| Sabessar v Presto Sales & Serv., Inc. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 09384 [45 AD3d 829] |
| November 27, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Dale Sabessar, Appellant, v Presto Sales and Service, Inc.,et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant. |
—[*1] Baxter, Smith, Tassan & Shapiro, P.C., Jericho, N.Y. (Robert C. Baxter, Sim R. Shapiro, andAmy L. Schaefer of counsel), for respondent Presto Sales and Service, Inc. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Richard M. Fedrow and Patrick T. Steinbauer ofcounsel), for respondent Tuff Manufacturing, Inc. Ahmuty, Demers & McManus, Albertson, N.Y. (Brendan T. Fitzpatrick of counsel), fordefendant Giant Industries, Inc.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, inter alia, based upon strict productsliability, the plaintiff appeals (1), as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.), dated April 24, 2006, as granted those branches ofthe separate motions of the defendant Presto Sales and Service, Inc., and the defendant TuffManufacturing, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against each of them, and (2) from a judgment of the same court entered November 9,2006, which, upon the order, is in favor of the defendant Presto Sales and Service, Inc., andagainst him, in effect, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against that defendant.[*2]
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order asgranted that branch of the motion of the defendant Presto Sales and Service, Inc., which was forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it is dismissed; and it isfurther,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants Presto Sales and Service, Inc., andTuff Manufacturing, Inc., payable by the plaintiff.
The appeal from so much of the intermediate order as granted that branch of the motion ofthe defendant Presto Sales and Service, Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint insofar as asserted against it must be dismissed because the right of direct appealtherefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action in favor of that defendant (seeMatter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on appeal from that part of theorder are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment(see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
The plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment while using a "Tuff Super Skid"power washer (hereinafter the product) to steam clean a public sidewalk. The nozzle attached tothe power washing wand disconnected from the end of the wand, causing the wand to emit hotwater at high pressure on the plaintiff's right boot, burning his foot.
Alleging, inter alia, that the nozzle was defective and that this defect was the proximatecause of his injuries, the plaintiff commenced the instant action against the defendant TuffManufacturing, Inc. (hereinafter Tuff), which manufactured and assembled the power washer, thedefendant Presto Sales and Service, Inc. (hereinafter Presto), the wholesale distributor of thepower washer, and the defendant Giant Industries, Inc. (hereinafter Giant), a manufacturer anddistributor of high pressure pumps and accessories. The defendants separately moved, inter alia,for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. Byorder dated April 24, 2006, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motions. The courtentered a judgment on November 9, 2006, in favor of Presto and against the plaintiff, in effect,dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against that defendant. The plaintiff appeals from thejudgment and from so much of the order as granted those branches of the motions of Presto andTuff which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against each of thosedefendants.
On their respective motions, Presto and Tuff each made a prima facie showing of entitlementto judgment as a matter of law, as they demonstrated that the product was not defective when itleft their control (see Rosado v Proctor & Schwartz, 66 NY2d 21, 25 [1985]; Vogel v American Motorized Prods., Inc.,34 AD3d 457, 458 [2006]), and that there were other causes of the accident notattributable to them (see D'Elia v Martin A. Gleason, Inc., Funeral Homes, 250 AD2d803, 804 [1998]). In opposition, the plaintiff neither offered direct evidence that the product wasdefective at the time it was manufactured or sold, nor did he offer evidence excluding causes ofthe accident not attributable to Presto and Tuff (see Vogel v American Motorized Prods., Inc.,34 AD3d at 458; D'Elia v Martin A. Gleason, Inc., Funeral Homes, 250 AD2d at804). The plaintiff's expert's affidavit failed to raise a triable issue of fact, as it was, inter alia,impermissibly speculative and lacking in probative value (see Amatulli v Delhi Constr. Corp.,77 NY2d 525, 533 [1991]; Castro v Delta Intl. Mach. Corp., 309 AD2d 827, 828[2003]; Aghabi v Sebro, 256 AD2d 287, 288 [1998]). Accordingly, the [*3]Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to Presto andTuff (see Vogel v American Motorized Prods., Inc., 34 AD3d at 457; James v HarryWeinstein, Inc., 258 AD2d 562 [1999]; D'Elia v Martin A. Gleason, Inc., Funeral Homes,250 AD2d at 803).
In light of our determination, Presto's remaining contention is academic. Crane, J.P., Fisher,Carni and McCarthy, JJ., concur.