| Matter of Terrance D. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 07431 [44 AD3d 656] |
| October 2, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Terrance D., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow andSuzanne K. Colt of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal isfrom an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Bogacz, J.), dated May 9,2006, which, inter alia, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated March 27, 2006, madeafter a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, wouldhave constituted the crimes of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree and petitlarceny, adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation under the supervisionof the Probation Department of the County of Queens for a period of 12 months. The appealbrings up for review the denial of that branch of the appellant's omnibus motion which was tosever his case from that of his corespondent and the fact-finding order dated March 27, 2006.
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant onprobation under the supervision of the Probation Department of the County of Queens for aperiod of 12 months is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements, as the period ofplacement has expired; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs ordisbursements.
The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant on probationunder the supervision of the Probation Department of the County of Queens for a period of 12months has been rendered academic, as the period of placement has expired (see Matter of [*2]Ricky A., 11 AD3d 532, 532-533 [2004]; Matter ofRosalis D., 305 AD2d 407 [2003]). However, because there may be collateral consequencesresulting from the adjudication of delinquency, that portion of the appeal which brings up forreview the fact-finding order is not academic (see Matter of Ricky A., 11 AD3d at 533;Matter of Ejiro A., 268 AD2d 428 [2000]).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, under the circumstances of this case, the Family Courtprovidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of his motion which was to sever hiscase from that of his corespondent (see Matter of Antoine L., 248 AD2d 472, 473 [1998];Matter of Michael J., 117 AD2d 602, 603 [1986]; Matter of Barry G., 4 Misc 3d 1015[A], 2004 NY Slip Op50885[U] [2004]; Family Ct Act § 311.3; cf. People v Cruz, 66 NY2d 61, 69[1985]; People v Bornholdt, 33 NY2d 75, 87 [1973]; CPL 200.40). The appellant'sargument that the Family Court was influenced by certain noncompetent evidence in arriving atits fact-finding determination is without merit. The Family Court, sitting as the trier of fact, ispresumed to have disregarded the irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, and considered only thecompetent evidence in reaching its verdict (cf. People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 406[1987]; People v Pettiford, 28 AD3d687, 687-688 [2006]; People v Palmer, 300 AD2d 412, 413 [2002]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matterof David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]),we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellantcommitted acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminalpossession of stolen property in the fifth degree and petit larceny. Moreover, upon the exercise ofour factual review power (cf. CPL 470.15 [5]), we find that the Family Court'sfact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Bryan C., 23 AD3d652 [2005]; Matter of James B., 262 AD2d 480, 481 [1999]). Schmidt, J.P., Rivera,Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.