| Matter of Eck v Eck |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 07947 [44 AD3d 1168] |
| October 25, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Leslie K. Eck, Appellant, v Kenneth R. Eck Jr.,Respondent. |
—[*1] Joseph A. Ermeti, Sidney, for respondent. Jehed Diamond, Law Guardian, Delhi.
Cardona, P.J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Delaware County (Burns, J.),entered June 12, 2006, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toFamily Ct Act article 8, for an order of protection.
Petitioner commenced this family offense proceeding seeking an order of protection againstrespondent, who is her former husband (see Family Ct Act § 812 [1] [c]). At theensuing hearing, petitioner testified that after she called respondent from her place ofemployment—the Delaware County Department of Social Services (hereinafterDSS)—on June 22, 2005 to inform him that she would be late picking up their son,respondent then called DSS's administrative office and, among other things, inquired whetherpetitioner was required to pay for personal calls. She also testified that respondent filed acomplaint about her with DSS, although she did not specify the substance of the complaint. Shefurther indicated that respondent told her supervisor—who was representing her on asupport violation petition against respondent—that "rumors and allegations. . . were going around" about petitioner. Another witness testified in reference torespondent's unauthorized investigation of another man who respondent suspected of having arelationship with petitioner, which investigation formed the partial basis of a disciplinaryproceeding that culminated in respondent's termination from his employment as a [*2]deputy sheriff (see Matter of Eck v County of Delaware, 36 AD3d 1180 [2007]).Following the hearing, Family Court dismissed the petition as unsupported by the evidence. Wenow affirm.
Petitioner argues that respondent's conduct constituted harassment in the second degree(see Penal Law § 240.26 [3]; Family Ct Act § 812 [1]). As relevant herein,"[a] person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy oralarm another person: . . . He or she engages in a course of conduct or repeatedlycommits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimatepurpose" (Penal Law § 240.26 [3]). Under the circumstances herein, and accordingdeference to Family Court's credibility determinations, we decline to disturb the court'sconclusion that the proven conduct does not support a finding of harassment in the second degree(compare Matter of Corey v Corey,40 AD3d 1253 [2007]; Matter of Machukas v Wagner, 246 AD2d 840, 842 [1998],lv denied 91 NY2d 813 [1998]; Matter of Christina LL., 233 AD2d 705 [1996],lv denied 89 NY2d 812 [1997]).
We have examined petitioner's remaining contentions and found them to be unpersuasive.
Carpinello, Mugglin, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.