| Matter of Shaquill Dywon M. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 08229 [44 AD3d 1047] |
| October 30, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Shaquill Dywon M., Also Known as Shaquill M.Lakeside Family and Children's Services, Inc., Respondent; Shaquana Nicole M., Also Known asShaquana M., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Shanyia M. Lakeside Family andChildren's Services, Inc., Respondent; Shaquana Nicole M., Also Known as Shaquana M.,Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.) |
—[*1] Jeremiah Quinlan, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. (Daniel Gartenstein of counsel), forrespondent. Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Amy Hausknecht of counsel), LawGuardian.
In two related proceedings pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate themother's parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect, the mother appeals from two ordersof fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Lim, J.) (one as to eachchild), both dated June 9, 2006, which, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, found thatshe had permanently neglected the subject children, terminated her parental rights, andtransferred custody [*2]and guardianship of the children to thepetitioner and the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York for the purpose ofadoption.
Ordered that the orders of fact-finding and disposition are reversed, on the facts and in theexercise of discretion, without costs or disbursements, and the matters are remitted to the FamilyCourt, Kings County, for a new dispositional hearing in accordance herewith.
"In section 384-b, the Legislature has placed primacy on the child remaining with the naturalparent, because it found both that the child's needs are usually best met in the natural home andthat parents are generally entitled to bring up their own children. The State's first obligation is tohelp the family stay together (Social Services Law § 384-b [1] [a] [ii], [iii])" (Matter ofJoyce T., 65 NY2d 39, 47 [1985]). In a proceeding to terminate parental rights based uponpermanent neglect, the threshold consideration is whether the presentment agency discharged itsstatutory obligation to exercise diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parentalrelationship (see Social Services Law § 384-b [7]; Matter of Jamie M., 63NY2d 388, 390 [1984]; Matter of Darlene L., 38 AD3d 552, 554-555 [2007]).
In the case at bar, the Family Court concluded that the termination of parental rights waswarranted because, although the presentment agency made diligent efforts to "assist andencourage a meaningful relationship" between the mother and her children, the mother failed toavail herself of such efforts or plan for the children's future (see Social Services Law§ 384-b [7] [c]; Matter of Ailayah Shawneque L., 40 AD3d 1097 [2007], lvdenied 9 NY3d 806 [2007]; Matter of Jennifer R., 29 AD3d 1005 [2006]). However,the testimony adduced at the fact-finding hearing reveals that the mother did make significantstrides toward strengthening her parent-child relationships during the subject time period (seeMatter of Moniea C., 9 AD3d 888 [2004]; Matter of Zachary CC., 301 AD2d 714[2003]).
For example, although there is concern that the mother was chronically late in arriving forvisitation, and that she missed some of her scheduled visits, nevertheless, the caseworkerconsidered the mother to be in compliance with the agency-formulated service plan for much ofthe designated period of neglect. Indeed, in September 2004, the caseworker congratulated themother on her completion of the service plan, which included visitation with the children, havingan income, and obtaining public assistance, as well as on her successful completion of a 22-weekparenting skills program, and for being generally cooperative with the caseworker. In addition,the mother provided proof of suitable housing for her and the children - a two-bedroomapartment in a building owned by her father.
Given these circumstances, we conclude that the termination of the mother's parental rightswas unwarranted (see Matter of Hannah D., 292 AD2d 867 [2002]; Matter of PrincessC., 279 AD2d 825 [2001]). Instead, the Family Court should have suspended judgment forone year, at which point it would have been in a better position to evaluate the mother's progressand to determine whether the children's best interests would be endangered by their return to thecustody of the natural mother (see Social Services Law § 384-b [1] [a] [ii];Matter of Society for Seamen's Children v Jennifer J., 208 AD2d 849 [1994]).
Since 18 months have elapsed since the dispositional hearing was held, the entry of asuspended judgment at this time would be imprudent (see Family Ct Act § 633).Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Family Court for a new dispositional hearing. At suchhearing, the court shall determine, among other things, whether the mother had met theappropriate conditions outlined in [*3]22 NYCRR 205.50, priorto the issuance of the two orders dated June 9, 2006, in other words, whether she had been able tobuild upon her apparent successful beginning in forging a healthy relationship with her childrenup to that time, or whether, in light of her present circumstances and those of the children, thebest interests of the children would require a termination of parental rights (see Matter ofHannah D., 292 AD2d 867 [2002]; Matter of Alexis E., 272 AD2d 935 [2000]).Miller, J.P., Ritter, Santucci and Dillon, JJ., concur.