| Matter of Sephaniah A. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 08853 [45 AD3d 386] |
| November 15, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Sephaniah A., a Child Alleged to be Abused.Jasmine Vanessa J., Appellant; Administration for Children's Services,Respondent. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Jane L. Gordon of counsel), forrespondent. Todd D. Kadish, Brooklyn, Law Guardian.
Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Sara P. Schechter, J.), entered on orabout March 20, 2006, which, upon a fact-finding determination that respondent motherderivatively abused the subject child, placed the child in the custody of the Commissioner ofSocial Services pending the completion of the next permanency hearing scheduled for June 12,2006, unanimously affirmed insofar as it brings up for review the fact-finding determination, andthe appeal otherwise dismissed as moot, without costs.
The challenge to the disposition is moot. The terms of the order have expired and the subjectchild has since been discharged to his father (see Matter of Clifford J., 238 AD2d 244[1997]). Were we to review the merits, we would find that a preponderance of the evidencesupported the determination that it was not in the best interests of the child to be returned torespondent.
The finding that respondent derivatively abused her son was supported by a preponderance ofthe evidence, including her failure to provide a reasonable explanation for injuries to her otherchildren which led to prior findings of neglect and abuse (Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [i];see Matter of Marino S., 100 NY2d 361, 374 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1059[2003]). The prior findings were based not only on burns found on one child, but from a numberof other unexplained injuries to that child and another. Respondent's general acceptance ofresponsibility is not dispositive, and it is noteworthy that at the time of the prior abuse,respondent did not merely assert a lack of knowledge, but affirmatively lied about thecircumstances of the injury, and failed to bring the child in for medical treatment after allegedlydiscovering the injuries. Under these circumstances, the court properly concluded that respondentcontinued to have defective judgment regarding her duties as a parent, and thereby posed a risk tothe subject child (see Matter of Umer K., 257 AD2d 195, 199 [1999]). Given the [*2]very serious nature of the injuries, it is of no moment that the priorabuse occurred more than two years earlier (Matter of Simone M., 298 AD2d 171[2002]), and we find no reason to disturb the court's finding, which was based largely on itscredibility determinations (see Matter ofNasir J., 35 AD3d 299 [2006]). Contrary to respondent's argument, Nicholson v Scoppetta (3 NY3d357 [2004]) does not require a different result (and cf. Matter of Summer Y.-T., 32 AD3d 212 [2006]).
We have considered respondent's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.Concur—Friedman, J.P., Sullivan, Buckley and Malone, JJ.