| People v Royster |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 06921 [43 AD3d 758] |
| September 25, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v JohnRoyster, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York (Hilary Hassler of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Leslie Crocker Snyder, J.), rendered March24, 1998, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first degree, murder in thesecond degree (two counts), attempted murder in the second degree (two counts), robbery in thefirst degree (three counts), assault in the first degree and attempted rape in the first degree, andsentencing him to an aggregate term of life without parole, unanimously affirmed.
Defendant was convicted of brutally attacking and robbing three women in the course of asingle week in 1996, causing the death of one of them. Defendant challenges the testimony ofvarious relatives of the three victims as having no purpose except to induce sympathy andprejudice. As a general rule, the People are not limited in the quantum of relevant evidence thatthey wish to introduce (People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241, 245 [1987]). Certaintestimony by family members of the victims as to events subsequent to the crimes, including thevictims' permanent physical and cognitive injuries, was properly admitted as relevant to trialissues and elements of the crimes charged (see People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88, 112-114 [2004]). However,"[T]estimony about victims' personal backgrounds that is immaterial to any issue at trial shouldbe excluded." (People v Harris, 98 NY2d 452, 490-491 [2002].) Evidence serving nopurpose except to establish the victims' good character, and the impact of defendant's crimes ontheir relatives, should have been excluded as irrelevant. Nevertheless, we find any evidentiaryerrors to be harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Defendant's sole defensewas extreme emotional disturbance (Penal Law § 125.27 [2] [a]; § 125.25 [1] [a]), adefense which did not even have a bearing on many of the crimes of which he was convicted,including felony murder. The evidence not only failed to satisfy defendant's burden ofestablishing this affirmative defense, but overwhelmingly refuted it.
The court's brief questioning of two detectives about police tactics in obtaining confessionswas permissible (see People v Moulton, 43 NY2d 944, 946 [1978]). Defendant'sadditional claim that the court made an inappropriate remark during testimony concerning anewspaper article is unpreserved because defendant requested no further relief after the courttook curative action, and his overall claim that the court's conduct was biased and deprived himof a fair trial is unpreserved because he only objected to a few specific matters. We decline toreview these unpreserved claims in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we[*2]would find no basis for reversal (see e.g. People v Martinez, 35 AD3d 156[2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 924 [2007]).
The court properly exercised its discretion in receiving evidence of defendant's attack on awoman in Westchester County, which was very similar to the charged crimes and occurredduring the same week. This evidence was part of a pattern of deliberate conduct that wasprobative of defendant's intent, and inconsistent with his extreme emotional disturbance defense(see generally People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233 [1987], supra). Although the courtreceived an excessive amount of evidence relating to the Westchester crime and the injuriessuffered by its victim, we find any error to be harmless, for the reasons set forth above in ourdiscussion of the victims' relatives' testimony.
Defendant's arguments concerning joinder and severance of the counts of the indictment arewithout merit (see CPL 200.20 [2] [b], [c]; [3]).
Defendant was not prejudiced by the court's order, made pursuant to the news media ShieldLaw (Civil Rights Law § 79-h), which quashed a subpoena. Defendant was seeking toestablish that one or more detectives expressed to a newspaper reporter their opinions as todefendant's mental condition. Such lay opinions were irrelevant, and, in any event, cumulative toother evidence including the testimony of defendant's psychiatric expert. Moreover, defendantwas able to place before the jury the fact that some detective may have described defendant as a"madman." Accordingly, we find no basis for reversal, and find it unnecessary to decide anyother issues relating to the operation of the Shield Law. Concur—Tom, J.P., Saxe,Friedman, Gonzalez and McGuire, JJ.