| Dinallo v DAL Elec. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 06824 [43 AD3d 981] |
| September 18, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Stephen Dinallo et al., Respondents, v DAL Electric et al.,Appellants, et al., Defendants. (And a Third-Party Action.) |
—[*1] Babchik & Young, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Jordan Sklar of counsel), for appellantThyssenKrupp Elevator. Longo & D'Apice, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Mark A. Longo and Steven J. Weissler of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant DAL Electricappeals, as limited by its notice of appeal and brief, from so much of an order of the SupremeCourt, Kings County (Kramer, J.), dated July 29, 2006, as denied those branches of its motionwhich were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-lawnegligence and violations of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against it, and thedefendant ThyssenKrupp Elevator separately appeals from so much of the same order as deniedthose branches of its motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of actionalleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law § 200 insofar as assertedagainst it.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs,and those branches of the respective motions of the defendants DAL Electric and ThyssenKruppElevator which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action allegingcommon-law negligence and violations of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted againsteach of them are granted.[*2]
In support of their respective motions, the appellantsmade a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez vProspect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 323 [1986]). The appellants established that the "jackassembly" that the injured plaintiff tripped over, which had been set up at the construction sitewhere he was working, and which he described as being three feet high, 30 inches wide, and 30inches deep, was an open and obvious condition that was not inherently dangerous (see Sun Ho Chung v Jeong Sook Joh,29 AD3d 677, 678 [2006]; Greenstein v Realife Land Improvement, Inc., 13 AD3d 338, 339[2004]). In response, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v ProspectHosp., supra at 323). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted those branches ofthe appellants' motions which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of actionalleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law § 200 insofar as assertedagainst each of them. Mastro, J.P., Covello, McCarthy and Dickerson, JJ., concur.