| People v Guerrier |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 09623 [46 AD3d 937] |
| December 6, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jean Guerrier,Appellant. |
—[*1] P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Alison M. Thorne of counsel), forrespondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), rendered October3, 2006 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of criminalpossession of marihuana in the first degree.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of criminal possession of marihuana in the firstdegree based upon evidence that police had found marihuana in his girlfriend's apartment whilehe was present, including more than 10 pounds of it in a duffle bag, and he then stated that all ofthe marihuana in the apartment was his. Although he now contends that the People failed toprove that he knowingly possessed the marihuana in the duffle bag, a necessary element of thecrime charged (see Penal Law § 221.30), he presented no evidence contradictingthe People's proof of his admission of ownership. Further, his argument that there was noshowing that he owned the bag or knew what it contained is unavailing because he made hisadmission after a police officer brought the open duffle bag into the room. In addition, anotherofficer testified that the closet where it was found contained men's clothing which defendant thenused to get dressed. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the People, the jurycould rationally conclude that he was aware of the contents of the duffle bag and they wereencompassed by his sweeping admission (see People v Richardson, 28 AD3d 1002, 1004 [2006], lvdenied 7 NY3d 817 [2006]; Peoplev Hines, 24 AD3d 964, 966-967 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 834 [2006]). Further,the verdict is amply supported by the weight of the evidence.[*2]
Defendant's contention that Supreme Court's deadlockcharge was coercive or denied him a fair trial is equally unavailing. It is well settled that a courtmay give a deadlock charge that encourages a verdict after the jurors have expressed that they areat an impasse, so long as the charge does not coerce them to reach a particular verdict (see People v Aponte, 2 NY3d 304,308 [2004]; People v Williams, 306 AD2d 691, 692-693 [2003], lv denied 1NY3d 582 [2003]). Here, when the jury deadlocked after little more than three hours ofdeliberation, Supreme Court properly gave the charge recommended in the Criminal JuryInstructions (see CJI2d[NY] Deliberation Issues—Deadlock Jury). That chargecautioned the jurors not to relinquish their convictions in order to reach a verdict. Following thecharge, the jurors continued deliberating for approximately three hours more over a period of twodays, during which time they requested further instruction on the law.
To the extent that defendant also argues that Supreme Court should have declared a mistrialbecause, during the overnight break in deliberations, one juror required medical attention andreturned to the courtroom on crutches the next day, the court reasonably determined that the jurorwas able to continue to serve and the record reveals no indication that the juror's presenceengendered a coercive environment.
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Crew III and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.