| Chestnut Hill Partners, LLC v Van Raalte |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 09100 [45 AD3d 434] |
| November 20, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Chestnut Hill Partners, LLC,Respondent-Appellant, v Peter Van Raalte et al., Respondents, and Corinthian CapitalGroup, LLC, et al., Appellants-Respondents. |
—[*1] Fogel & Wachs PC, New York City (Louis I. Fogel of counsel), forrespondent-appellant.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Helen E. Freedman, J.), entered March 16, 2007,which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and(7) to the extent of dismissing the complaint as against the individual defendants and denied themotion to the extent it sought dismissal of the complaint as against defendants Corinthian CapitalGroup, LLC (Corinthian) and Sabre Communications Holding, Inc. (Sabre), and denied plaintiff'scross motion to amend the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The complaint alleges that plaintiff entered into a finder's fee agreement with nonpartyLincolnshire Management, Inc. (Lincolnshire) for the acquisition of a target company, Sabre.Lincolnshire decided against acquiring the company and the individual defendants, who wereformer Lincolnshire employees, subsequently formed Corinthian, which later acquired Sabre.Under the circumstances, the court properly declined to dismiss the complaint as againstCorinthian and Sabre since plaintiff adequately pleaded claims for unjust enrichment and in quasicontract. The sequence of events, together with the fact that Corinthian voluntarily tendered acheck in the amount of $75,000 to plaintiff after it had closed on its purchase of Sabre, presentsufficient facts to infer that defendants benefitted from plaintiff's actions in bringing the deal tothe attention of Corinthian's principals (see Bradkin v Leverton, 26 NY2d 192, 197-198[1970]). Although there was no written contract between plaintiff and defendants, the facts asalleged in the complaint suggest that the statute of frauds may not be an available defense (id.at 199; see General Obligations Law § 5-701 [a] [10]). The decision to dismissthe complaint as against the individual defendants, however, was appropriate since plaintifffailed to allege facts implying individual abuse of the privilege of doing business in the corporateform resulting in harm (see Matter of Morris v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin.,82 NY2d 135, 141-142 [1993]).
The court also properly denied plaintiff's cross motion to amend the complaint. Althoughleave to amend pleadings under CPLR 3025 (b) is to be freely given, the speculative allegations[*2]set forth by plaintiff are insufficient to sustain a claim foreither tortious interference with contract (see Burrowes v Combs, 25 AD3d 370, 373 [2006], lvdenied 7 NY3d 704 [2006]; Washington Ave. Assoc. v Euclid Equip., 229 AD2d486, 487 [1996]), or misappropriation of confidential information (see Precision Concepts vBonsanti, 172 AD2d 737, 738 [1991]).
We have considered the parties' remaining contentions for affirmative relief and find themunavailing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Mazzarelli, Saxe, Nardelli and Kavanagh, JJ. [See2007 NY Slip Op 30293(U).]