| People v McCowan |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 08128 [45 AD3d 888] |
| November 1, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v AntonioMcCowan, Appellant. |
—[*1] P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Alison M. Thorne of counsel), forrespondent.
Carpinello, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Herrick, J.),rendered March 23, 2006, upon a verdict convicting defendant of two counts of the crime ofcriminal contempt in the first degree.
Defendant was indicted on two counts of criminal contempt in the first degree in violation ofPenal Law § 215.51 (b) (v) and (ii), stemming from allegations that he had contact with hisex-girlfriend (hereinafter the victim) in violation of an order of protection. Found guilty ascharged by a jury and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 2 to 4 years on each count, he nowappeals. We affirm.
Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence against him on both counts andalso alternatively argues that the verdict on each was against the weight of the evidence. Withrespect to count 1, defendant specifically argues that the victim's testimony, if believed,established only verbal harassment on his part and, therefore, there was insufficient proof that hesubjected her to "physical contact or attempt[ed] or threaten[ed]" physical contact to satisfy theelements of Penal Law § 215.51 (b) (v). With respect to count 2, defendant claims that thevictim's testimony, if believed, established but one single event and did not establish "repeatedlyfollowing [the victim] or engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts over a[*2]period of time" to satisfy the elements of Penal Law §215.51 (b) (ii). We turn to the evidence.
At trial, it was established that the romantic relationship between defendant and the victimended in March 2004. As a result of numerous instances of harassing and threatening behavior onhis part following their breakup, an order of protection was issued in January 2005 whichprohibited him from contacting or communicating with the victim. One afternoon in May 2005,the victim was driving her vehicle on a city street when she observed defendant's vehicletraveling in the opposite direction. Within seconds, defendant's vehicle was then directly behindher in traffic. As she idled behind two other cars at a red light, defendant jumped out of his carand began running toward her shouting obscenities. The victim was able to speed away.
Defendant, however, gave chase and began following her through the city. After travelingdown various streets during what she repeatedly described as a "chase," the victim becamefearful that she was going to either injure herself or a bystander in a car accident and shetherefore pulled over and got out of her car. At this time, defendant again got out of his car andcame at her. He was angry and shouting obscenities. He also threatened to kill her. As he nearedher, she sprayed him with pepper spray, jumped back into her car and immediately drove to anearby police station for assistance. The patrol officer on duty that afternoon testified that whenthe victim entered the station seeking help, she was very upset and distressed, sobbing andshaking uncontrollably.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the People, and according the People thebenefit of every reasonable inference, we conclude that it was legally sufficient to supportdefendant's guilt on both counts (see People v Thompson, 72 NY2d 410, 413 [1988];People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), including the challenged elements (seee.g. People v Eichele, 258 AD2d 592, 593 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 969 [1999];Matter of Ivan F., 233 AD2d 210, 210-211 [1996]; Matter of Luis A., 223 AD2d505, 506 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 803 [1996]; People v Perez, 189 Misc 2d516, 520 [2001]; People v Murray, 167 Misc 2d 857, 860-861 [1995]; People vPayton, 161 Misc 2d 170, 174 [1994]; cf. People v Demisse, 24 AD3d 118, 118-119 [2005], lvdenied 6 NY3d 833 [2006]). Moreover, viewing the evidence in a neutral light and givingdue deference to the jury's credibility determination, we find that the weight of the evidencesupports the jury's verdict (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Pettengill, 36 AD3d 1070, 1071 [2007], lv denied8 NY3d 948 [2007]; People vTomasky, 36 AD3d 1025, 1026 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 927 [2007]; seegenerally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Clearly, the jury found the victimcredible and believed her testimony about the events which transpired that afternoon.
Finally, we also reject defendant's contention that County Court erred in admitting evidenceof his prior bad acts of vandalism, harassment and threatening conduct toward the victim. Giventhe nature of the charges against him, the evidence was relevant to the issues of intent and motive(see People v Miles, 36 AD3d1021, 1023 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 988 [2007]; People v Gorham, 17 AD3d 858,860 [2005]) and further provided necessary background information (see People vGorham, 17 AD3d at 860-861; People v Demchenko, 259 AD2d 304 [1999], lvdenied 93 NY2d 923 [1999]). Moreover, County Court prudently restricted the number ofincidents that the People could introduce, appropriately weighed their probative worth againsttheir potential for prejudice and provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury (seePeople v Miles, 36 AD3d at 1023; People v Demchenko, 259 AD2d at 304).
Mercure, J.P., Peters, Spain and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.