| Roberson v Moveway Transfer & Stor. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 07831 [44 AD3d 839] |
| October 16, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Lloyd Roberson, Appellant, v Moveway Transfer andStorage, Respondent, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] DeCicco, Gibbons & McNamara, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Daniel J. McNamara and IoanaGheorghiu of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by hisbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated April25, 2006, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Moveway Transfer and Storagewhich was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff was placed in the temporary employ of the defendant Moveway Transfer andStorage (hereinafter Moveway) by his general employer, a temporary staffing service, which paidhim and maintained workers' compensation coverage for him. During the course of his temporaryemployment, the plaintiff was injured. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court grantedMoveway's motion, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against it, concluding that the plaintiff was Moveway's special employee. We affirm theorder insofar as appealed from.
Moveway unequivocally established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment bydemonstrating that on the day the plaintiff was injured "[Moveway] 'exclusively controlled anddirected the manner, details, and ultimate result of the plaintiff's work' " (Bailey v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 12AD3d 545, 546 [2004], quoting Causewell v Barnes & Noble Bookstores, 238 AD2d536 [1997]; Ugijanin v 2 W. 45 St. JointVenture, 43 AD3d 911 [2007]; see Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78NY2d 553, 558 [1991]; Niranjan v Airweld, Inc., 302 AD2d 572 [2003]). In [*2]opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Undersuch circumstances, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that the plaintiff was a specialemployee of Moveway as a matter of law and properly dismissed the complaint on the groundthat it is barred by Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29 (6) (see Thompsonv Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 NY2d at 558, 560). Rivera, J.P., Covello, Angiolillo andDickerson, JJ., concur.