| Bauersfeld v Board of Educ. of Morrisville-Eaton Cent. SchoolDist. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 09658 [46 AD3d 1003] |
| December 6, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Nelson K. Bauersfeld, Appellant, v Board of Education of theMorrisville-Eaton Central School District, Respondent. |
—[*1] Law Firm of Frank W. Miller, East Syracuse (Frank W. Miller of counsel), forrespondent.
Cardona, P.J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McDermott, J.), entered October4, 2006 in Madison County, which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissingthe complaint.
In 1998, plaintiff was hired by defendant to serve as Superintendent of Schools. Over thecourse of the next six years, the 1998 employment contract between the parties was amendedseveral times, extending plaintiff's term as superintendent through June 30, 2006. The mostrecent version was executed in June 2003 and amended in July 2004. As relevant herein,paragraph 13 of that amendment entitled plaintiff and his spouse to lifetime health insurancecoverage "[u]pon his retirement from the District on or after June 30, 2005." Subsequently,plaintiff decided to take a position as superintendent of schools of a different school districtlocated in central New York at an increased yearly salary. By letter dated August 24, 2005,plaintiff notified defendant of his "intent to retire from the position of Superintendent ofSchools." In reply, defendant "accepted, with regret, [plaintiff's] resignation as Superintendent ofSchools." Defendant specifically informed plaintiff that it was its position that he was deemed tohave resigned, rather than retired, and consequently, plaintiff was not entitled to lifetime healthinsurance coverage pursuant to paragraph 13.[*2]
Plaintiff thereafter commenced this litigation allegingcauses of action for breach of contract, equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment, seeking, amongother things, over $450,000 in damages. Prior to joinder of issue, defendant moved pursuant toCPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. On the basis thatthere were no disputed issues of fact, Supreme Court converted defendant's motion to dismissinto a motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint, prompting this appeal.
Initially, we are unpersuaded that Supreme Court erred in dismissing plaintiff's breach ofcontract cause of action. "The written terms and conditions of a contract define the rights andobligations of the parties where the language employed is clear and unambiguous" (DierkesTransp. v Germantown Cent. School Dist., 295 AD2d 683, 684 [2002] [citations omitted]).Notably, the initial 1998 employment contract provided that the parties' employment agreementcould be terminated by, among other things, the "[r]etirement of the Superintendent" or"[r]esignation by the Superintendent," thus making it clear that the concepts of "resignation" and"retirement" were not considered to be synonymous. Paragraph 13 of the 2004 contractamendment stated that lifetime health insurance would be provided in the event of plaintiff'sretirement and made no reference to resignation.
It is undisputed that, in leaving his employment with defendant, plaintiff did not change hisstatus in any way by, for example, applying for retirement benefits or ceasing to engage in hisregular employment as a school superintendent. Instead, he took a similar position with a schooldistrict in a neighboring county at a higher salary. While it does not appear that plaintiff's actionsresemble a voluntary "retirement" from his "employment or career" as that term is commonlyunderstood (Black's Law Dictionary 1342 [8th ed 2004]), plaintiff, nevertheless, maintains thatparagraph 13 of the 2004 amendment actually refers to his retirement from a particularschool district, i.e., defendant. Given the language of this particular employment agreement, weare not persuaded by plaintiff's argument. "[A] court is duty-bound to adjudicate the parties'rights according to unambiguous provisions and give words and phrases employed their plainmeaning" (Estate of Hatch v NYCO Mins., 245 AD2d 746, 747 [1997]; see Hudock v Village of Endicott, 28AD3d 923, 924 [2006]). In that regard, it is notable that, in contrast to the concept ofretirement, plaintiff's departure from defendant's employment fits fully within the recognizeddefinition of "resignation" (Black's Law Dictionary 1336 [8th ed 2004]). Thus, since it is notpermissible for this Court to add the phrase "or resignation" to paragraph 13 of the parties'agreement, as amended (see generallyVermont Teddy Bear Co. v 538 Madison Realty Co., 1 NY3d 470, 475 [2004]),Supreme Court properly found in favor of defendant.
We have examined plaintiff's remaining contentions, including his claims that SupremeCourt erred in dismissing his equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment claims, and find them tobe lacking in merit.
Mercure, Crew III, Mugglin and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withoutcosts.