| Sneddon v Koeppel Nissan, Inc. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 10524 [46 AD3d 869] |
| December 26, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Eric McIver Sneddon et al., Appellants, v Koeppel Nissan,Inc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Abrams, Gorelick, Friedman & Jacobson, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Bryan Goldstein ofcounsel), for respondent Koeppel Nissan, Inc. Thomas M. Bona, P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (James C. Miller of counsel), for respondentHabberstad Nissan, Inc. London Fischer LLP, New York, N.Y. (Matthew K. Finkelstein of counsel), for respondentNissan North America.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the infant plaintiff Eric McIverSneddon and the plaintiff Jayne Sneddon appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of anorder of the Supreme Court, Queens County (O'Donoghue, J.), dated June 12, 2006, as grantedthose branches of the separate motions of the defendants Nissan North America, Koeppel Nissan,Inc., and Habberstad Nissan, Inc., which were to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted againsteach of them by the infant plaintiff Eric McIver Sneddon on the ground of collateral estoppel.
Ordered that the appeal by the plaintiff Jayne Sneddon is dismissed, as she is not aggrievedby the portion of the order appealed from (see CPLR 5511); and it is further,
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from by the infant plaintiff Eric McIverSneddon on the law, and those branches of the separate motions of the defendants Nissan NorthAmerica, Koeppel Nissan, Inc., and Habberstad Nissan Inc., which were to dismiss the complaintinsofar as asserted against each of them by the infant plaintiff Eric McIver Sneddon on theground of collateral estoppel are denied; and it is further,[*2]
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the infantplaintiff payable by the respondents.
In June 1996 the infant plaintiff Eric McIver Sneddon was struck by a Nissan Pathfindervehicle when the vehicle suddenly accelerated while the driver was attempting to park. In aprevious action (hereinafter Sneddon 1) asserted solely against the driver and the owner of thevehicle for damages caused by the driver's negligence, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs'motion for summary judgment on the issue of the liability of the driver and owner. In decidingthat motion, the Supreme Court added that the driver's negligence was the "sole proximate cause"of the infant's plaintiff's injuries. The parties thereafter entered into a settlement agreement andan infant's compromise order was entered.
Two years later, the plaintiffs commenced the instant action against, among others, therespondents, who were not parties to the original action, asserting, inter alia, causes of actionalleging products liability and negligent repair. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint onthe ground that the issue of liability was determined in Sneddon 1, and the plaintiffs werecollaterally estopped from asserting that anything other than the driver's negligence caused theinfant's injuries.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits a party from relitigating an issue which waspreviously decided in a proceeding in which that party had a full and fair opportunity to fullylitigate the identical issue (see Jeffreys vGriffin, 1 NY3d 34, 39 [2003]; Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455[1985]). Preclusive effect may be given to an issue only when it is clear that the issue wasnecessarily decided in the prior proceeding (see Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 NY3d at 39).
Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court and the respondents' contention, thedoctrine of collateral estoppel is not a bar here. The only necessary determination in Sneddon 1was that the driver's negligence was a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff's injury, towhich the infant plaintiff did not contribute. By contrast, here, the issues raised are whether thealleged manufacturing defect or negligent repair of the vehicle were also proximate causes of theinfant plaintiff's injuries. The Sneddon 1 issues and the issues raised in the current action arediscrete and not identical. Thus, the plaintiffs are not barred from litigating the current issues (see Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 NY3d 34,39 [2003]; Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455 [1985]; Lombardi vGiannattasio, 192 AD2d 512, 513 [1993]). Crane, J.P., Goldstein, Florio and Dillon, JJ.,concur.