| Granera v 32nd St. 99¢ Corp. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 10101 [46 AD3d 750] |
| December 18, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Edith Granera, Appellant, v 32nd Street 99� Corp.,Respondent. |
—[*1] Hammill, O'Brien, Croutier, Dempsey & Pender, P.C., Syosset, N.Y. (Anton Piotroski ofcounsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Kings County (Schneier, J.), dated October 13, 2006, which granted thedefendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries which she claims weresustained as a result of a slip-and-fall accident in an aisle of the defendant's store. The plaintiffalleged that the fall was precipitated by a puddle of soapy water on the aisle floor. The SupremeCourt granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Wereverse.
A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burdenof making a prima facie showing that it neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual orconstructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it (see Miguel v SJS Assoc., LLC, 40AD3d 942 [2007]; Rodriguez vWhite Plains Pub. Schools, 35 AD3d 704, 705 [2006]; Perlongo v Park City 3 & 4 Apts., Inc.,31 AD3d 409 [2006]). Here, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement tojudgment as a matter of law (see e.g.Hagan v P.C. Richards & Sons, Inc., 28 AD3d 422 [2006]). However, in oppositionthereto, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact with [*2]respectto whether the defendant created the dangerous condition by its cleaning and mopping procedure.
The plaintiff testified at her examination before trial that it was neither snowing nor rainingon the day of the accident, and that immediately after she fell, she observed an employee with amop and a bucket standing a couple of aisles away. There was also testimony from the storemanager that after the accident occurred, he too observed "two clean-up individuals" with theirbuckets and mops "by the cashier." Under the circumstances of this case, such evidence wassufficient to demonstrate an issue of fact as to whether the defendant may have created thecondition which proximately caused the accident (see Healy v ARP Cable, 299 AD2d152, 154 [2002]; DiFusco v Wal-Mart Discount Cities, 255 AD2d 937 [1998]; cf. Collins v Laro Serv. Sys. of N.Y.,Inc., 36 AD3d 746 [2007]).
Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint shouldhave been denied (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]).Santucci, J.P., Goldstein, Dillon and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.