| Matter of World Buddhist Ch'An Jing Ctr., Inc. v Schoeberl |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 08159 [45 AD3d 947] |
| November 1, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of World Buddhist Ch'An Jing Center, Inc., Appellant,v Curt J. Schoeberl, as Assessor of the Town of Shawangunk, et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Richard W. Hoyt, Walden, for respondents.
Spain, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lynch, J.), entered June 7, 2006 inUlster County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article78, to review a determination of respondents denying petitioner's applications for real propertytax exemptions.
Petitioner is a not-for-profit tax exempt religious corporation which owns a Buddhist Templein Queens County that reportedly has over 1,000 members. In 2000, petitioner acquired a102-acre parcel of land in the Town of Shawangunk, Ulster County, which contains buildingsand housing for its leader and approximately 25 monks, nuns and disciples. That parcel wasgranted an exemption from real property taxes pursuant to RPTL 420-a in 2001. Inmid-December 2004, petitioner was gifted three adjoining lots containing approximately 42 acresand it filed applications for exemptions from real property taxes under RPTL 420-a. RespondentCurt J. Schoeberl, the Assessor of the Town of Shawangunk, denied the applications premised,[*2]among other grounds, on the finding that petitioner "has notshown any plans or any good faith contemplation to utilize the additional 37 [sic] acresexclusively to carry out its religious purposes."
Petitioner filed grievances and, after a hearing, the Board of Assessment Review upheld theassessor's denial of exemptions for the three parcels. Petitioner commenced this specialproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 claiming that the denials were arbitrary and capriciousand should be annulled. On cross motions for summary judgment, Supreme Court dismissed thepetition concluding that petitioner had not demonstrated entitlement to the exemptions. Petitionernow appeals.
"[RPTL] 420-a establishes a mandatory tax exemption for real property of nonprofitcorporations" (Matter of Legion ofChrist v Town of Mount Pleasant, 1 NY3d 406, 411 [2004]). The property owner carriesthe burden of proof to demonstrate entitlement to a real property tax exemption (see Matter of Ksiaze Chylinski-PolubinskiTrust, Inc. v Board of Assessment Review for Town of De Kalb, 21 AD3d 620, 621[2005]; see also Matter of New York Botanical Garden v Assessors of Town ofWashington, 55 NY2d 328, 334 [1982]); tax exemption statutes are "strictly construed"against the property owner (Matter of Yeshivath Shearith Hapletah v Assessor of Town ofFallsburg, 79 NY2d 244, 249 [1992]), although they "should not be so narrowly interpretedas to defeat their settled purpose to encourage, foster and protect religious institutions as a publicbenefit" (Matter of Legion of Christ v Town of Mount Pleasant, 1 NY3d at 412).
Qualification for this exemption requires property owners to demonstrate, first, that theircorporation is "organized or conducted exclusively for religious [or other enumerated] purposes"(RPTL 420-a [1] [a]), which respondents have at all times conceded with regard to petitioner.The second requirement is proof that the property is being "used exclusively for carrying outthereupon one or more of such purposes" (RPTL 420-a [1] [a]). "The term 'exclusively,' in thiscontext, has been broadly defined to connote 'principal' or 'primary' such that purposes and usesmerely 'auxiliary or incidental to the main and exempt purpose and use will not defeat theexemption' " (Matter of Yeshivath Shearith Hapletah v Assessor of Town of Fallsburg,79 NY2d at 249, quoting Matter of Association of Bar of City of N.Y. v Lewisohn, 34NY2d 143, 153 [1974]). Where the property for which an exemption is sought is "not in actualuse" (RPTL 420-a [3]) for exempt purposes, such as where it is unimproved or, in its currentstate it lacks "suitable buildings or improvements" (RPTL 420-a [3]), the owner may qualify forthe exemption by demonstrating that "the construction of such buildings or improvements isin progress or is in good faith contemplated by such corporation" (RPTL 420-a[3] [a] [emphasis added]). Such a showing that improvements are "in good faith contemplated"requires the owner to set forth " 'concrete and definite plans for utilizing andadopting the property for exempt purposes within the reasonably foreseeable future' " (Matterof Legion of Christ v Town of Mount Pleasant, 1 NY3d at 411 [emphasis added], quotingCongregation K'hal Torath Chaim v Town of Ramapo, 72 AD2d 804, 805 [1979]).
Here, we agree with Supreme Court's conclusion that the limited record before respondentswas inadequate to establish that petitioners were then exclusively using the three lots for theirreligious purposes or incidental to such purposes, or that improvements were in progress [*3]or in good faith contemplated as evidenced by concrete and definiteplans to utilize the property for exempt purposes (see RPTL 420-a). Petitioner's initialapplication for all three parcels, later replaced by a separate application for each parcel, listed thebuildings on the parcels as "three residential dwellings and a former restaurant" and described theuses of the property as "proposed living quarters for participants in retreat, library, meditationcenter, office for staff; publication of religious tracts." However, the section in which plannedbuildings or other improvements should be detailed contained no additional information, the nextquestion indicated that no resolution authorizing improvements existed, and the question aboutwhen construction would begin was answered "undecided." With regard to the unimprovedportion of the land, petitioner indicated only that it was "to remain undisturbed consistent withuse of adjoining property . . . as a monastery and retreat house," with no detailsabout activities, access or improvements contemplated to so utilize the land.
In petitioner's subsequently filed individual applications for each parcel, which presumablyreplaced the initial application, the proposed uses indicated are: (lot 1.1) "to house Retreat andSutra House," described at the hearing as a house of worship; (lot 1.2) the use of the property islisted as "administrative office," and "possible housing for lecturers, disciples and other visitors"is denoted as a description given for the "buildings or other improvements" planned; and (lot 1.3)the use of the property is as a "house of worship [open to the public] and meditation, visitingspiritual teacher's quarters," and a later answer reflects a planned, unspecified "expansion ofhouse of worship and meditation." None of the three individual applications describes theexisting buildings or other improvements on the parcels, and none provides any information howor when those buildings will be renovated, expanded and utilized or what newbuildings/improvements are contemplated, indicating simply "undecided," no answer or"unknown" to the question of when construction would begin.
According to the minutes of the hearing, petitioner's counsel asserted, without specificity,that petitioner intended to "fix the [existing] buildings" and make use of them with "no definiteplans to build a larger building." Counsel also summarily stated that "the property is being usedas a retreat" which contemplated "large amounts of undeveloped land" which will be kept "at itsnatural state," although it is not clear if this was a reference to the original parcel or one/all ofthese parcels.[FN*]
Upon review of the foregoing, we find that respondents rationally denied petitioner'sapplications for real property tax exemptions. While it has been recognized that "property ownedby a religious corporation and used primarily as a spiritual retreat is entitled to the exemption"(Order Minor Conventuals v Lee, 64 AD2d 227, 230 [1978]; see Greater N.Y. Corp.of Seventh-Day Adventists v Town of Dover, 29 AD2d 861, 861-862 [1968], appealdismissed 23 NY2d 682[*4][1968]), petitioners did notdemonstrate to respondents that any or all of the three parcels was actually being exclusivelyused as a retreat or for other religious purposes so as to qualify under RPTL 420-a (1) (a) (seeMatter of Ksiaze Chylinski-Polubinski Trust, Inc. v Board of Assessment Review for Town ofDe Kalb, 21 AD3d at 621). Neither did petitioners put forth information which would havepermitted respondents to conclude that it had " 'concrete and definite plans' " to renovate and useexisting buildings for exempt purposes at any time in the " 'foreseeable future' " (Matter ofLegion of Christ v Town of Mount Pleasant, 1 NY3d at 411, quoting Congregation K'halTorath Chaim v Town of Ramapo, 72 AD2d at 805; cf. Matter of Legion of Christ, Inc. v Town of Mount Pleasant, 10 AD3d609, 610-611 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 707 [2005]). To be sure, petitioner's goodfaith future intentions are not in doubt. However, even giving due regard to petitioner's relativelyshort period of ownership prior to the submission of these applications, the submissions weredevoid of sufficient information or specifics to satisfy its burden of proof in seeking anexemption from all real property taxes (cf. Matter of Legion of Christ v Town of MountPleasant, 10 AD3d at 610; Order Minor Conventuals v Lee, 64 AD2d at 229-230).
To the extent that petitioner relies on evidentiary submissions tendered in this specialproceeding—and on those submitted on the parties' cross motions—but which werenot before respondents, this is impermissible as it violates a basic principle of CPLR article 78review that "[j]udicial review of administrative determinations is confined to the 'facts and recordadduced before the agency' " (Matter of Yarbough v Franco, 95 NY2d 342, 347 [2000],quoting Matter of Fanelli v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 90 AD2d 756,757 [1982], affd 58 NY2d 952 [1983]; see Matter of Featherstone v Franco, 95NY2d 550, 554 [2000]). Likewise, courts have no authority to review issues raised for the firsttime in special proceedings, because no issue of law is presented by an unpreserved issue (seeMatter of Khan v New York State Dept. of Health, 96 NY2d 879, 880 [2001]; Matter of Reed v Artus, 39 AD3d1056, 1057 [2007]). Thus, petitioner's new arguments and evidence in favor of theexemption, raised for the first time in this proceeding, may not be considered in evaluating thesoundness of respondents' determination. We are constrained to conclude that petitioner failed todemonstrate entitlement to the exemption and that respondents had a rational basis for denyingthe requests (see Matter of RegionalEconomic Community Action Program, Inc. v Bernaski, 40 AD3d 1000, 1001 [2007],lv granted 9 NY3d 809 [2007]; Matter of Ecclesia Word Ministries Intl., Inc. v Brophy, 21 AD3d 372, 373[2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 702 [2005]; Matter of Greentree Found. v Assessor of County of Nassau, 1 AD3d357, 358 [2003]). Accordingly, Supreme Court correctly dismissed the petition.
Crew III, J.P., Peters, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote *: In a letter to the assessoraccompanying the grievances, petitioner's counsel stated on this subject only that "since one ofthe primary uses of the property is a retreat, excessive improvement would be inappropriate."