| Hageman v Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 09206 [45 AD3d 732] |
| November 20, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Daniel Hageman, Plaintiff, v Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant. B & B Electrical Contractors of L.I., Inc., et al.,Third-Party Defendants-Respondents. |
—[*1] Jeffrey S. Shein & Associates, Syosset, N.Y. (Charles R. Strugatz of counsel), for third-partydefendants-respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant third-party plaintiffappeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Cozzens, J.), dated April 7, 2006, as, in effect, denied its motion for leave to renew that branchof its prior cross motion which was for summary judgment on its third-party cause of action forcontractual indemnification against the third-party defendants, which had been determined in anorder dated June 16, 2005.
Ordered that the order dated April 7, 2006 is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action against Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (hereinafter HomeDepot), to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained while working at a Home Depotstore in Valley Stream, New York. The plaintiff asserted causes of action against Home Depotalleging negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6). Home Depotthereafter impleaded the plaintiff's employers B & G Electrical Contractors of L.I., Inc., and B &G Electrical Contractors of NY, Inc. (hereinafter together B & G), seeking, inter alia,contribution and common-[*2]law and contractualindemnification. At the time the plaintiff allegedly was injured, B & G and Home Depot wereparties to a maintenance service agreement (hereinafter the MSA) with respect to "maintenanceand/or cleaning" services to be performed by B & G at certain Home Depot stores in New York.
Home Depot cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on its cause of action forcontractual indemnification against B & G. In an order dated June 16, 2005, the Supreme Courtdenied that branch of Home Depot's cross motion. Home Depot moved for leave to renew thatbranch of its cross motion and, in an order dated April 7, 2006, the Supreme Court, in effect,denied the motion for leave to renew. We affirm.
The Supreme Court properly, in effect, denied Home Depot's motion for leave to renew, asthe new information submitted in connection with the motion, consisting of the terms of theMSA, did not warrant a different outcome with respect to that branch of Home Depot's priorcross motion which was for summary judgment on its third-party cause of action against B & Gfor contractual indemnification.
The MSA governed the work at issue. The MSA's indemnity clause provides forindemnification of Home Depot when injury arises "from the acts or omissions of [B & G],"except when claims arise from B & G's use of equipment or materials furnished by Home Depot.As Home Depot correctly argues, the parties' agreement that the MSA was to be "governed byand construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Georgia" is enforceable. Here, Georgiahas a reasonable relationship to the MSA both for this reason and because Home Depot'sprincipal place of business is in Atlanta (see Welsbach Elec. Corp. v MasTec N. Am., Inc., 23 AD3d 639,642 [2005], revd on other grounds 7NY3d 624 [2006]; Finucane v Interior Constr. Corp., 264 AD2d 618 [1999]).Moreover, B & G failed to sustain its heavy burden of proving that applicable Georgia law isoffensive to New York public policy (see Welsbach Elec. Corp. v MasTec N. Am., Inc.,7 NY3d 624, 632 [2006]; Finucane v Interior Constr. Corp., 264 AD2d at 620),which is articulated in General Obligations Law § 5-322.1. Enacted in 1975, this statuteassumed its present form when it was amended in 1981 to prohibit indemnification agreementswhich purport to indemnify a promisee for its own negligence, whether the promisee wasnegligent "in whole or in part" (see General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 [1]). Priorto 1981, General Obligations Law § 5-322.1, like the parallel Georgia statute (Ga CodeAnn § 13-8-2 [b]), barred indemnification under agreements purporting to indemnify apromisee only when the promisee was solely negligent. Thus, it cannot be said that GeneralObligations Law § 5-322.1 represents a "deep-rooted tradition of the common weal"(Finucane v Interior Constr. Corp., 264 AD2d at 621 [internal quotation marks omitted]).Moreover, although Georgia law on this issue is more permissive than New York law, it cannotbe said that it is "truly obnoxious" to the law of this State (Finucane v Interior Constr. Corp.,264 AD2d at 621).
Nonetheless, Home Depot failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, its entitlement tojudgment on its cause of action for contractual indemnification against B & G. As Home Depotitself interprets it, the indemnification provision of the MSA is inapplicable without a findingthat B & G was negligent. To the extent that the MSA's indemnification provision is enforceableunder Georgia law, there are issues of fact as to whether negligence, if any, by B & G caused orcontributed to the plaintiff's accident, thus precluding an award of summary judgment to HomeDepot on its cause of action for contractual indemnification. Crane, J.P., Lifson, Carni andBalkin, JJ., concur.