| Matter of Ronald O. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 07158 [43 AD3d 1351] |
| September 28, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Ronald O. and Others, Infants. Oneida CountyDepartment of Social Services, Respondent; Catherine L.B., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) Inthe Matter of Maryann B. and Others, Infants. Oneida County Department of Social Services,Respondent; Lawrence B., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.) |
—[*1] Andrew M. Dunn, Oneida, for respondent-appellant Catherine L.B. Chester W. Jaskolka, Utica, for petitioner-respondent. William L. Koslosky, Law Guardian, Utica, for Ronald O., Justin O., Beverly O., Jennifer O.,Maryann B., Steven B. and Franklin B.
Appeals from an order of the Family Court, Oneida County (Charles C. Merrell, J.), enteredSeptember 21, 2006 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order,inter alia, terminated respondents' parental rights.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimouslyaffirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Respondents appeal from an order that, inter alia, revoked a suspendedjudgment entered upon a finding of permanent neglect and terminated their parental rights. Wenote at the outset that the contention of respondent mother that the terms of the suspendedjudgment were so restrictive that it was impossible for her to comply with them relates towhether petitioner exercised "diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parentalrelationship" (Social Services Law § 384-b [7] [a]). That issue is not properly before usbecause it was conclusively determined in the prior proceedings to terminate respondents'parental rights (see Matter of Bryan W., 299 AD2d 929, 930 [2002], lv denied 99NY2d 506 [2003]). We note in any event that respondents admitted to the permanent neglect ofthe children and consented to the entry of the suspended judgment, and thus no appeal would lietherefrom because respondents were not aggrieved, based on their consent (see Matter ofCherilyn P., 192 AD2d 1084 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 652 [1993]; see also Matter of Moniea C., 9 AD3d888 [2004]).
With respect to the merits of respondents' contentions concerning revocation of thesuspended judgment, it is well established that, during the period of the suspended judgment, "'the parents must comply with [the] terms and conditions set forth in the judgment that aredesigned to ameliorate their [actions]' " (Matter of Kaleb U., 280 AD2d 710, 712 [2001]).If the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been noncompliancewith any of the terms of the suspended judgment, the court may revoke the suspended judgmentand terminate parental rights (see Matterof Gracie YY., 34 AD3d 1053, 1054 [2006]; Matter of Nikkias T., 32 AD3d 1220 [2006], lv denied 7NY3d 716 [2006]). Here, there is a sound and substantial basis in the record to support the court'sdetermination that respondents violated numerous terms of the suspended judgment and that it isin the children's best interests to terminate respondents' parental rights (see Gracie YY.,34 AD3d at 1054-1056; Nikkias T., 32 AD3d 1220 [2006]). Present—Hurlbutt,J.P., Martoche, Smith, Lunn and Peradotto, JJ.