant Wen Qin You(hereinafter the appellants' vehicle) had slowed and almost stopped behind the vehicle operatedby Rosas (hereinafter the Rosas vehicle) without coming into contact with it, when a fourthvehicle, operated by Oleg Chuyka, a defendant in action Nos. 1 and 2, struck the appellants'vehicle in the rear, propelling it into the rear of the Rosas vehicle, which in turn was propelledinto the rear of the Guzman vehicle. The plaintiffs, who were passengers in the vehicle operatedby Chuyka, commenced action No. 1 against the appellants, among others. Guzman commencedaction No. 2 against the appellants, among others. Rosas, along with another person, commencedaction No. 3 against the appellants. Action Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were ordered to be jointly tried. TheSupreme Court thereafter denied the appellants' motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaints and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them in action Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Wereverse.
"A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of liabilitywith respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebutthe inference of negligence to provide a non-negligent explanation for the collision" (Rainford v Sung S. Han, 18 AD3d638, 639 [2005]; see Niyazov vBradford, 13 AD3d 501 [2004]; Russ v Investech Sec., 6 AD3d 602 [2004]). Under thesecircumstances, where a stopping vehicle is rear-ended and propelled into the vehicle in front of it,such facts provide a non-negligent explanation sufficient to relieve the operator of the stoppingvehicle from liability (see Harris v Ryder, 292 AD2d 499 [2002]; Campanella vMoore, 266 AD2d 423 [1999]; Escobar v Rodriguez, 243 AD2d 676 [1997]). Thus,the appellants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the crossclaims insofar as asserted against them.
Furthermore, the appellants demonstrated that their conduct was not a proximate cause of therear-end collision between their vehicle and the vehicle behind it, in which the plaintiffs werepassengers (see Ratner v Petruso, 274 AD2d 566 [2000]; Centeno v Goldstein,261 AD2d 566 [1999]; Man Ng v Reid, 259 AD2d 601 [1999]). In opposition, no triableissue of fact was raised. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have awarded summaryjudgment in favor of the appellants dismissing the complaints and all cross claims insofar asasserted against them in action Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Mastro, J.P., Covello, McCarthy and Dickerson,JJ., concur.