| Matter of Melissa DD. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 09470 [45 AD3d 1219] |
| November 29, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Melissa DD. and Others, Children Alleged to bePermanently Neglected. Broome County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Debra DD.et al., Appellants, et al., Respondent. |
—[*1] Abbie Goldbas, Utica, for Scott GG., appellant. Kuredin V. Eytina, Broome County Department of Social Services, Binghamton, forrespondent. F. Daniel Casella, Law Guardian, Binghamton.
Kane, J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Broome County (Connerton, J.),entered February 5, 2007, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toSocial Services Law § 384-b, to adjudicate the subject children to be permanentlyneglected, and terminated respondents' parental rights.
Respondent Debra DD. is the mother of seven children, including Melissa DD. (born in1998), Scott EE. (born in 1999), Danielle EE. (born in 2000) and Shannen EE. (born in 2002).Respondent Scott GG. is the father of Scott, Danielle and Shannen. In September 2003, afterinvestigating a suspicious bruise on Melissa, petitioner removed all four children living in the[*2]home with Debra DD. and Scott GG. (hereinafter collectivelyreferred to as respondents), and placed them in foster care. Family Court (Ray, J.) adjudicated thefour children to be neglected by respondents and continued their placement in foster care. In May2005, petitioner commenced this permanent neglect proceeding against respondents andMelissa's father. Following a lengthy hearing, Family Court (Connerton, J.) determined that allthree parents permanently neglected their respective children involved in this proceeding. Thecourt then rendered a disposition terminating respondents' parental rights to these children.Respondents appeal.
Family Court properly determined that respondents permanently neglected their children. Toobtain a termination of parental rights based upon permanent neglect, petitioner is required toprove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to maintain contact with or plan forthe future of his or her child for one year after the child came into petitioner's custodynotwithstanding petitioner's diligent efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship(see Social Services Law § 384-b [3] [g]; [4] [d]; [7]; Matter of GregoryB., 74 NY2d 77, 86 [1989]; Matter of Keith JJ., 295 AD2d 644, 647 [2002]). Thethreshold issue is whether petitioner made diligent efforts to encourage and nurture theparent-child relationship (see Matter of Gregory B., 74 NY2d at 86). The court'sdispositional order on the neglect matter required respondents to attend parenting classes,cooperate with petitioner and a parent aide, attend visits with the children, handle the children'smedical needs and attend all medical and educational appointments for the children. It alsorequired Debra DD. to attend codependency classes and comply with all follow-uprecommendations, and for Scott GG. to attend parenting classes and anger management anddomestic violence counseling.
Petitioner provided respondents with a parenting aide, arranged visits with the children everyother week, supplied a bus pass to alleviate respondents' transportation concerns and set up atelephone schedule for respondents to call the foster parents twice weekly to find out about thechildren's appointments and speak to the children. Petitioner offered Debra DD. referrals toparenting classes and codependency classes, and offered Scott GG. referrals for parenting classesand anger management and domestic violence counseling. Both respondents attended most visitswith the children, cleaned up their residence and completed parenting classes but, as of the filingof the instant petition, they only attended approximately half of the children's medicalappointments, missed several special education meetings and called the foster parents abouttwice per month at the regularly scheduled times, rather than twice per week. Debra GG. droppedout of codependency classes the first time and was attending them for the second time. Scott GG.was in an anger management program but had not completed it, and he had not attended domesticviolence counseling. Under the circumstances, Family Court correctly determined that petitionerexercised diligent efforts toward reuniting the family but, despite those efforts, respondents failedto adequately plan for their children's futures by resolving the problems which led to theirremoval (see Matter of Destiny CC.,40 AD3d 1167, 1168-1169 [2007]; Matter of Willard L., 23 AD3d 964, 965 [2005], lv denied 6NY3d 708 [2006]; Matter of Keith JJ., 295 AD2d at 648).
Family Court properly terminated respondents' parental rights. At the time of thedispositional hearing, although Debra DD. had completed her codependency classes, she did notfollow through with the recommended mental health treatment, even though she suggested it maybe necessary and wondered whether she may have an undiagnosed bipolar condition requiringmedication. Scott GG. completed anger management treatment, but still had not attended orarranged for domestic violence counseling, apparently feeling that it was not necessary. Yet [*3]respondents separated twice in the six months prior to thedispositional hearing, with police becoming involved due to domestic disturbances on twooccasions. Each respondent lived in four different places in the year prior to disposition. Basedupon the extended period of time that respondents had to address their parenting and relationshipdifficulties, especially considering that most of petitioner's recommendations had beencourt-ordered for respondents since a prior neglect adjudication in 2001, a suspended judgmentwould have been inappropriate. Providing respondents a grace period as a final chance to reunitewith their children would merely have delayed the chances at permanency for these special needschildren and would not have served their best interests (see Matter of Nahia M., 39 AD3d 918, 921 [2007]; Matter of Douglas H., 1 AD3d824, 826 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]).
Because Debra DD.'s parental rights were terminated in an adversarial proceeding, not as aresult of a voluntary surrender, Family Court had no authority to permit postterminationvisitation between her and the children (see Matter of Jessi W., 20 AD3d 620, 621 [2005]; Matter ofShane J. v Cortland County Dept. of Social Servs., 305 AD2d 751, 751 [2003];compare Social Services Law § 383-c [2], [5] [b] [ii]).
Mercure, J.P., Mugglin, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.