| Torres v Mazzone Admin. Group, Inc. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 09836 [46 AD3d 1040] |
| December 13, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Norman Torres et al., Appellants, v Mazzone AdministrativeGroup, Inc., Respondent. |
—[*1] Carter, Conboy, Case, Blackmore, Maloney & Laird, P.C., Albany (James A. Resila ofcounsel), for respondent.
Carpinello, J.P. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Kramer, J.), entered November2, 2006 in Schenectady County which, among other things, granted defendant's cross motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint.
In March 2003, plaintiff Norman Torres (hereinafter plaintiff) was a maintenance worker at acatering facility. While in the course of performing work on existing sprinkler heads in theceiling of a ballroom, the ladder on which he was working collapsed causing him injuries.Plaintiff thereafter collected workers' compensation benefits from the corporate entity whichmanaged all facility employees and also (along with his wife, derivatively) pursued this LaborLaw action against the corporate entity which owns the property. Following plaintiffs' motion forsummary judgment on the issue of liability with respect to their Labor Law § 240 (1) claimand defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety,Supreme Court granted the cross motion prompting this appeal. We affirm.
The record reveals that the ladder on which plaintiff was working at the time of his accidentwas not the ladder supplied to him by his supervisor. Although plaintiff used the ladder providedto him to perform part of his work assignment without incident, he nevertheless chose to retrievea smaller wooden ladder because it was easier to maneuver around the table and chairs in theballroom. Under these circumstances, we find that plaintiff's conduct in opting to use a [*2]piece of equipment out of convenience, instead of the otherwiseadequate safety device provided to him by his supervisor, was the sole proximate cause of hisinjuries and thus the complaint was properly dismissed in its entirety (see Robinson v East Med. Ctr., LP, 6NY3d 550, 554 [2006]; Montgomery v Federal Express Corp., 4 NY3d 805, 806 [2005]; Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. ofN.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 290-292 [2003]; Albert v Williams Lubricants, Inc., 35 AD3d 1115, 1116-1117[2006]; cf. Miro v Plaza Constr.Corp., 38 AD3d 454 [2007], mod 9 NY3d 948 [2007]; Danton v Van Valkenburg, 13 AD3d931, 932 [2004]; Morin v MachnickBldrs., 4 AD3d 668, 670 [2004]).
As a final matter, we note that the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim was properly dismissedbecause plaintiffs failed to allege defendant's violation of a specific regulatory standard (seeRoss v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 505 [1993]; Fairchild v ServidoneConstr. Corp., 288 AD2d 665, 667 [2001]; Gavigan v Bunkoff Gen. Contrs., 247AD2d 750, 751 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 804 [1998]) and the Labor Law § 200claim was likewise properly dismissed because defendant did not have control over the mannerand methods of plaintiff's work (see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82NY2d 876, 877 [1993]).
Mugglin, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.