| Financial Pac. Leasing, LLC v D & D Wire, Inc. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 07657 [44 AD3d 706] |
| October 9, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Financial Pacific Leasing, LLC, Respondent, v D & DWire, Inc., Doing Business as D & D Bakery, et al., Defendants, and Denise Robertson,Appellant. |
—[*1] Platzer Swergold Karlin Levine Goldberg & Jaslow, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Steven D. Karlinof counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of an equipment lease, the defendantDenise Robertson appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Weber, J.),dated March 23, 2006, which granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on thecomplaint insofar as asserted against her and denied her motion to compel discovery, and (2) anorder of the same court dated June 18, 2006, which denied her motion for leave to renew andreargue.
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order dated June 18, 2006, as denied that branchof the motion of the defendant Denise Robertson which was for leave to reargue is dismissed, asno appeal lies from an order denying reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated June 18, 2006, is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated March 23, 2006, is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.[*2]
The defendant D & D Wire, Inc., doing business as D &D Bakery (hereinafter D & D Bakery), executed a written lease, signed by the defendant JohnDedio and allegedly signed by the defendant Denise Robertson, as President of D & D Bakeryand individually. Robertson also allegedly signed a provision of the lease guaranteeing paymentof the corporate obligations. Pursuant to the terms of the lease, D & D Bakery leased equipmentfrom the plaintiff Financial Pacific Leasing and was to have made certain monthly leasepayments. The plaintiff thereafter brought the instant action against the defendants, claiming theyhad defaulted on their obligations under the subject lease. After the defendants failed to answerthe complaint, a default judgment was entered against them. The defendants moved to vacate thedefault judgment, and the parties stipulated to vacate the default solely to the extent that it wasentered against Robertson. The Supreme Court thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion forsummary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Robertson, and deniedRobertson's motion for leave to renew and reargue.
The Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Theplaintiff demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presentingthe subject lease, which bore Robertson's signatures (see Cochran Inv. Co., Inc. v Jackson, 38 AD3d 704 [2007]; North Fork Bank Corp. v Graphic FormsAssoc., Inc., 36 AD3d 676 [2007]). In opposition, Robertson failed to raise a triableissue of fact as to whether her signatures were forgeries (see Banco Popular N. Am. v Victory Taxi Mgt., 1 NY3d 381[2004]).
That branch of Robertson's motion which was for leave to renew failed to contain reasonablejustification for the failure to present the newly asserted facts on the prior motion. Therefore, thatbranch of the motion was properly denied (see CPLR 2221 [e]).
Robertson's remaining contention is without merit. Miller, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein andDickerson, JJ., concur.