| L'Art de Jewel Ltd. v Hudson Sheraton Corp., LLC |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 10068 [46 AD3d 418] |
| December 20, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| L'Art de Jewel Ltd., Respondent-Appellant, v HudsonSheraton Corporation, LLC, Respondent-Appellant, and The Hyman Companies, Inc., DoingBusiness as Landau Costume Jewelry, Appellant-Respondent and Third-PartyPlaintiff-Appellant-Respondent. HST Lessee SNYT LLC, Third-PartyDefendant-Respondent-Appellant. |
—[*1] Goldberg Rimberg & Friedlander PLLC, New York City (Brad Coven of counsel), for L'Artde Jewel Ltd., respondent-appellant. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, New York City (Kenneth A. Philbin of counsel), for HudsonSheraton Corporation LLC and HST Lessee SNYT LLC, respondents-appellants.
Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Walter B. Tolub, J.), entered January 18 andMay 11, 2006, which, with respect to defendant Hyman, doing business as Landau, (1)determined it to be in breach of its license agreement with defendant Hudson Sheraton (hotel),(2) granted plaintiff partial summary judgment on its first cause of action against the hotel to theextent it determined Landau to be in breach of the restrictive covenant in plaintiff's lease, (3)granted the hotel's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing Landau's first (contributionand indemnification) and third (breach of license agreement) cross claims against the hotel, and(4) denied Landau's cross motion to dismiss the hotel's four cross claims against Landau forbreach of license, indemnification, contribution and attorney fees; with respect to defendanthotel, (A) denied its cross motion to dismiss plaintiff's first (breach of lease) and fifth (injunctiverelief) causes of action against it, (B) denied its cross motion to dismiss Landau's second crossclaim (legal expenses) against it, and (C) granted plaintiff summary judgment on its first cause ofaction (breach of the restrictive covenant); and with respect to plaintiff, (i) denied its motion forsummary judgment on its fifth cause of action (injunctive relief against Landau), (ii) granted thehotel's cross motion to dismiss the second (breach of lease), third (fraudulent misrepresentation)and fourth (interference with business) causes of action, and (iii) granted Landau's cross motionto dismiss the fifth cause of action (injunctive relief), unanimously modified, on the law,Landau's motion to dismiss the hotel's cross claims granted; the hotel's motion to dismiss the firstand fifth causes of action granted; and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Order, same court and Justice, entered December 7, 2006, insofar as it denied third-partydefendant HST's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, and granted plaintiff's motion toassert claims against HST, the hotel's successor in interest, unanimously affirmed; appeal from somuch of said order as denied Landau's motion for Yellowstone relief unanimouslydismissed as academic in view of the foregoing, all without costs.
In May 1999, the hotel entered into an agreement with Landau, which sells high qualitycostume jewelry in stores throughout the United States, allowing Landau to use space in the hotelto sell its jewelry. A significant portion of Landau's jewelry employs some degree of 14k gold inconjunction with synthetic stones. Section 1 (a) of the license limited Landau's sale to "highquality costume jewelry" and other high quality merchandise.
Approximately 10 months after the Landau license was executed, the hotel entered into alease with plaintiff permitting plaintiff to use its store space at the hotel for merchandise such as"jewelry, time pieces, gifts, health and beauty aids, cultured pearls, tobacco product and candyand for no other purpose." This agreement contained a restrictive covenant whereby the hotelpromised that as long as the plaintiff tenant was not in default under the lease, the hotel agreed tonot rent any other space in the hotel "for the sale and/or display of Karat Gold Jewelry, watchesand cultured pearls."
Plaintiff's principal was given a copy of the Landau license, and personally visited Landau'sstore in the hotel prior to signing its lease. During that visit plaintiff's principal was able to viewthe merchandise Landau had on display, including costume jewelry earrings that incorporated14k gold settings with synthetic stones.
Four years after entering into its lease with the hotel, plaintiff commenced this actioncomplaining that the merchandise on sale in Laudau's space violated the restrictive covenant inits lease. Plaintiff seeks damages from the hotel, as well as a permanent injunction against boththe hotel and Landau seeking to halt the sale of some of its jewelry.
Supreme Court erred by granting plaintiff summary judgment on its first cause of actionagainst the hotel on the grounds that Landau's operation and some of the jewelry it had for saleconstituted a breach of the restrictive covenant in plaintiff's lease. The restrictive covenant by itsterms is expressly prospective in that it provides that the hotel "will not rent" competing space,and as such constitutes an expression of future intention and a prohibition of future action. Thefact that it is conditioned upon plaintiff not defaulting in its obligations under the lease isevidence that the restrictive covenant only became effective during the lease term, and was notintended to apply to uses that predate plaintiff's lease agreement with the hotel.
Moreover, plaintiff took possession with full knowledge not only of the specific provisionscontained in Landau's license, but also with the type of merchandise that Landau had for sale inits operation in the hotel's lobby. As such plaintiff's claim against the hotel for damages and/orinjunctive relief must be dismissed (see Danish Maid v South Bay Ctr., 11 AD2d 768[1960]; see generally Tigges, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect ofLessor's Covenant [*2]against Use of His Other Property inCompetition with the Lessee-Covenantee, 97 ALR2d 4).
Additionally, the claim against Landau was properly dismissed because Landau's licensepredated plaintiff's lease, and as such, Landau cannot be held to have notice of or be subject to it(see Key Drug Co. v Luna Park Realty Assoc., 221 AD2d 598 [1995]).
Plaintiff's contention that its claim for injunctive relief against Landau should survivebecause Landau was on notice of the terms of the restrictive covenant in plaintiff's lease whenLandau commenced a "new" term of its license in July 2002 is belied by the record. Thisagreement between Landau and the hotel merely amended the existing May 1999 license byextending its term and relocating Landau's operation in a different part of the hotel's lobby. As toall other particulars, the May 1999 agreement continued in effect, and governed the rights of theparties in regard to Landau's operation in the hotel lobby.
In addition, the record warrants a finding that Landau was selling merchandise ascontemplated by its license with the hotel. Hyman, Landau's owner, testified that Landau had foryears been selling products that incorporated 14k gold settings in combination with syntheticstones, as well as earrings that had 14k posts for hypoallergenic purposes. Landau's experttestified that once a precious metal is combined with something synthetic like a synthetic stone, itis considered "costume jewelry," and Landau's merchandise was, by industry standards, highquality costume jewelry. He also testified that jewelry such as that being sold by Landau wascommonly classified at industry trade shows and by department stores as costume jewelry, andsold as such. Plaintiff's expert offered a differing opinion regarding the classification of costumeand fine jewelry, but while he was experienced as an importer and wholesaler of "fine jewelry,"he was not a retailer, and offered no testimony regarding the jewelry Landau was selling in itsstore in the hotel's lobby.
The hotel's cross claims against Landau should have been dismissed. Because the motioncourt correctly dismissed the fifth cause of action for injunctive relief against Landau, there is noclaim remaining that would prevent Landau from exercising and fulfilling its rights under theMay 1999 license. Once the claim against Landau for breach of license is dismissed, the otherclaims, for indemnification, contribution and attorneys' fees, must fall.
The motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, and plaintiff's motion to amend, wereproperly granted insofar as HST is the hotel's successor in interest. In light of this disposition, theYellowstone application is academic.
We have considered the parties' other arguments for affirmative relief and find them withoutmerit. Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Gonzalez, Sweeny and Kavanagh, JJ.