| Arrufat v City of New York |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 09189 [45 AD3d 710] |
| November 20, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Luz Arrufat, Appellant, v City of New York et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Harry Steinberg and Steven B. Prystowsky of counsel), for respondent Temco Service Industries, Inc.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Queens County (Flug, J.), entered July 20, 2006, which granted thedefendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell down several stairs at a school owned by thedefendant City of New York and managed by the defendant Temco Service Industries, Inc.(hereinafter collectively the defendants). The plaintiff testified that she did not see any waterbefore the accident, but after she fell her pants were wet and she saw "dirty water" on the stairs.She subsequently commenced this action, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants were negligentin permitting the stairs to remain wet and slippery. The defendants moved for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court granted their motion, finding that the defendantsestablished that they did not have actual or constructive notice of the wet stairs, and that theplaintiff's evidence was purely speculative. There was no claim that the defendants created thecondition.
The deposition testimony submitted by the defendants indicating that the stairs were checkedregularly throughout the day and that no complaints had been received established, prima [*2]facie, that they did not have actual or constructive notice of thealleged hazard (see Grant v Radamar Meat, 294 AD2d 398 [2002]). In response, theplaintiff's evidence was not specific enough to raise any triable issues of fact as to whether thedefendants had or should have had notice of the particular wetness that allegedly caused theplaintiff to fall (see Stumacher v Waldbaum, Inc., 274 AD2d 572 [2000]). Rather, itmerely established a general awareness that the floors may have been wet (see Piacquadio vRecine Realty Corp., 84 NY2d 967, 969 [1994]; Gonzalez v Jenel Mgt. Corp., 11 AD3d 656 [2004]). Further, theplaintiff failed to show by specific factual references that the defendants had knowledge of aspecific recurring condition. The evidence proffered only referred to the condition of wet stairs invery general terms (see Green v City ofNew York, 34 AD3d 528 [2006]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint. Miller, J.P., Ritter, Santucci and Balkin, JJ., concur.