Schroeder v Connelly
2007 NY Slip Op 10325 [46 AD3d 1439]
December 21, 2007
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 13, 2008


Thomas Schroeder et al., Respondents, v William Connelly et al.,Appellants.

—[*1]Law Offices of Epstein & Donnelly, North Syracuse (Michael G. Donnelly of counsel),for defendants-appellants.

Parker & Waichman, LLP, Great Neck (Brett A. Zekowski of counsel), forplaintiffs-respondents.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Edward D. Carni, J.),entered September 25, 2006. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendants' crossmotion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimouslyaffirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages for injuries sustained byThomas Schroeder (plaintiff) when the vehicle in which he was a passenger was rear-ended by avehicle operated by defendant Susan Connelly and owned by defendant William Connelly.Plaintiffs moved to strike defendants' third affirmative defense, in which defendants asserted thatthe action is barred by a release signed by plaintiff, and defendants cross-moved for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint based, inter alia, on that release. Supreme Court denied themotion and cross motion, and defendants contend on appeal that the court should have grantedtheir cross motion. We affirm.

In support of their motion, plaintiffs contended that the release signed by plaintiff was theresult of mutual mistake and therefore should be set aside. It is well established, however, that"[a] release should not be set aside unless plaintiff demonstrates duress, illegality, fraud, ormutual mistake" (Budnack v Crymes, 288 AD2d 827 [2001]; see Rocanova vEquitable Life Assur. Socy. of U.S., 83 NY2d 603, 616 [1994]; Gibli v Kadosh, 279AD2d 35, 38 [2000]) and that, "[i]n the instance of mutual mistake, the burden of persuasion ison the one who would set the release aside" (Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d 556, 563[1969]). "[I]n resolving claims of mutual mistake as to injury at the time of release, there hasbeen delineated a sharp distinction between injuries unknown to the parties and mistake as to theconsequence of a known injury. A mistaken belief as to the nonexistence of presently existinginjury is a prerequisite to avoidance of a release" (id. at 564). " 'Even where a releasor hasknowledge of the causative trauma, it has been held that there must be actual knowledge of theinjury' " (O'Neal v Life Science Labs.,Inc., 23 AD3d 1024, 1024-1025 [2005]).[*2]

Here, plaintiffs submitted evidence establishing that, atthe time plaintiff signed the release, he had been diagnosed only with sprains and strains and that,a few months later, he was diagnosed with a herniated disk and a rotator cuff tear, both of whichrequired surgery. Defendants, on the other hand, submitted the affidavit of their insuranceadjuster wherein she asserted that she was aware that plaintiff was suffering from somethingmore serious than a sprain or strain at the time the release was signed by plaintiff. We thusconclude that there is an issue of fact whether the release was the result of mutual mistake andthat the court therefore properly denied defendants' cross motion (cf. id. at 1025; seegenerally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).Present—Scudder, P.J., Gorski, Lunn, Fahey and Green, JJ.


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