People v Hart
2007 NY Slip Op 06793 [43 AD3d 722]
September 20, 2007
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 7, 2007


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Zebadiah Hart, Appellant.

—[*1]Watters & Svetkey, LLP, New York (Jonathan Svetkey of counsel), for appellant.

Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Lawrence H. Cunningham of counsel) forrespondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Denis J. Boyle, J.), rendered May 20, 2002,convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in thefirst degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and sentencing him, as apersistent violent felony offender, to concurrent terms of 25 years to life, and order, same courtand Justice, entered December 14, 2006, which denied defendant's CPL 440.10 motion to vacatethe judgment and CPL 440.20 motion to set aside the sentence, unanimously affirmed.

The motion court properly denied those portions of defendant's CPL 440.10 motion assertingviolations of Brady v Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]). The People failed to disclose awiretapped conversation that occurred prior to the crime at issue, in which persons unconnectedto defendant plotted to kill the victim. However, this tape's exculpatory value was completelynegated by another taped conversation, occurring after the shooting, in which the plotterscelebrated the fact that someone else had shot the victim, causing life-threatening injuriesthat would hopefully render their conspiracy unnecessary. This conversation unequivocallyestablished that the plotters were not responsible for the shooting, and we reject defendant'ssuggestion that it was subject to multiple interpretations presenting a question that should havebeen resolved by the jury.

Furthermore, the People did not mislead the jury and defendant about the victim'sexpectation or receipt of a benefit for his testimony in the instant case. The victim also testifiedin a murder case, and the prosecutor assigned to that case wrote a letter to a federal judge beforewhom the victim was appearing for sentencing in a weapon case. The letter related, in detail, thevictim's assistance to the prosecution in the murder case, and only incidentally mentioned that thevictim had also testified, in his capacity as a complainant, in the instant attempted murder case.There was nothing in this letter that was inconsistent with the testimony given at the instant trialby the victim and the homicide prosecutor, or any other information disclosed to defendant andthe jury.

Were we to find that the People violated any disclosure obligations with respect to thewiretap evidence, the letter to the federal judge, or both, we would find that there was not even a[*2]reasonable possibility that the nondisclosures contributed tothe verdict (see People v Vilardi, 76 NY2d 67, 77 [1990]), particularly in light of theoverwhelming evidence of guilt. In addition to the victim's testimony, there was anotheridentifying eyewitness, as well as evidence that defendant made admissions to two other persons.

Defendant received effective assistance of counsel under the state and federal standards(see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; see also Strickland vWashington, 466 US 668 [1984]). Counsel's error in revealing to the jury defendant'sallegedly "violent" nickname was not particularly prejudicial under the circumstances of the case(cf. People v Santiago, 255 AD2d 63, 66 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 829[1999]). Defendant's remaining ineffective assistance arguments are without merit.

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in receiving evidence of defendant's drugdealing in order to provide necessary background information, to place the testimony regardingthe shooting in context, and to establish defendant's motive for shooting the victim (seePeople v Mena, 269 AD2d 147 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 800 [2000]). Theprobative value of this evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Defendant's constitutional challenge to the procedure under which he was adjudicated apersistent violent felony offender is without merit (see Almendarez-Torres v UnitedStates, 523 US 224 [1998]). His claim that his 1994 conviction should not have beencounted as a predicate violent felony is procedurally barred (see CPL 400.15 [7] [b]; [8])and, in any event, meritless.

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.

We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining claims. Concur—Lippman,P.J., Mazzarelli, Sullivan, Nardelli and Sweeny, JJ.


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