| Matter of Alexander D. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 08280 [45 AD3d 264] |
| November 1, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Alexander D. and Another, Children Alleged to beNeglected. Victoria D. et al., Appellants; Administration for Children's Services,Respondent. |
—[*1] Anne Reiniger, New York City, for Robert B. appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Marta Ross of counsel),respondent. Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Claire V. Merkine of counsel),Law Guardian.
Order, Family Court, New York County (Sara P. Schechter, J.), entered on or about May 10,2007, which, after a fact-finding hearing, found that respondents medically and educationallyneglected the subject children, reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, the findings ofneglect vacated and the petitions dismissed.
Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Edward D., a10-year-old autistic child, was educationally neglected (see Family Ct Act § 1012[f] [i] [A]; § 1046 [b] [i]). Edward's unexcused absence from school "does not, ipso facto,establish either the parental misconduct or the harm or potential harm to the child necessary to afinding of [educational] neglect," where a preponderance of the evidence shows that respondentmother was actively engaged in "securing an appropriate and specific special educationplacement for the child, and there is no evidence that the child's education was adversely affectedby his absence from school" (Matter of Giancarlo P., 306 AD2d 28, 28-29 [2003]; cf.Matter of Aishia O., 284 AD2d 581, 583-584 [2001]). Nor does a preponderance of theevidence show that respondents' decision not to seek medical care after Edward fell down a flightof stairs was medical neglect (Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [A]), where it appears thatrespondents adequately attended to injuries that were minor (see Matter of Hofbauer, 47NY2d 648, 655 [1979]), and that such decision did not impair or threaten to impair Edward'shealth (cf. Matter of Faridah W., 180 AD2d 451 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 751[1992]). The oral report to the Administration for Children's Services (ACS) that precipitated thisproceeding and was called in by Edward's teacher, who did not see Edward after the accident butreported that he sustained bruises to his face and could not walk as a result of falling down aflight of stairs, and that respondents were refusing her advice to take Edward to a doctor, wasbased on [*2]her telephone conversation with respondent motherthe day after the fall, concerning which the latter credibly testified that she exaggerated Edward'sinjuries out of fear that ACS would take him away if she told the truth about his absence, i.e.,that it was due to another tantrum. The derivative findings of neglect should be vacated since theevidence of neglect as to Edward does not demonstrate "such an impaired level of parentaljudgment as to create a substantial risk of harm" to the other child in respondents' care(Matter of Vincent M., 193 AD2d 398, 404 [1993]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Saxe,Friedman and Gonzalez, JJ.
McGuire, J., concurs in a separate memorandum as follows: I agree that the findings thatrespondent parents medically and educationally neglected Edward and derivatively neglectedAlexander should be reversed, the findings vacated and the petitions dismissed. I would reverseon the law, however, as I am of the view that the evidence was legally insufficient to support theneglect findings.
As for the medical neglect finding, none of the witnesses who saw Edward after he fell downthe stairs provided testimony that would support a finding that he suffered an injury requiringmedical attention. To the contrary, the child protective specialist saw a black and blue mark and ascratch on Edward's face and no other evidence of any injury; he did not see Edward limping orobserve any cuts on his arms or legs. Similarly, respondent father testified that after the fall,Edward climbed back up the stairs "with no problem." He had only a scratch and did notcomplain of pain or limp either that day or in the following days. Respondent mother saw only a"pink, like a small ball" on Edward's face, which she treated with an antibacterial medication. Tobe sure, Family Court heard evidence during the Law Guardian's case from Edward's teacher, Ms.Perez, that the day after Edward fell respondent mother told her that Edward was absent fromschool because he had fallen, was "black and blue," limping and would not get up. Evenassuming that Family Court rationally could have rejected all the other evidence and concludedfrom the testimony of Ms. Perez that the fall was other than the kind of minor or "triflingaffliction which . . . everyday experience teaches us . . . may beovercome by simple household nursing" (Matter of Hofbauer, 47 NY2d 648, 655 [1979]),critical evidence nonetheless was lacking. That is, there was no evidence that "the failure toobtain medical assistance result[ed] in impairment of the child's condition or the imminentdanger thereof" (Matter of Faridah W., 180 AD2d 451, 452 [1992], lv denied 80NY2d 751 [1992]).
As for the educational neglect finding, the evidence established that 10-year-old Edward, achild with autism and mild retardation who lived in Manhattan and attended a school in Brooklynthat required him to take a lengthy bus trip, was regularly resistant to attending the school andmissed some 14 days of school at the beginning of the 2006-2007 school year. The evidencerelating to the difficulties respondents faced in their efforts to get Edward on the bus need not berecounted. Suffice it to say that the evidence was uncontradicted and the difficulties wereformidable. But putting that aside, and as the majority recognizes, the 14 days of missed school"does not, ipso facto, establish either the parental misconduct or the harm or potential harm to thechild necessary to a finding of [educational] neglect" (Matter of Giancarlo P., 306 AD2d28, 28 [2003]). I also agree with the majority that "a preponderance of the evidence shows thatrespondent mother was actively engaged in 'securing an appropriate and specific specialeducation placement for the child, and [*3]there is noevidence that the child's education was adversely affected by his absence from school' "(quoting id. at 28-29 [emphasis added]). The conclusion that there was no such evidenceon an essential element of an educational neglect finding is, of course, a conclusion of law.
Because the evidence was legally insufficient to support the findings of neglect of Edward byrespondents, it is legally insufficient to support the derivative findings of neglect as to Alexander.