People v Williams
2007 NY Slip Op 09823 [46 AD3d 1024]
December 13, 2007
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 13, 2008


The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robbie E.Williams, Appellant.

[*1]Mathew B. Tully, Albany, for appellant.

Gerald F. Mollen, District Attorney, Binghamton (Stephen D. Ferri of counsel), forrespondent.

Spain, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Mathews, J.),rendered August 29, 2006, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of grand larceny inthe fourth degree.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of grand larceny in the fourth degreestemming from a scheme on August 13 and 14, 2005, in which he stole over $1,900 from variousATMs owned by Visions Federal Credit Union in Broome County. Pursuant to the scheme,Arturo Deas, an addict in need of money to support his habit, obtained identification listingdefendant's address as his home address, and he then opened a Visions account and an ATM cardand PIN number were mailed to him at defendant's address. Defendant, somewhat disguised,used Deas's ATM card at various ATMs to simulate a series of fraudulent deposits—intoDeas's Visions' account—of falsely identified money orders, and then made withdrawalsagainst those deposits. Defendant gave a small amount of the proceeds of his scheme to Deas.Upon his conviction, defendant was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to a prison term of 2to 4 years, and he now appeals.

Defendant's various challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, most of which werenot preserved for our review (see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 18-22 [1995]), do not[*2]withstand scrutiny (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d490, 495 [1987]). Defendant's identity as the perpetrator of these larcenous withdrawals wasestablished by Deas's testimony, as well as the photographs—taken from the videocameras positioned at the various ATMs and introduced at trial—which depict theperpetrator and corresponded to Visions' records of the transactions at those machines. Indeed,we do not find that the relatively minor timing discrepancies between the times stamped on thephotographs taken from the video camera and the times recorded on the official record of theATM transactions had any bearing on their probative or corroborative value. Further, Deas'sgirlfriend, who had known defendant for 15 years, identified defendant from several of thephotographs. Defendant did not dispute that the fraudulent transactions occurred and, viewing theevidence most favorably to the People (see People v Rossey, 89 NY2d 970, 971 [1997]),we find that there was legally sufficient evidence establishing his identity as the perpetrator (see People v Lopez, 9 AD3d 692,694 [2004]).

County Court correctly charged the jury that Deas was an accomplice as a matter of lawwhose testimony required corroboration (see CPL 60.22 [1]; see also People v Caban, 5 NY3d143, 154-155 [2005]; People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 143-144 [2001]). Thecorroborative testimony need not have established all of the elements of the crime but, rather,needed only to have tended to connect defendant to the crime in a manner sufficient to provide"some basis for the jury to conclude [that] the accomplice testimony is credible" (People vBesser, 96 NY2d at 143, citing People v Breland, 83 NY2d 286, 292-293 [1994];see People v McLean, 307 AD2d 586, 587-588 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 643[2003]). Here, the testimony of Deas's girlfriend, coupled with the ATM photographs and therecords of the ATM transactions, provided the requisite corroboration. Nor are we persuaded bydefendant's claim that inconsistencies or inaccuracies in Deas's testimony rendered it "sounworthy of belief as to be incredible as a matter of law" (People v Allen, 13 AD3d 892, 894 [2004], lv denied 4NY3d 883 [2005] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]).

Contrary to his assertions on appeal, the record reflects that defense counsel providedmeaningful representation, obtaining dismissal of most counts in the indictment prior to trial andvigorously attacking the key witnesses' testimony and credibility; counsel pursued a cogent albeitunsuccessful trial strategy of emphasizing shortcomings in the documentary and photographicevidence and implicating Deas as the perpetrator (see People v Caban, 5 NY3d at 152).While defendant is correct that Deas's testimony regarding the terms of his cooperationagreement was somewhat inconsistent, the jury was in fact clearly informed that Deas hadcooperated and that his testimony against defendant allowed him to avoid charges for hisadmitted role in these transactions and brought him a measure of leniency on another pendingcriminal matter. Counsel explored Deas's motive to testify falsely against defendant andimpeached his credibility at length, and defendant did not demonstrate that counsel's otherconduct of which he complains either lacked a strategic purpose or represented error so"egregious and prejudicial as to compromise [his] right to a fair trial" (id. at 152).Defendant's remaining claims are also rejected as unpersuasive.

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Peters and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.


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