| People v Patten |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 06725 [43 AD3d 964] |
| September 11, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Valdin Patten, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Sharon Y.Brodt, and Quynda L. Henry of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McGann,J.), rendered July 22, 2004, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree and reckless endangerment in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's conviction arose out of an incident in which he and another man shot at twoindividuals in a courtyard where bystanders were present. After a Molineux hearing(see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 [1901]), the People were permitted to introduce attrial the defendant's grand jury testimony that he had been convicted of criminal possession andsale of marijuana in the area in which the shooting occurred, that this area was the location wherehe sold drugs, and that no other individuals sold drugs in that location out of respect for him. Theintroduction of this evidence was permitted in connection with the People's theory that theshooting was motivated by the defendant's desire to protect his "turf."
Evidence of prior bad acts or crimes may be admitted if relevant to establish motive (seePeople v Molineux, supra at 293; People v Porter, 256 AD2d 363, 364 [1998];People v Collins, 220 AD2d 610, 611 [1995]). The evidence concerning the defendant'sdrug activities was properly admitted, since it was relevant to the alleged motive for his conduct.[*2]
The defendant's argument that the prosecutor improperlyused the evidence of the eyewitness's employment with the Transportation SecurityAdministration of the Federal Department of Homeland Security in order to bolster her testimonyis unpreserved for appellate review, as he made only a general objection to the challengedstatements (see People v Tonge, 93 NY2d 838, 839-840 [1999]; People v Dien,77 NY2d 885, 886 [1991]; People vBenson, 38 AD3d 563 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 863 [2007]; People v Rivera, 19 AD3d 620[2005]).
In any event, the defendant's contention that the prosecutor's summation statements deprivedhim of a fair trial is without merit. The challenged statements were either "rhetorical comments. . . a fair response to the defense counsel's summation" (People v Valdes,291 AD2d 513, 514 [2002]), "fair comment on the evidence adduced at trial" regarding thewitness' employment (People vMartinez, 17 AD3d 484, 485 [2005]; see People v Valdes, supra at 514;People v Ferrer, 245 AD2d 569, 570 [1997]), or harmless in light of the overwhelmingevidence of the defendant's guilt (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975];People v Williams, 38 AD3d925 [2007]).
Resolution of issues of credibility is primarily a matter to be determined by the jury, whichsaw and heard the witnesses, and its determination should be accorded great deference on appeal(see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633, 644-645 [2006]; People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied542 US 946 [2004]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15[5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (seePeople v Romero, supra; People v Gonzalez, 3 AD3d 579 [2004]; see also People vJohnson, 57 NY2d 969, 970 [1982]). Spolzino, J.P., Skelos, Lifson and Balkin, JJ., concur.